{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"f4b54542-8403-4515-a674-82b3120af71d","title":"[国外马克思学译丛]马克思的社会学","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787303230143","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"f4b54542-8403-4515-a674-82b3120af71d","id":"f4b54542-8403-4515-a674-82b3120af71d","uuid":"f4b54542-8403-4515-a674-82b3120af71d","title":"[国外马克思学译丛]马克思的社会学","normalized_title":"国外马克思学译丛马克思的社会学","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787303230143","isbns":["9787303230143"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":192,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/f4b54542-8403-4515-a674-82b3120af71d","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/%5B%E5%9B%BD%E5%A4%96%E9%A9%AC%E5%85%8B%E6%80%9D%E5%AD%A6%E8%AF%91%E4%B8%9B%5D%E9%A9%AC%E5%85%8B%E6%80%9D%E7%9A%84%E7%A4%BE%E4%BC%9A%E5%AD%A6","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/f4b54542-8403-4515-a674-82b3120af71d/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/f4b54542-8403-4515-a674-82b3120af71d/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/f4b54542-8403-4515-a674-82b3120af71d","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/f4b54542-8403-4515-a674-82b3120af71d/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/f4b54542-8403-4515-a674-82b3120af71d/search"},"page":{"printed_page":23,"pdf_page":47,"physical_index":47,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"c18a6cb780c78a31b7cf795b71982d9e8b81d6cd8d7610cfaa66dd2f381efbd8"},"chapter":"马克思的社会学","content":"人的思维是否具有客观的真理性，这并不是一个理论的问题，而是一个实践的问题。人应该在实践中证明自己思维的真理性，以及自己思维的现实性和力量，亦即自己思维的此岸性。关于离开实践的思维是否具有现实性的争论，是一个纯粹经院哲学的问题。(《关于费尔巴哈的提纲》第二条)\n\n在与实践活动相关联的方式中，知识的诸多分支发现了它们的范围和意义。思辨哲学家们考虑的“知识的问题”，是一个虚假的问题。抽象的逻辑一致性，与社会活动和实践证实相脱离的理论，没有任何价值。人的本质是社会的，社会的本质是实践行为、行动和互动的过程。与实践相分离，理论就会徒劳地固执于错误地构想出的或者不可解决的问题，陷入神秘主义和神秘化(《关于费尔巴哈的提纲》第八条)。\n\n在早期著作中，实践主要是以否定的术语来定义的：作为那些哲学忽视或舍弃了的东西，作为哲学所不是的东西。这是一个有争议的规定，尽管否定的定义有助于引出对辩证思想而言本质性的和积极的东西。这个新概念仍然没有得到充分的阐述。马克思对它的阐释还不足以预防某些特定的混淆。在《关于费尔巴哈的提纲》第二条中阐述的实践的标准，后来被解释为一种为了维护实践性而对理论的完全拒绝，被解释为对经验主义的追随和对效果的膜拜，被解释为一种实用主义。以哲学批判之名，哲学的重要性被忘记，这一事实也被忘记，即在马克思看来，实践包含着对哲学的超越。\n\n第2章 马克思的实践概念\n\n23\n\n扫描全能王创建","previous_page":22,"next_page":24}