{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"dfe67541-4039-4f88-87ce-dbbadb056cb2","title":"什么是批判","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787303287741","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"dfe67541-4039-4f88-87ce-dbbadb056cb2","id":"dfe67541-4039-4f88-87ce-dbbadb056cb2","uuid":"dfe67541-4039-4f88-87ce-dbbadb056cb2","title":"什么是批判","normalized_title":"什么是批判","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787303287741","isbns":["9787303287741","0120214113"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":490,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/dfe67541-4039-4f88-87ce-dbbadb056cb2","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/%E4%BB%80%E4%B9%88%E6%98%AF%E6%89%B9%E5%88%A4","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/dfe67541-4039-4f88-87ce-dbbadb056cb2/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/dfe67541-4039-4f88-87ce-dbbadb056cb2/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/dfe67541-4039-4f88-87ce-dbbadb056cb2","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/dfe67541-4039-4f88-87ce-dbbadb056cb2/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/dfe67541-4039-4f88-87ce-dbbadb056cb2/search"},"page":{"printed_page":426,"pdf_page":446,"physical_index":446,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"ca4ad3c6217b6778a9ebca74e2fe5e2e28a9ac59d177826f1e3b1ed1ce1e2285"},"chapter":"什么是批判","content":"对此立场的决定性批评由哈贝马斯所表述。他反对伽达默尔的哲学解释学，坚持批判和反思的普遍不可或缺。理由在于，传统并不等于真理；它常常也传递错误意见并与之相系，使得其权威无法保证知识。①因此，与解释学的普遍性要求相反，需要坚持批判性启蒙的必要性。按此批评调整，则解释学仅仅澄清了一般性理解(das normaleVerstehen)，也就是与显而易见的持续性社会共识相联系的理解。因此，尽管解释学可以平衡对启蒙与批判的绝对化，但由于并非所有表现为一般性理解的理解都是真正的理解，解释学仍然需要由彻底的、单独对理性负责的批判作为补充。②\n\n伽达默尔和哈贝马斯争论的对立涉及两种关于对话的见解。伽达默尔着眼于与流传物(Überlieferung)会话的非对象化发生，过去和当下共有的实事(Sache)由此通过流传物被归于当下。与之相对，哈贝马斯看到的则是一种对历史性交流关系进行批判的可能性，这是对解释学尚未被问及的，关于流传物条件的对话性反思。不过很明显，两种立场间的抉择—其争议性表达仍缺少一个关键点。伽达默尔和哈贝马斯都掩饰了，他们的争论乃是解释学内部的冲突。哈贝马斯预设了可以找到与传统批判性的关系，伽达默尔则将这一预设视作“教条的客观主义”进行批判①，与哈贝马斯相反，他认为流传物可能成问题的条件不能被视为“实在因素”(Realfak-toren)②，而必须就其本身来理解③。事实上，哈贝马斯必须能够接受这一点。毕竟，为了说明他的批判性纲要，他也提到了一种应该对“理性言谈规范性原则”负责的“深层解释学”(Tiefenhermeneutik)。④他对伽达默尔的批评因而本质上是解释学的；需要考虑的是一种批判性理解，它并不会取代一般性理解的位置，而是作为与之相对的修正(Korrektiv)而出现。尽管如此，哈贝马斯还是否认“解释学的普遍性要求”，并且将解释学和批判相互对立起来，仿佛是在处理两种根本不同的方法。\n\n① Jürgen Habermas, »Zu Gadamers Wahrheit und Methode <«, in: K.-O. Apel u. a. (Hg. ), Hermeneutik und Ideologiekritik, Frankfurt/M. 1971, S. 45-56, hier: S. 48, und Jürgen Habermas, » Der Universalitätsanspruch der Hermeneutik «, in: ebd., S.120-159，hier：S.158.亦参见：Jürgen Habermas，Erkenntnis und Interesse, Frankfurt/M. 1968,S. 267.\n\n② Jürgen Habermas, »Der Universalitätsanspruch der Hermeneutik«, in; ebd , S. 120-159, hier: S. 158. Vgl. auch Jürgen Habermas, Erkenntnis und Interesse , Frankfurt/M. 1968, S. 158-159.\n\n426\n\n什么是批判","previous_page":425,"next_page":427}