{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"ea3b7167-0435-4a94-84b9-80a5359326a4","title":"递归与偶然","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787576004694","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"ea3b7167-0435-4a94-84b9-80a5359326a4","id":"ea3b7167-0435-4a94-84b9-80a5359326a4","uuid":"ea3b7167-0435-4a94-84b9-80a5359326a4","title":"递归与偶然","normalized_title":"递归与偶然","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787576004694","isbns":["9787576004694"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":401,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/ea3b7167-0435-4a94-84b9-80a5359326a4","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/%E9%80%92%E5%BD%92%E4%B8%8E%E5%81%B6%E7%84%B6","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/ea3b7167-0435-4a94-84b9-80a5359326a4/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/ea3b7167-0435-4a94-84b9-80a5359326a4/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/ea3b7167-0435-4a94-84b9-80a5359326a4","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/ea3b7167-0435-4a94-84b9-80a5359326a4/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/ea3b7167-0435-4a94-84b9-80a5359326a4/search"},"page":{"printed_page":268,"pdf_page":280,"physical_index":280,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"95f8bb0bc83f9d2ec1a692c9b633dfea35e34682a9dafb782d2b7144923caf26"},"chapter":"第四章组织性的无机","content":"当把握着的自我关注指向即将到来的事物，这种主动指向性会跟随在预存的基础上累积在知觉中的被动方向。当把握的关注指向刚刚被觉察的事物，也就是说，当把握的关注经过持存的连续体，这种指向性的方向与属于知觉本身的被动方向相反。③\n\n我们不能把预存和持存彻底拆分为两个操作，事实上它们共同构成了一个必要的回路：持存虽是被动的，但却能激发预存；预存是主动的，它根据与个体经验相符的结构来丰富持存。然而，我们在此必须强调，预存不能被简化为第一或第二持存，否则就不会有延异了，正如德里达阐明的：不如说，被动性和主动性的分界的动态，才是胡塞尔先验现象学的基础。如果我们在第三持存的历史背景下进一步考察被动和主动指向性之间的动态，便能看到，第三持存的演化同时也引发了预存的演化，这个演化过程既不能包含在人类主体或意识中，也不能化简为任何固化的持存。\n\n268\n\n递归与偶然\n\n① 同上，第74页。\n\n② 同上，第77页。\n\n③ 图因·科图姆斯(Toine Kortooms)，《时间现象学——埃德蒙德·胡塞尔对时间意识的分析》(Phenomenology of Time EdmundHusserl's Analysis of Time-Consciousness)，多德雷赫特：Springer, 2002年，第183页。","previous_page":267,"next_page":269}