{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7","title":"差异与重复","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787567591363","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7","id":"de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7","uuid":"de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7","title":"差异与重复","normalized_title":"差异与重复","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787567591363","isbns":["9787567591363"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":538,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/%E5%B7%AE%E5%BC%82%E4%B8%8E%E9%87%8D%E5%A4%8D","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7/search"},"page":{"printed_page":54,"pdf_page":73,"physical_index":73,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"b2a91411ebd891c8b3ce23f360d6c8c8662e9a513fd1c10c1f03b9b911387915"},"chapter":"差异与重复","content":"但是，差异的概念(理念)不能被还原为一种概念性的差异，重复的实定性本质不能被还原为一种无概念的差异\n\n有一些重复并不仅仅是外在的差异；有一些内部的差异，它们既不是内在的也不是概念性的。这样一来，我们就能够更好地定位先前种种模棱含混之处的来源。当我们将重复规定为无概念的差异时，我们就会断定重复之中的差异只具有单纯外在的特征；我们因而认为：任何内部的“新的东西”都足以使我们远离重复之谜，而且它只能与通过类比而被言说的近似重复相调和。但事实并非如此。因为我们还不知道什么是重复的本质，不知道“无概念的差异”这一表述到底有何意指，不知道它所能够蕴含的内部性具有什么样的本性。与此相反的是，当我们将差异规定为概念性的差异时，我们相信[41]这样就足以完成对差异概念本身的规定了。但即便如此，我们仍旧得不到任何差异的观念或贴切的差异概念。由亚里士多德发端，经由莱布尼茨，直至黑格尔的差异哲学也许因为满足于将差异纳入到概念一般之中而错误地将差异之概念与单纯的概念性差异混为一谈。实际上，只要差异被纳入到概念一般之中，人们就无法拥有任何差异的奇异理念，从而只能停留在已然由表象所中介的差异之元素那里。因此，我们须要直面两个问题：什么是差异的概念—它不能被还原为单纯的概念性差异，它需要一个本己的理念，一个理念之中的奇异性？另一方面，什么是重复的本质—它既不能被还原为一种无概念的差异，又不能与种种被表象在相同概念下的对象的表面特征混为一谈，它本身就表现了作为理念之强力的奇异性？差异与重复这两个基本概念的相遇不再能够从一开始就被设定出来，而是应当借助于两条线的相互影响，相互交叉而显现出来：一条线关涉重复的本质，另一条线关涉差异的观念。\n\n54\n\n差异与重复","previous_page":53,"next_page":55}