{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7","title":"差异与重复","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787567591363","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7","id":"de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7","uuid":"de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7","title":"差异与重复","normalized_title":"差异与重复","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787567591363","isbns":["9787567591363"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":538,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/%E5%B7%AE%E5%BC%82%E4%B8%8E%E9%87%8D%E5%A4%8D","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/de9b4263-c277-4979-9f00-91fe8d8660f7/search"},"page":{"printed_page":57,"pdf_page":76,"physical_index":76,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"627a91a25dcdcffbe8cc253249196c3e162ab6bd97fa332d1c8daa852d219144"},"chapter":"第一章 自在之差异","content":"第一章 自在之差异\n\n57\n\n①【译按】“基底(fond)”是德勒兹在《差异与重复》中反复探讨的一个概念。我们会在第三章看到，“基底”概念即谢林(F.-W.Schelling)的“Grund”，而德勒兹对谢林著作的了解主要依赖扬凯列维奇(SamuelJankélévitch)翻译的《谢林文集》(Essais，Par-is，Aubier，1946)。扬凯列维奇在《谢林文集》的译者序言中对“基底”概念做出了如下解释：“‘基底’是谢林哲学的一个专有术语…………它表现的是过去在当前中的持存，表现的是生成过程的支撑物。过去从未被完全取消。它不是存在的超绝因(causeéminente)，而只是它的充足理由，因为存在是基底的规定理由(raison déterminante)”(页40)。\n\n②【译按】参 Proclus,《神学原理》(The Elements of Theology, trans. E. R. Dodds,Oxford：Clarendon，1963),命题5(“任何多都在一之后”)：“一的统一性不是派生的统一性，如果它绝没有分有多样性，那么，无论从哪个方面看，多都是在一之后，是多分有了一，而不是一分有了多……任何多都是从一自身那里产生出来”(页5、7)。","previous_page":null,"next_page":58}