{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"dadb939e-7360-4727-a1fb-be08c2f7a611","title":"Critical Theory of Communication New Readings of Lukács, Adorno, Marcuse, Honneth and Habermas in the Age of the Internet","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9781911534044","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"dadb939e-7360-4727-a1fb-be08c2f7a611","id":"dadb939e-7360-4727-a1fb-be08c2f7a611","uuid":"dadb939e-7360-4727-a1fb-be08c2f7a611","title":"Critical Theory of Communication New Readings of Lukács, Adorno, Marcuse, Honneth and Habermas in the Age of the Internet","normalized_title":"criticaltheoryofcommunicationnewreadingsoflukácsadornomarcusehonnethandhabermasintheageoftheinternet","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9781911534044","isbns":["9781911534044","9781911534051","9781911534068","9781911534075"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":236,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/dadb939e-7360-4727-a1fb-be08c2f7a611","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/Critical%20Theory%20of%20Communication%20New%20Readings%20of%20Luk%C3%A1cs%2C%20Adorno%2C%20Marcuse%2C%20Honneth%20and%20Habermas%20in%20the%20Age%20of%20the%20Internet","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/dadb939e-7360-4727-a1fb-be08c2f7a611/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/dadb939e-7360-4727-a1fb-be08c2f7a611/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/dadb939e-7360-4727-a1fb-be08c2f7a611","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/dadb939e-7360-4727-a1fb-be08c2f7a611/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/dadb939e-7360-4727-a1fb-be08c2f7a611/search"},"page":{"printed_page":156,"pdf_page":160,"physical_index":160,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"e3191512347f1204497a7d7602ae14c1d73fc2bd402eb40e75928481ea186a24"},"chapter":"C H R I S T I A N F U C H S CRITICAL THEORY OF COMMUNICATION","content":"For Rahel Jaeggi (2005, 14), alienation means a form of appropriation of society, an ethical perspective of how to change the world, whereas Kant’s concept of autonomy neglects social institutions and their pathologies as well as the harms they cause. She argues that the critique of alienation is connected to the question of how we want to live (Jaeggi 2005, 14). The alienation concept has an objective and a subjective meaning (41): the loss of power and the loss of sense/meaning. Alienation is for her not a lack of relations, but a relationship to something, albeit ‘a relationship of unrelatedness’3 (19, 43, translation from German). For Jaeggi, there are two main problems of the concept of alienation: a) the objective definition of what is good independent from human self-definitions, b) the notion of reconciliation with an original essence. The notion of alienation as estrangement from an essence was according to Jaeggi first formulated by Rousseau and then also by Hegel, Marx, Lukács, Heidegger, and the Frankfurt School. The problem would be that a prescription of what is good for humans would be an objectivistic-perfectionistic paternalism (47).\n\nJaeggi wants to have a qualified subjective notion of alienation that gives up metaphysics and the notions of essence and reconciliation. Alienation for her has to do with the conditions of successful relations to oneself and the world (51) and Ernst Tugendhat’s question: can we control ourselves in what we want? (52). Such an approach would take human wants seriously, but also have the possibility to question them (58–59). Alienation means for Jaeggi obstructions of the realisation of what one wants (53). It obstructs the positive freedom to determine oneself. ‘Alienation is prevented appropriation of the world and the self”4 (Jaeggi 2005, 183). It means that one cannot relate to and appropriate one’s own preconditions (185). Self-alienation is a lack of power of and presence in what one does, lack of identification with one’s own actions and wants or lacking participation in one’s own life.\n\nJaeggi understands appropriation as something active that changes the thing that is appropriated (56–57) and creates the self (184). One’s wishes, interests and actions take place in the world. Therefore self-appropriation would also be appropriation of the world (Jaeggi 2005, 184). Appropriation is a process with open results (185). The self is relational (197), so self-appropriation is a change of social relations so that one is empowered in social relations. Selfappropriation means that we can articulate ourselves in the world and in our social relations (198) and that one becomes and is present in one’s own actions, controls one’s life, appropriates social roles, can identify with one’s wants, and is involved in the world (187). The self that is appropriated does not already exist as essence, but is created in the process of self-appropriation (Jaeggi 2005, 184) and invented in this process (self-invention).\n\n5.2.3. Limits of Revised Concepts of Alienation\n\nRosa and Jaeggi share the critique of Hegel’s, Marx’s and Lukács’ notions of alienation. They therefore cannot qualify objective social conditions as true or false independent of human consciousness, which makes it dificult to make moral judgements in situations when protest is forestalled and the slaves love their masters. Rosa and Jaeggi argue for de-Hegelianising and de-Lukácianising the notion of alienation, which takes out the potential of universalism and makes alienation a cultural contextual, relative, purely immanent and nonuniversal concept that lacks transcendental and universal potentials. Honneth (2007a) argues that Foucault, under the influence of Nietzsche, brought about a shift in social philosophy that displays ‘a distaste for universalism’ (39), but whose problem is that ‘normative criteria remain on the whole […] obscure and […] overshadowed by epistemological perspectivism’ (40). The task for a critical theory would be to ground principles that allow ‘to assess certain developments in social life as pathologies in a context-transcending way’ (42) so that ‘institutions and practices can be taken as ‘pathological’ for the very reason that, upon unbiased reflection, they contradict the conditions of the good life’ (60).\n\n156\n\nCritical Theory of Communication","previous_page":155,"next_page":157}