{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4","title":"State Platform Capitalism","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9781009619714","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4","id":"d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4","uuid":"d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4","title":"State Platform Capitalism","normalized_title":"stateplatformcapitalism","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9781009619714","isbns":["9781009619714","9781009446594","9781009446587"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":98,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/State%20Platform%20Capitalism","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/d06b946b-6924-4f30-afbd-92f915edbae4/search"},"page":{"printed_page":53,"pdf_page":58,"physical_index":58,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"7cf9baaeeec2f91a5a802c7d2022624e69e255e4046852b7fe906b28d863b302"},"chapter":"Cambridge Elements","content":"The United States had long favoured a laissez-faire approach to data flows, supporting stringent restrictions on data localization and privacy requirements, to the benefit of its world-spanning platform firms. But Katherine Tai, then US Trade Representative (USTR), formally reversed the US position on digital trade at the WTO in September 2023 in favour of a more restrictive approach to data flows. Domestically, this was understood as a pitch battle between the ‘antimonopolist’ Tai and the National Security Council, which favoured upholding free digital trade (and the predominant position of US platform giants) at all costs. However, the shift in the USTR position signals that the United States is responding to the growing success ofChinese platforms’ internationalization by adapting its own data regime and understanding of cyber-security in ways enable states to raise protections against Chinese data exports. Domestically, the Biden administration passed Executive Order 13873 and the Protecting Americans’ Data from Foreign Adversaries Act of 2024, both of which set up a framework for limiting bulk data flows to a list of ‘adversary’ countries (including China). Trump’s second administration has upheld these restrictions. Internationally, as Ruiz and Savona (2023) argue, creating ‘regulatory space within digital trade could mean precisely setting up parameters on how data flows may be protected from undue interference’ – assisting the United States in rebuffing Chinese platforms’ advances (particularly in the field of AI) through stricter regulations on data exports. For both the United States and China, then, the goals of advancing platform prowess and state power are converging on an expanded notion of cybersecurity.\n\nState Platform Capitalism\n\n53\n\nhttps://x.com/SenTomCotton/status/1757055483217604697?lang=en.","previous_page":52,"next_page":54}