{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7","title":"差异与重复","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787567591363","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7","id":"de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7","uuid":"de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7","title":"差异与重复","normalized_title":"差异与重复","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787567591363","isbns":["9787567591363"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":538,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/%E5%B7%AE%E5%BC%82%E4%B8%8E%E9%87%8D%E5%A4%8D","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7/search"},"page":{"printed_page":252,"pdf_page":271,"physical_index":271,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"7c49bc26fefb1815aa724cc000340e1d305cca894517c1d2705708f554f96182"},"chapter":"第三章 思想的形象","content":"252\n\n差异与重复\n\n① Heidegger,《么召唤思?》(Qu'appelle-t-on penser?, trad. Becker et Granel,Presses Universitaires deFrance)，页21(【译按】中译参海德格尔，〈什么召唤思?〉，李小兵、刘小枫译，见《海德格尔选集》，上海：上海三联书店，1996，页1205一1206)。——海德格尔的确保留了一种“欲”或“φλía[希：爱]”的主题，一种思想与有待去思的东西的类比——或者更确切地说，思想与有待去思的东西的相同性—的主题。这是因为他保留了相同的首要地位，即使它被认为聚集和包含了如其所是的差异。而取代了暴力的隐喻的赠礼(don)的隐喻正由此产生。综观这一切，海德格尔并没有否弃我们在前文中所说的那种主观的前提。正如人们在《存在与时间》([L’être et le temps， trad. Bæhm et Waehlens, N. R. F. ]页 21) 中看到的那样，一种对存在的先于存在论的、隐含的领会是现实存在的—尽管海德格尔明确指出，明确的存在概念不应派生自这种领会。\n\n②【译按】参柏拉图，《巴曼尼得斯篇》，前揭，156D—E，页275：“那么有这样一个奇异事物，当任何转变时，它即在这个里？—怎样一个？一突然(aiφvηs)。因为突然’仿佛指示这样一个，像任何的向动和静止之中的一个转变时所从出发的。因为它不从仍然静止的静止转变，也不从仍然运动的运动转变。但是突然，这个奇异的性质，处于动静之间，不在时间以内，凡运动的向静止或静止的向运动转变皆进入它里，再由它出。”","previous_page":251,"next_page":253}