{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7","title":"差异与重复","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787567591363","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7","id":"de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7","uuid":"de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7","title":"差异与重复","normalized_title":"差异与重复","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787567591363","isbns":["9787567591363"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":538,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/%E5%B7%AE%E5%BC%82%E4%B8%8E%E9%87%8D%E5%A4%8D","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7/search"},"page":{"printed_page":26,"pdf_page":45,"physical_index":45,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"0b9b0f834fbdac9387506484547c00a935eb207713bbb0687a1fa44965481b53"},"chapter":"差异与重复","content":"重复与一般性：从概念着眼的第三种区别\n\n从行为和法则的观点看，重复和一般性相互对立。我们还需要明确第三种对立，也就是以概念或表象为着眼点的对立。我们要提出一个quidjuris[拉：权利问题]①：从原则上说，概念可以是某一实存的特殊之物的概念，它因而拥有无限的内涵。无限内涵是外延=1的相关项。非常重要的一点是：21内涵的这种无限须要被设定为实无限，而非潜无限或单纯的无定限。只有在这一条件下，作为概念环节的谓词才能被保存下来，这些谓词才能在它们所归属的主词中具有效力。无限的内涵同样使回想和认定、记忆和自身意识(甚至是在这两种能力本身并非无限时)成为可能。概念与概念对象的关系，就它在这种记忆和这种自身意识中得以成立这两个方面而言，被称为表象。人们可以从这里得出几条通俗的莱布尼茨主义原则。根据差异原则，一切规定根本上都是概念规定。或者说，一切规定都现实地构成了概念内涵的一部分。根据充足理由原则，每个特殊之物都有一个概念。依据与充足理由原则互逆的不可分辨者之同一原则，每个概念都只对应唯一一个事物。所有这些原则形成了作为概念性差异的差异之阐明或作为中介的表象之展开。\n\n26\n\n差异与重复\n\n①【译按】“quidjuris”是康德所使用的法律用语：“法学家在谈到权限和越权时，把一桩法律诉讼中的权利问题(quid juris)和涉及事实的问题(quid facti)区别开来……”(康德，《纯粹理性批判》，邓晓芒译，北京：人民出版社,2004,A84/B116,页79)。","previous_page":25,"next_page":27}