{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7","title":"差异与重复","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787567591363","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7","id":"de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7","uuid":"de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7","title":"差异与重复","normalized_title":"差异与重复","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787567591363","isbns":["9787567591363"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":538,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/%E5%B7%AE%E5%BC%82%E4%B8%8E%E9%87%8D%E5%A4%8D","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7/search"},"page":{"printed_page":260,"pdf_page":279,"physical_index":279,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"6a9f9b3eb914712e7a4672bfbeb3173829e130ebc2a9cc6a37a93d7b02a20a4e"},"chapter":"第三章 思想的形象","content":"愚蠢的问题\n\n从某种意义上说，哲学家们对这种必然性一直有敏感的意识。他们中有很多人都感到有必要用一些具有另一种本性的规定来丰富错误概念（让我们来看几个范例：由卢克莱修[Lucrèce]、斯宾诺莎，以及18世纪的哲学家——尤其是丰特奈尔[Fontenelle]—所阐发的迷信概念。某种“迷信”的“荒谬性”显然不能被还原为它的错误内核。同样地，柏拉图的无知或遗忘不同于错误，正如回忆不同于天赋性那样。斯多亚派的愚蠢stultitia概念同时是疯狂和愚蠢。康德的内在于理性的内部幻相观念从根本上不同于错误的外在机制。黑格尔主义者的异化假定了一种对真一假关系的深入改动。叔本华[Schopenhauer]的恶俗概念和蠢行概念内含着一种意志一理智关系的完全颠转)。不过，阻止这些更为丰富的规定得到展开的仍然是独断形象的维持，以及伴随它的通感[常识]、认知和表象的诸公设的维持。这些起纠正作用的概念因而只能显现为一些“修改”，[196]其对〔思想的]形象进行了片刻的复杂化或搅扰，但却没有颠覆它的隐含原则。\n\n260\n\n差异与重复\n\n①【译按】参柏拉图，《泰阿泰德》，前揭，195e—196a,页114—115。\n\n② 参 Hegel,《精神现象学》(Phénoménologie de l'esprit, trad. Hyppolite, Aubier),卷一，页35：“知识和哲学研究里的思维方式的独断论无非是这样一个看法，即以为真相可以归结为一个命题，而命题又是一个固定的结果。诚然，诸如凯撒是什么时候诞生的？’以及一个竞技场的长度为多少尺？’之类问题应该得到一个利索的答案……但是，这些所谓的真理就其本性而言是与哲学真理有差异的”(【译按】中译参黑格尔，《精神现象学》，前揭，页25)。","previous_page":259,"next_page":261}