{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7","title":"差异与重复","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787567591363","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7","id":"de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7","uuid":"de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7","title":"差异与重复","normalized_title":"差异与重复","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787567591363","isbns":["9787567591363"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":538,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/%E5%B7%AE%E5%BC%82%E4%B8%8E%E9%87%8D%E5%A4%8D","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7/search"},"page":{"printed_page":293,"pdf_page":312,"physical_index":312,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"5a30583a752960305ff55538538480d9d3538836ee2fc9779c621c4a7e293f66"},"chapter":"第四章 差异的理念综合","content":"※\n\n微分\n\n正如我们将自在之差异与否定性对立起来那样，我们将作为差异之符号的“dx”(Differenzphilosophie[德：差异哲学])与作为矛盾之符号的“非A”对立起来①。矛盾确实是在最大的差异一方找寻理念，而微分则有坠入无限小(infiniment petit)的深渊的危险。不过，这种提问方式并不妥当：将符号dx的价值与无穷小(infinitésimaux)的实存捆绑在一起是个错误。但是，以拒斥无穷小为名而否认符号dx具有任何存在论的或认识论的价值同样也是个错误。在对微分学的旧式阐释、亦即所谓的不规范的或前科学的阐释中存在着一种应当从其无穷小的粗糙外表中解脱出来的宝藏。要严肃地对待符号dx必须抱有许多真正的哲学天真与欢乐：但康德放弃了，甚至连莱布尼茨都放弃了。在微分哲学(philosophie différentielle)的隐秘历史(histoire ésotérique)中，有三个名字闪耀着灿烂的光辉:迈蒙——这位犹太哲学家以一种对微分学的莱布尼茨主义再阐释而悖论性地为后康德主义奠定了基础(1790)；弗龙斯基(HoënéWronski)—这位杰出的数学家设计出了一个同时具备实证主义、弥赛亚主义和神秘主义性质的体系，这一体系内含着一种对微分学的康德主义阐释(1814);波尔达—德穆兰(Bordas-Demoulin)—他在反思笛卡尔之时对微分学做出了柏拉图主义阐释(1843)。这里的哲学财富不应因现代的科学方法而牺牲掉：一位是微分学的莱布尼茨，一位是微分学的康德，一位是微分学的柏拉图。微分哲学的一般原则应当成为一种严格阐明的课题，并且它丝毫不取决于无限小。符号dx222同时作为未规定者、可规定者和规定登场。这三个方面对应着三条形成了充足理由的原则：与未规定者 $( d x , d y )$ 对应的是可规定性原则；与可被实在地规定之物 $\\left( { \\frac { d y } { d x } } \\right)$ 对应的是相互规定原则；与被现实地规定了的东西$\\left( { \\frac { d y } { d x } } \\right)$ 的值对应的是完全规定原则。简而言之，dx就是理念——柏拉图式理念、莱布尼茨式理念或康德式理念，是“问题”及其存在。\n\n第四章 差异的理念综合\n\n293\n\n①【译按】关于德勒兹对微分学的哲学阐释，参Henry Somers-Hall,《黑格尔、德勒兹与表象之批判——否定与差异的辩证法》(Hegel, Deleuze, and the Critique of Represen-tation, Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2012) ,页 161—186。","previous_page":292,"next_page":294}