{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"ea3b7167-0435-4a94-84b9-80a5359326a4","title":"递归与偶然","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787576004694","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"ea3b7167-0435-4a94-84b9-80a5359326a4","id":"ea3b7167-0435-4a94-84b9-80a5359326a4","uuid":"ea3b7167-0435-4a94-84b9-80a5359326a4","title":"递归与偶然","normalized_title":"递归与偶然","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787576004694","isbns":["9787576004694"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":401,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/ea3b7167-0435-4a94-84b9-80a5359326a4","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/%E9%80%92%E5%BD%92%E4%B8%8E%E5%81%B6%E7%84%B6","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/ea3b7167-0435-4a94-84b9-80a5359326a4/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/ea3b7167-0435-4a94-84b9-80a5359326a4/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/ea3b7167-0435-4a94-84b9-80a5359326a4","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/ea3b7167-0435-4a94-84b9-80a5359326a4/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/ea3b7167-0435-4a94-84b9-80a5359326a4/search"},"page":{"printed_page":179,"pdf_page":191,"physical_index":191,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"d8dcf0f2995515c9a481861f4a05cb31032bd2ab6ac49ddef9b4f5431a300f81"},"chapter":"第二章逻辑与偶然","content":"第二章逻辑与偶然\n\n179\n\n① 科林·皮登里奇，《适应，自然选择和行为》(Adaptation，Natu-ral Selection，and Behavior),见《行为与演化》(Behaviorand Evolution),罗伊(A. Roe)和乔治·盖洛德·辛普森(George Gaylord Simpson)编，康涅狄格州纽黑文：耶鲁大学出版社，1958年，第394页；另见恩斯特·迈尔，《目的论的与目的学的：一种新分析》(Teleological and Teleonomic：ANew Analysis)，载于《自然与社会科学方法论和历史论文》(Methodolog-ical and Historical Essays in the Natural and Social Sciences), 科恩(R.S. Cohen)和沃托斯基(M. W. Wartofsky)编，《科学哲学中波士顿研究》(Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science)，第14 卷，多德雷赫特：Springer，1974年，第91—117页。\n\n②乔纳斯比较了飞行员和机器。飞行员不像只接受并执行命令的机器人，因为他有自己的动机和情感。但乔纳斯可能忽略了这样一点：在控制论中动机和情感也可以通过反馈机制来分析。\n\n③一个经典的例子是丹尼尔·丹尼特(Daniel Dennett)的《达尔文的危险思想：演化与生命的意义》(Darwin's Dangerous Idea：Evolutionand Meaning of Li fe)，伦敦：Penguin，1996 年，第48—52 页，他在这里把自然选择简化为一种“盲目”的算法。","previous_page":178,"next_page":180}