{"resolved":true,"match_type":"uuid","source_type":"original_book","book_id":"fa2211c7-60b5-424b-a841-a97c7196aed1","title":"数据资本时代","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787508694313","requested_by":"printed_page","book":{"source_type":"original_book","book_id":"fa2211c7-60b5-424b-a841-a97c7196aed1","id":"fa2211c7-60b5-424b-a841-a97c7196aed1","uuid":"fa2211c7-60b5-424b-a841-a97c7196aed1","title":"数据资本时代","normalized_title":"数据资本时代","author":null,"edition":null,"publisher":null,"year":null,"isbn":"9787508694313","isbns":["9787508694313","9783642038211"],"parsed":true,"ai_readable":true,"document_type":"book","page_count":278,"navigation_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/fa2211c7-60b5-424b-a841-a97c7196aed1","title_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/title/%E6%95%B0%E6%8D%AE%E8%B5%84%E6%9C%AC%E6%97%B6%E4%BB%A3","fixed_page_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/ai/book/fa2211c7-60b5-424b-a841-a97c7196aed1/page/{printed_page}","path_api_url_template":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/book/fa2211c7-60b5-424b-a841-a97c7196aed1/page/{printed_page}","read_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/fa2211c7-60b5-424b-a841-a97c7196aed1","page_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/fa2211c7-60b5-424b-a841-a97c7196aed1/page","search_url":"https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/books/fa2211c7-60b5-424b-a841-a97c7196aed1/search"},"page":{"printed_page":237,"pdf_page":257,"physical_index":257,"physical_index_base":0,"printed_page_status":"recognized","page_sha256":"dfad4966be58015cbcf93a81d772388b73a157db1aa56fec2479a3f7cd08524e"},"chapter":"第3章 市场与货币","content":"参考文献\n\n40. Honda's sales fell from 90 percent: Hagel and Brown, The Only Sustainable Edge, 108 - 109.\n\n第3章 市场与货币\n\n41. market volatility plummeted: Robert Jensen, “The Digital Provide: Information (Technology), Market Performance, and Welfare in the South Indian Fisheries Sector,\" Quarterly Journal of Economics 122, no. 3 (August 2007), 879-924, https://academic.oup.com/qje/articleabstract/122/3/879/1879540/The-Digital-Provide-Information-Technology-Market.\n\n42. “The market is essentially an ordering mechanism” : Friedrich August von Hayek, “Coping with Ignorance,\" Ludwig von Mises Memorial Lecture, Hillsdale College, Hillsdale, Ml, July 1978.\n\n43. the market for used cars: George A. Akerlof, “The Market for Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism,\" Quarterly Journal of Economics 84, no. 3 (August 1970), 488- 500, http:// qje.oxfordjournals.org/content/84/3/488.short.\n\n44. fewer peaches are offered for sale: Information asymmetries can also cause sellers to lose out when they undervalue their goods and services and a more informed buyer takes advantage of it. For example, a seller may offer an initial service at a loss to a buyer, imagining that the transaction will lead to repeat sales, not knowing that\n\n45. the buyer never intends to come back—or would only do so for the same low price. The seller's \"loss leader\" leads to nothing but a loss.\n\n46. before copycats appear and free ride: In his famous book The Theory of Economic Development, Joseph Schumpeter argued that entrepreneurs, by definition, have discovered a category of exclusive information. They're the first people to identify a new market, patent an invention, launch an efficient means of production, or introduce some other \"new combination\" —a wayto coordinate human activity—before anyone else is aware of it. For Schumpeter and his acolytes, the resulting information asymmetry creates an economic incentive. Even though the market becomes less efficient, that is the price we pay for innovation, Hence, information imbalances aren't necessarily bad—up to a point. The incentives created by information asymmetries are essential to innovation, but the reward for innovation cannot be permanent without harming the market. Asymmetries must be fleeting and temporal lest market predators exploit their information monopoly forever, creating a vacuum, a black hole in which information is trapped. Information vacuums force buyers to make suboptimal decisions. Thankfully, most information asymmetries are temporary. Competitors copy or emulate innovations and catch up, erasing the innovator' s information advantage.\n\n47. a transactiontakes placethat shouldn't: There are numerous such cases; see, e.g., the discovery of an original Declaration of Independence hidden in a picture bought at a flea market (Eleanor Blau, “Declaration of Independence Sells for \\$2.4 Million,\"New York Times\n\n237","previous_page":236,"next_page":238}