{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4","title":"State Platform Capitalism","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9781009619714","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4","id":"d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4","uuid":"d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4","title":"State Platform Capitalism","normalized_title":"stateplatformcapitalism","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9781009619714","isbns":["9781009619714","9781009446594","9781009446587"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":98,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/State%20Platform%20Capitalism","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4/search"},"page":{"printed_page":48,"pdf_page":53,"physical_index":53,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"084e1ffbb5c8296cd24fd15215c6ab0dba748f695b321d59caec535473ceb4fd"},"chapter":"Cambridge Elements","content":"6 Cybersecurity\n\nEarly in November 1971, Captain John McNish of the USS Halibut stared at a grainy image on a control room screen. The Halibut, a vintage nuclearpowered submarine from the early 1950s, was anchored at a depth of 120 metres in the Sea of Okhostk off the Kamchatka peninsula – deep inside Soviet territorial waters. McNish watched anxiously via video link as saturation divers, wearing liquid-heated suits, left the submarine’s decompression chamber and entered the murky depths. Moving slowly, they used airguns to blow accumulated silt offa bump in the ocean floor, revealing a thick telephone cable that connected the peninsula’s naval base to the Russian mainland, and carried unencrypted conversations between senior commanders. After the dust settled, they spent hours fixing a large battery-powered recording device to the cable, before gathering a sample ofthe voices it transmitted. The Halibut would return to Okhostk every six months for the next nine years, gathering and replacing tapes and devices, and returning a treasure trove of strategic intelligence to the Pentagon’s analysts in Washington DC (Sontag et al., 1998).\n\nOperation Ivy Bells was one ofthe Cold War’s most elaborate and significant espionage missions. US analysts credit the intelligence it provided with laying the basis for the 1979 SALT II nuclear arms agreement. Today, US agencies continue to tap undersea cables. In 2005, it was revealed that the USS Jimmy Carter had cable splicing capabilities which were used to intercept undersea fibre optic networks (Weichert, 2024) – cables which extend over 1 million kilometres and are estimated to carry 99% of all global internet traffic. The US Navy’s ongoing efforts to purchase a replacement Virginia-class nuclear attack submarine for the Carter, modified for spy usage and including cable tapping and cutting capabilities, signal their ongoing significance (Honrada, 2023).\n\nHowever, such efforts form only a small part of the National Security Agency’s (NSA) arsenal. Far more common is the collection of data from fibreoptic cables’ landing stations (as captured in Trevor Paglen’s photography).<sup>6</sup> Typically conducted with the consent of cables’ operators, devices are placed onto the transition points where undersea cables connect with terrestrial infrastructure networks, refracting the light travelling through them and beaming the mirrored data to US intelligence operatives (Khazan, 2013). Edward Snowden’s 2013 leaks revealed the mass data gathering provided by so-called ‘upstream’ collection programs FAIRVIEW, STORMBREW, BLARNEY, and OAKSTAR, which developed these techniques (see Figure 2). The NSA was able to undertake such expansive surveillance initiatives thanks to the ‘extreme willingness’ ofits corporate partners to assist with data collection (Angwin et al., 2015). And unlike wiretaps like Ivy Bells, today’s security services can gather far more than simply voice communications.\n\n48\n\nReinventing Capitalism\n\n<sup>6</sup> See Sohn (2015). For detail on the vital role of British intelligence services in the NSA’s global data gathering operations, see Mainwaring (2020).","previous_page":47,"next_page":49}