{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7","title":"差异与重复","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787567591363","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7","id":"de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7","uuid":"de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7","title":"差异与重复","normalized_title":"差异与重复","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787567591363","isbns":["9787567591363"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":538,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/%E5%B7%AE%E5%BC%82%E4%B8%8E%E9%87%8D%E5%A4%8D","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7/search"},"page":{"printed_page":148,"pdf_page":167,"physical_index":167,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"0f82307b5aab20666c0707f603b0f5b036905f76946cc0962bd4e2894814117d"},"chapter":"第二章 自为之重复","content":"148\n\n差异与重复\n\n①【译按】就此而言，德勒兹在《尼采与哲学》(周颖、刘玉宇译，北京：社会科学文献出版社，2001)中对永恒回归的阐释是以他对柏格森纯粹过去理论的阐释为基础的。只是，德勒兹在阐释“作为宇宙学说和物理学说”的永恒回归时不但构想了过去与当前的共存，而且还构想了未来与当前的共存。就此而言，在德勒兹所理解的永恒回归中,我们看到的是作为不动的综合的先验时间结构(structure synthétique transcendan-tale du temps)的“(永远是过去的)过去一(永远是当前的)当前—(永远是未来的)未来”(当然，这种时间构想显然也受到了康德“先验感性论”中的“时空概念(转下页注)","previous_page":147,"next_page":149}