{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"ea3b7167-0435-4a94-84b9-80a5359326a4","title":"递归与偶然","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787576004694","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"ea3b7167-0435-4a94-84b9-80a5359326a4","id":"ea3b7167-0435-4a94-84b9-80a5359326a4","uuid":"ea3b7167-0435-4a94-84b9-80a5359326a4","title":"递归与偶然","normalized_title":"递归与偶然","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787576004694","isbns":["9787576004694"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":401,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/ea3b7167-0435-4a94-84b9-80a5359326a4","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/%E9%80%92%E5%BD%92%E4%B8%8E%E5%81%B6%E7%84%B6","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/ea3b7167-0435-4a94-84b9-80a5359326a4/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/ea3b7167-0435-4a94-84b9-80a5359326a4/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/ea3b7167-0435-4a94-84b9-80a5359326a4","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/ea3b7167-0435-4a94-84b9-80a5359326a4/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/ea3b7167-0435-4a94-84b9-80a5359326a4/search"},"page":{"printed_page":322,"pdf_page":334,"physical_index":334,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"125f5a5cda016919e79e98ff15348961cd40810cd4a88f19efae2ad1f74984b2"},"chapter":"第五章剩余的非人","content":"偶然性是超出互联主义的东西，在某种程度上，我们也可以相反地说——就像我们在第一章一开始引用过的谢林那样——也许相互关联本身就是偶然的，或者像保罗·克利在他的笔记中所说，“可见之物只是整体的一个碎片，还有许多其他潜在的现实”，[258]按照布鲁门伯格的说法，这是“对自然的贬值”。①偶然性是必要的，因为它挑战了互联主义的绝对化，这实际上引向了去绝对化。理性发现自己处在秩序与无序的丛林之中。如果我们承认互联主义不是唯一的认识方式，且知识不能被还原为主体的经验，那么就有可能设想一种思辨性而不只是事实性的唯物主义。梅亚苏的目标是知识的绝对异质性(heterogeneity)，它具有本性(na-ture)上的而非程度上的差异，因为程度的差异暗含着一种一元论，或虚假的多元论：\n\n我们不需要一元论——也不需要单一多元论(monopluralism)，即差异的一元论，它试图成为多元论(一条神奇的公式：“一元论=多元论”)，却只是或多或少地把一切事物重新吸收进同一个整体(只不过是个开放的整体；一条悲剧的公式：“多元论=一元论”)。相反，我们在各个地方都需要多元论：自然中的纯差异，它们区分开的东西、实在的各个领域(物质，生命，心灵，社会等等)之间没有连续性，它们彼此协调的可能性完全不能允许我们设想它们之间有和睦的关系，除非是作为一种粗暴的盲目事实。①\n\n322\n\n递归与偶然\n\n① 保罗·克利，引自汉斯·布鲁门伯格，《对自然的模仿：走向创造性存在概念的前历史》(Imitation of Nature:Toward a Prehistory of theIdea of the Creative Being),安娜·韦兹(Anna Wertz),Qui Parle 12,第 1期，2000年春/夏，第47页。","previous_page":321,"next_page":323}