{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"dfe67541-4039-4f88-87ce-dbbadb056cb2","title":"什么是批判","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787303287741","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"dfe67541-4039-4f88-87ce-dbbadb056cb2","id":"dfe67541-4039-4f88-87ce-dbbadb056cb2","uuid":"dfe67541-4039-4f88-87ce-dbbadb056cb2","title":"什么是批判","normalized_title":"什么是批判","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787303287741","isbns":["9787303287741","0120214113"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":490,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/dfe67541-4039-4f88-87ce-dbbadb056cb2","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/%E4%BB%80%E4%B9%88%E6%98%AF%E6%89%B9%E5%88%A4","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/dfe67541-4039-4f88-87ce-dbbadb056cb2/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/dfe67541-4039-4f88-87ce-dbbadb056cb2/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/dfe67541-4039-4f88-87ce-dbbadb056cb2","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/dfe67541-4039-4f88-87ce-dbbadb056cb2/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/dfe67541-4039-4f88-87ce-dbbadb056cb2/search"},"page":{"printed_page":79,"pdf_page":99,"physical_index":99,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"1b197910271719b2b96febcbf77732a0681abc281e19ae12fe76fa632416327c"},"chapter":"什么是批判","content":"作为对哈贝马斯的回应，布迪厄的实践理论首先明确了生活世界的矛盾性，即这个概念在哈贝马斯那里，一方面奠基于不能被客观化或难以客观化的无问题的实践行为[知道如何(knowhow)〕，交往和战略意图行动〔知道如此(knowthat)〕都基于此；另一方面则奠基于交往行为的领域。此外，与哈贝马斯相比，布迪厄毫无疑问地认为，战略行动和交往行为的领域不能从存在论上理解为两个不同的世界，而是指所有行动的很难被分割开来的两个方面。与此相关的是，和哈贝马斯相比，布迪厄的权力概念要宽泛得多。布迪厄将资本的概念扩展到符号和文化结构，这也清楚地表明，权力不能局限于资本主义市场及其官僚机构，如果赋予这些结构以哈贝马斯式的最高地位，就会赋予这些狭义上的资本主义结构过多的东西。此外，根据布迪厄的观点，交往和战略这两种意向行动也与自明的、生活世界的实践中的非意向行动密切相关，以至于哈贝马斯的批判方案显得不足。哈贝马斯假设行为者可以在市场和官僚结构的不稳定范围之外批判自己，而布迪厄则强调习惯性实践行为面对批判的讳莫如深，尤其是在生活世界中。一方面因为它们很难被辨析；另一方面因为它们与我们的身份如此相关，以至于批判往往甚至不是一个可以想象的选择。来自外部的干预即使还不清楚这个外部在哪里比哈贝马斯的建议更有意义，也更有必要。\n\n①“习惯”不应该被理解为封闭的规则系统，而应该被理解 为使某些可能性在无限的、不可预期的多样性中可用的图式。关 于习惯和场域之间的关系，也可参考：Pierre Bourdieuund Loiq J. D. Wacquant, An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology, Chicago 1992, S. 126 ff. , sowie Beate Krais und Gunter Gebauer, Habitus, Bielefeld 2002。奥马尔·利扎多(OmarLizardo)表明，下述反对 意见在什么意义上不正确，即布迪厄的“习惯”概念只允许在行为 者的背后改变实践，见：» The Cognitive Origins of Bourdieu's Habitus«, in: Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 34, 2004,S.375-401.\n\n(意识形态)批判如何被规训\n\n79","previous_page":78,"next_page":80}