{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"ea3b7167-0435-4a94-84b9-80a5359326a4","title":"递归与偶然","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787576004694","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"ea3b7167-0435-4a94-84b9-80a5359326a4","id":"ea3b7167-0435-4a94-84b9-80a5359326a4","uuid":"ea3b7167-0435-4a94-84b9-80a5359326a4","title":"递归与偶然","normalized_title":"递归与偶然","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787576004694","isbns":["9787576004694"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":401,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/ea3b7167-0435-4a94-84b9-80a5359326a4","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/%E9%80%92%E5%BD%92%E4%B8%8E%E5%81%B6%E7%84%B6","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/ea3b7167-0435-4a94-84b9-80a5359326a4/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/ea3b7167-0435-4a94-84b9-80a5359326a4/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/ea3b7167-0435-4a94-84b9-80a5359326a4","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/ea3b7167-0435-4a94-84b9-80a5359326a4/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/ea3b7167-0435-4a94-84b9-80a5359326a4/search"},"page":{"printed_page":316,"pdf_page":328,"physical_index":328,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"365b23b07a18a713e85775a4a2e3097b9d5bd752271eca8c89e23e86e6c4df16"},"chapter":"第五章剩余的非人","content":"这里提到了递归的概念，但利奥塔没有进一步探讨递归和反思性判断的关系。他不理解递归概念，正如他之前在《后现代状态》中也忽略了控制论的信息理论，称它“简单”。在这里，他准备通过休伯特·德雷福斯[253]来拒绝这种观点，后者在《计算机不能做什么？对人工理性的批判》(What ComputersCannot Do?A Critique of Arti ficial Reason, 1972) 中质疑了那时的人工智能研究，认为这些研究太过笛卡尔主义，把理智化简为一种十分有限的认识方式。这一点可以用经典人工智能或“老式人工智能”(GOFAI)中所谓的框架问题(the frameproblem)来简单解释。框架问题讨论的是人工智能对世界的描述，为了认识一个事件或环境，它必须产生大量描述，但依然很难把这些描述置于语境中。说它是笛卡尔主义的，是因为按照这种认识形式，一切都只是海德格尔意义上的在手之物，却忽略了一个事实：在日常生活的事务中，此在遭遇的情况是上手的，它们与具现化及直观有关。拒绝把思维化简为二元形式，也是拒绝身体和心灵的二分。《非人》中遭到挑战的哲学家也是个现象学家。他必须捍卫身体与性别的重要性，因为假如没有身体和性，思维真的还能存在吗？布拉西埃把两位对话者的观点准确总结如下：\n\n一个认为思维和它的物质媒介的不可分性(insepa-rability)，使思维与它在一般有机生命(尤其是人体)中的根基性分开(separating)成为必要；另一个则认为两性间不可化约的分离(separation)，使思维与有机具体化，尤其是人这种具体化不可分离(inseparable)。①\n\n316\n\n递归与偶然\n\n① 同上，第12页。","previous_page":315,"next_page":317}