{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"ea3b7167-0435-4a94-84b9-80a5359326a4","title":"递归与偶然","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787576004694","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"ea3b7167-0435-4a94-84b9-80a5359326a4","id":"ea3b7167-0435-4a94-84b9-80a5359326a4","uuid":"ea3b7167-0435-4a94-84b9-80a5359326a4","title":"递归与偶然","normalized_title":"递归与偶然","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787576004694","isbns":["9787576004694"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":401,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/ea3b7167-0435-4a94-84b9-80a5359326a4","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/%E9%80%92%E5%BD%92%E4%B8%8E%E5%81%B6%E7%84%B6","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/ea3b7167-0435-4a94-84b9-80a5359326a4/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/ea3b7167-0435-4a94-84b9-80a5359326a4/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/ea3b7167-0435-4a94-84b9-80a5359326a4","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/ea3b7167-0435-4a94-84b9-80a5359326a4/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/ea3b7167-0435-4a94-84b9-80a5359326a4/search"},"page":{"printed_page":44,"pdf_page":56,"physical_index":56,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"50549fcda5299e9954bd73e4ec2c360d638a8e92c99ddc6b15fbb469d01035e2"},"chapter":"《以世界主义为目标的普遍历史观念》","content":"[36]我们在前面简要提到的库尔诺的客观偶然性，在甘丹·梅亚苏(Quentin Meillassoux)所谓的“绝对偶然性”中被推得更远了。对梅亚苏来说，绝对偶然性是一种摆脱自然与心灵的相互关联的尝试，它试图绕到这一相互关联背后，展现一种新的认识论基础的可能。这种新的认识论基础并不从作为无条件者(Unbedingt)的绝对出发，而是从作为偶然的绝对开始。如果说理念论和现象学中的互相关联没能把握住这种偶然的基础，是因为这些学派坚持以主客体的互联为知识的基础。\n\n主观主义者(梅亚苏选择使用主观主义者[subjectivists]而不是理念论者[idealists]这个词)希望通过强化思想的力量来接近原初事实(arche-fact)；即，思想如何能进入未知的领域。对梅亚苏来说，绝对必须被置于思维之外，在思维可触及处之外，一切因果关系之外。与他所说的互联主义传统的“相互关联的事实性”(facticity of correlation)不同，梅亚苏试图提出“实在性”(factuality)原则，即承认有独立于思维的现实或物质。比如，我们不能说上帝存在或不存在，因为他可能存在也可能不存在；他可能在你明天早上醒来时出现在你面前，或者你在生命中根本看不到他。我引用梅亚苏的说法：“假如我知道某个实体、事物或事件有可能或可以不是它所是的样子，我便称它为偶然的’。我知道这个花瓶可以不存在，或者可以以别的方式存在—我知道花瓶本可以不掉下来。”①远离互联主义(correlationism)是一种展开有关可能性存在的新探索的方式。\n\n44\n\n递归与偶然","previous_page":43,"next_page":45}