{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7","title":"差异与重复","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787567591363","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7","id":"de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7","uuid":"de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7","title":"差异与重复","normalized_title":"差异与重复","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787567591363","isbns":["9787567591363"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":538,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/%E5%B7%AE%E5%BC%82%E4%B8%8E%E9%87%8D%E5%A4%8D","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7/search"},"page":{"printed_page":29,"pdf_page":48,"physical_index":48,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"6b27ef6e0ffcf53686c64b4f00ac18bada2b69786de3bea56d14fa6b11cec8a8"},"chapter":"差异与重复","content":"问题是：除离散外延或有限内涵的自然阻断外还有其他的自然阻断吗？我们假设有一个概念，它的内涵是无定限的(潜无限的)。无论它的内涵推进得多远，人们始终可以认为它将一个个完全同一的对象统摄于自身之下。在实无限中，概念从原则上说足以将自身的对象和其他所有对象区分开来。与此相反，我们现在面对的情况是：概念可以无定限地推进自己的内涵，但它总会将无定限多的对象统摄于自身之下。这里，概念仍然是不同对象的相同(Même)—无定限的相同。这样一来，我们就应当认识到这些对象之间的非概念性差异。正是康德最为明确地指出了“能够进行单纯无定限的特殊化的概念”和“非概念的纯粹时空规定或对立规定”之间的相关关系(对称对象的悖论)。①但这些规定确切说来仅仅是重复的形态：空间与时间本身是重复的媒介；实在的对立②不是最大程度的差异，而是最小限度的重复：它被约简为二，是一种作为自身之回归与回声的重复，一种找寻到了自我界定之途径的重复。因此，重复表现为无概念的差异，它避开了无定限地继续下去的概念性差异。它表现了实存者的本己强力与它在直观中的固执——它抵制概念的任何特殊化，无论这种特殊化推进得有多远。按照康德的说法，无论你在概念中前进得多远，你总是会重复。也就是说，你总是会使概念和多个对象对应，最少是两个：一个左，[24]一个右；一个多，一个少；一个正，一个负。\n\n导论：重复与差异\n\n29\n\n① 图尼耶(Michel Tournier)在一篇即将发表的文章中指出了离散外延的表述与现象(【译按】亦即图尼耶1975年发表的《流星》[Les météores])。","previous_page":28,"next_page":30}