{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7","title":"差异与重复","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787567591363","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7","id":"de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7","uuid":"de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7","title":"差异与重复","normalized_title":"差异与重复","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787567591363","isbns":["9787567591363"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":538,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/%E5%B7%AE%E5%BC%82%E4%B8%8E%E9%87%8D%E5%A4%8D","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7/search"},"page":{"printed_page":239,"pdf_page":258,"physical_index":258,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"1dc57283fc185d564020903a017333f3cdb28be209eb6c6cfba9cc88a1e5f9b9"},"chapter":"第三章 思想的形象","content":"第三章 思想的形象\n\n239\n\n①【译按】参康德，《判断力批判》，前揭，页137，脚注①。\n\n② 参 Maurice Merleau-Ponty,《知觉现象学》(Phénoménologie de la perception, N. R.F.),页276以下、页366以下。—关于康德的通感[常识]理论，尤参《判断力批判》(Critique du jugement)，§18—22和§40(【译按】中译参康德，《判断力批判》，前揭，页73—77和页135—138)。以及《纯粹理性批判》中的原则声明：“最高的哲学在人类本性的根本目的方面,除了人类本性已赋予通感[常识](Sens commun)的那种指导作用以外，也不能带来更多东西”(【译按】康德，《纯粹理性批判》，前揭，A831/B859，页628)；“纯粹理性的诸理念就其自己本身而言决不再有可能是辩证的了，相反，唯有对它们的单纯误用才必然使得某种欺骗我们的幻相从它们中产生出来；因为它们是由我们理性的本性向我们提出的任务，而我们思辨的切权利和要求的这个至上法庭本身不可能包含本源的欺骗和幻觉”(【译按】康德，《纯粹理性批判》，前揭，A669/B697，页523)。\n\n【译按】在德勒兹所引用的《纯粹理性批判》的片段的德文原文中，“通感[常识]”(Gemeinsinn)一词并没有出现，也就是说，是《纯粹理性批判》的法译者将“最普遍的知性”(gemeinstenVerstande)译为了“通感[常识]”。不过，将“最普通的知性”等同于“常识”也并不是没有根据的做法：康德在《判断力批判》的第20节中写道：“鉴赏判断必定具有一条主观原则，这条原则只通过情感而不通过概念，却可能普遍有效地规定什么是令人喜欢的、什么是令人讨厌的。但一条这样的原则将只能被看作通感(转下页注)","previous_page":238,"next_page":240}