{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7","title":"差异与重复","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787567591363","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7","id":"de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7","uuid":"de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7","title":"差异与重复","normalized_title":"差异与重复","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787567591363","isbns":["9787567591363"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":538,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/%E5%B7%AE%E5%BC%82%E4%B8%8E%E9%87%8D%E5%A4%8D","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7/search"},"page":{"printed_page":270,"pdf_page":289,"physical_index":289,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"ef65ae48df0199ff9feb1e2de87ffae97e0a1476c21d3a9f14d09b3f11e463a1"},"chapter":"第三章 思想的形象","content":"270\n\n差异与重复\n\n①参埃利(Hubert Elie)的菁华之作《可赋意的复合体》(Le complexe significabile，Vrin，1936)。埃氏在书中表明了这一意义理论该理论于14世纪在奥卡姆学派(里米尼的格里高利[Grégoire de Rimini]、奥特古的尼古拉[Nicolas d'Autrecourt])那里得到了发展，后来又被迈农(Meinong)重新发现—的重要性和它所内含的种种悖论。——以这种方式被领会的意义之无效性甚至还出现在了胡塞尔那里：“表达的层次——这正是其独特性所在——除了它将表达赋予一切其他意向性之外，不是生产性的。或者如人们也可以说的：它的生产性、它的意向对象的活动，都穷尽于表达行为中和随其出现的概念形式中”(《现象学的指导思想》[Idées directrices pour unephénoménologie,trad. Ricœur，N. R.F.]，页421[【译按】中译参胡塞尔，《纯粹现象学通论：纯粹现象学和现象学哲学的观念(I)》，前揭，页220])。\n\n②【译按】参 Lewis Carroll,《爱丽丝漫游奇境记·镜之国的秘密》(Alice's Adventures in Wonderland & Through the Looking-Glass, New York : Airmont Publishing Company, Inc. , 1965),页 67—68。","previous_page":269,"next_page":271}