{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7","title":"差异与重复","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787567591363","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7","id":"de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7","uuid":"de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7","title":"差异与重复","normalized_title":"差异与重复","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787567591363","isbns":["9787567591363"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":538,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/%E5%B7%AE%E5%BC%82%E4%B8%8E%E9%87%8D%E5%A4%8D","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7/search"},"page":{"printed_page":298,"pdf_page":317,"physical_index":317,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"56dedbe0930d0da080034f474f9ef51d050b68d1fe9c095ed36fedcfa81d3a7d"},"chapter":"第四章 差异的理念综合","content":"迈蒙写道：\n\n例如，当我说“红色与绿色有差异”时，作为纯粹知性概念的差异不应被视为各种可感的质的关系(不然的话，康德的quidjuris[拉：权利问题]仍旧是悬而未决的)。它要么像康德的理论所说的那样，被视为可感的质的空间(空间是先天形式)关系，要么像我的理论所说的那样，被视为可感的质的微分(这些微分是理念)比「差异关系]……某一对象产生的特殊规则，或者它的微分样式，使该对象成为了一个特殊对象，而不同对象间的各种关系则来自于它们的[226]微分比[差异关系]。①\n\n298\n\n差异与重复","previous_page":297,"next_page":299}