{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7","title":"差异与重复","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787567591363","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7","id":"de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7","uuid":"de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7","title":"差异与重复","normalized_title":"差异与重复","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787567591363","isbns":["9787567591363"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":538,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/%E5%B7%AE%E5%BC%82%E4%B8%8E%E9%87%8D%E5%A4%8D","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7/search"},"page":{"printed_page":290,"pdf_page":309,"physical_index":309,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"b6c04b5dcc90c43182bd7f41fedd4efa296fdd095c57095107c60f455667d282"},"chapter":"第四章 差异的理念综合","content":"290\n\n差异与重复\n\n①【译按】参康德，《纯粹理性批判》，前揭，B538，页417：“纯粹理性的这一(范导性)规则……不能告诉我们什么是客体，而是告诉我们，为了达到客体的完备概念，必须进行经验性的回溯”(B538)。\n\n② 同上，“先验理念”(Des Idées transcendantales),I,页 306(【译按】中译参康德，《纯粹理性批判》，前揭，A321/B378，页275)。\n\n③【译按】参康德，《纯粹理性批判》，前揭，A482/B510,页398：“理念是一个不允许有任何解答的问题”。","previous_page":null,"next_page":291}