{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4","title":"State Platform Capitalism","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9781009619714","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4","id":"d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4","uuid":"d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4","title":"State Platform Capitalism","normalized_title":"stateplatformcapitalism","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9781009619714","isbns":["9781009619714","9781009446594","9781009446587"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":98,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/State%20Platform%20Capitalism","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4/search"},"page":{"printed_page":52,"pdf_page":57,"physical_index":57,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"adc5e6241ea8dc8380920e0013cfe660fd30f34ab3a61af810b4a37c8b33dccd"},"chapter":"Cambridge Elements","content":"China, meanwhile, has sought to develop a complex assortment of internet management tools and mechanisms to assert control over domestic internet content. These practices enlist platforms as partners and further their commercial ambitions. President Xi formed the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) in 2014 to integrate cyber-security policy with the development of the digital economy. The CAC formalized state control over the domestic internet with the National Cyber Security Law of 2016, which formally grants the state substantial legal authority over online content, cross border flows, and jurisdiction over foreign cyber operations inside China (Hong and Goodnight, 2020).\n\nChina has moved to restrict usage of US technologies across swathes of the Chinese technology stack by developing greater domestic capabilities. This represents an urgent task given that Creemers (2020, 116) cites Chinese research claiming that in 2014, ‘82 percent of servers, 73.9 percent of storage equipment, 95.6 percent of operating systems and 91.7 percent of databases’ employed in China were provided by foreign, principally US-based, firms (e.g., Microsoft, Cisco, Apple). In an attempt to weaken the position ofAmerican technology firms in China, China’s SASAC (which oversees its state enterprises) issued Directive 79 in September 2022, directing state firms to remove all foreign software and hardware from their enterprises by 2027 (Lin, 2024). Further, China’s stringent data localization requirements have meant significant stores of data have been shifted from foreign servers to Chinese joint-ventures – such as Apple’s Chinese user data, formerly hosted in the United States but subsequently moved to Guizhou-Yunshang’s servers, a firm backed by the Guizhou provincial government (Kokas, 2018). China’s data localization regime appears to have given Chinese platforms an edge when operating in similarly restrictive environments overseas, which pose a greater challenge to US models predicated upon widespread data export (O’Grady, 2024).\n\nA more expansive conception of data and cybersecurity driven by concern about data flows is fuelling concern amongst US policymakers about Chinese platforms’ commercial expansion. While the case of Huawei is well known (Liu, 2021), more recently controversies have surrounded digital platforms such as Bytedance’s TikTok, the fast-fashion platform Shein, and the e-commerce app Temu – all of which have penetrated global markets to significant degrees. Despite finding no evidence of ‘backdoors’ being designed into such digital technologies by the Chinese state for surveillance purposes (Gray, 2021), policymakers have aimed to curtail the influence of such platforms by raising security concerns. For example, US lawmakers cast aspersions on TikTok’s parent company ByteDance for potentially sharing US user data with the Chinese state (Bartz and Dang, 2021). And the chair of the UK Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee, Tom Tugendhat (2021), warned of Shein’s recommendation algorithms as a ‘sinister cross between surveillance and capitalism . . . [deploying] a data collection network to rival many ofthe world’s intelligence agencies’. Temu’s advertisements during the 2024 Superbowl drew condemnation from US lawmakers, with Republican Senator Tom Cotton posting on X that Temu ‘must allow the Communist Party unfettered access to its data’.<sup>7</sup> Such hyperbolic logic is intelligible if‘cybersecurity’ is interpreted to mean control by the United States and its allies over critical stack infrastructures into the future, which growing Chinese commercial prowess is beginning to erode (Tang, 2020).\n\n52\n\nReinventing Capitalism","previous_page":51,"next_page":53}