{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"ea3b7167-0435-4a94-84b9-80a5359326a4","title":"递归与偶然","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787576004694","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"ea3b7167-0435-4a94-84b9-80a5359326a4","id":"ea3b7167-0435-4a94-84b9-80a5359326a4","uuid":"ea3b7167-0435-4a94-84b9-80a5359326a4","title":"递归与偶然","normalized_title":"递归与偶然","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787576004694","isbns":["9787576004694"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":401,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/ea3b7167-0435-4a94-84b9-80a5359326a4","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/%E9%80%92%E5%BD%92%E4%B8%8E%E5%81%B6%E7%84%B6","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/ea3b7167-0435-4a94-84b9-80a5359326a4/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/ea3b7167-0435-4a94-84b9-80a5359326a4/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/ea3b7167-0435-4a94-84b9-80a5359326a4","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/ea3b7167-0435-4a94-84b9-80a5359326a4/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/ea3b7167-0435-4a94-84b9-80a5359326a4/search"},"page":{"printed_page":112,"pdf_page":124,"physical_index":124,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"82b26dd1f398781af910637845f4a3a4bdab752f59c9d6102dc909f279219de1"},"chapter":"第二章逻辑与偶然","content":"§17 有机主义者与反身逻辑\n\n递归使人能通过对他者的认识来把握有机整体——他者总是复数的，位于不同的反思中。《精神现象学》已经预见了那个黑格尔终其一生阐述的庞大系统。正如约翰·芬德利(JohnFindlay)所说，黑格尔在《精神现象学》中已经大量处理了生命与有机性的问题。③正如康德《判断力批判》中讨论的有机性，黑格尔也强调生命的整体论及其各个部分的相互作用。有机整体被理解为一个不断生产并消除差异的自足运动，因而它不再是个抽象概念：\n\n然而，差异存在的程度就和它们在这个简单普遍媒介中存在的程度一样，这一普遍的流动性正因为废除了差异，才具有否定的性质：要想废除差异，差异必须存在。但这个作为自足统一性的流动性，本身便是差异的实体的持存，差异的实体在流动性中作为彼此独立的不同部分出现。它们的存在不再具有抽象存在的意义，它们单纯的本质也不再具有抽象普遍性的意义：它们的存在只是自在的单纯运动这一简单的流动实体。①\n\n112\n\n递归与偶然\n\n① 同上，第 99 页：“kann allein das wissenschaftliche System de-selben seyn.”黑格尔，《精神现象学》，法兰克福：Suhrkamp，1970年，第15页。\n\n②皮雷斯，《现象学作为对绝对的自我指涉的确证》，第99一100页。皮雷斯用“有机统一”(organische Einheit)和“整体的生命”(das Leb-endesGanzen)的说法，指出一个相当简单的事实，即“不能通过静态描述把握生命”。\n\n③ 约翰·芬德利，《黑格尔主义对生物学和生命的处理》，见《黑格尔与科学》(Hegel and the Sciences),科恩(R. S. Cohen)和沃托斯基(M.W.Wartofsky)编，多德雷赫特：Springer，1984年，第83—100页。","previous_page":111,"next_page":113}