AI经济：机器人时代的工作、财富和社会福利（被科技洪流裹挟的每个人，都需要在AI时代做出自己的选择）

第3章

[1] Simon, H. (1966) "Automation", letter in the New York Review of Books, May 26, 1966.

[2] This remark, or something very much like it, is widely attributed to a range of people including Yogi Berra (the baseball coach of the New York Yankees), Niels Bohr, Albert Einstein, and Sam Goldwyn (the movie mogul).

[3] This statement is widely attributed to the great sage but I have found it impossible to pin down chapter and verse.

[4] Strictly speaking, there should be an increase in the volume of investment, but if the price of investment goods falls sufficiently then the total value of investment spending may not rise. This then undermines my subsequent point about real interest rates needing to rise.

[5] Ford, M. (2015) The Rise of the Robots, London: Oneworld.

[6] Say, J. B. (1803) A Treatise on Political Economy, New American Edition, 1859, Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott & Co.

[7] Downturns arise when, for a variety of reasons, the aggregate desire to save (i.e., not to spend all income) exceeds the aggregate desire to invest, and consequently aggregate demand falls short of productive potential. Demand bounces back when the aggregate desire to save falls short of the aggregate desire to invest.

Some economists argue that if we are again faced with a serious shortfall of demand, governments should do nothing. They should simply let demand fall short and let the economy turn down, and then recover through natural means. This is a return to what is

called the classical view that was advocated by many economists in the 1930s. Those who take this line are sometimes described as the "Austrian school," after a group of Austrian economists, led by the late Friedrich von Hayek, who took this position. Some economists of this school argued that, if a depressed economy is left to its own devices, recovery will occur spontaneously as inefficient production is "purged." Others, typically from the more analytical Anglo-Saxon tradition, also argued that recovery would occur automatically but because a depressed economy would cause prices to fall, thereby increasing the real value of the money supply, which would, ultimately, make people feel wealthier–this would spark an increase in spending and hence bring an economic recovery.

[8] This is not the place to engage in a detailed discussion of Keynesian economics. Suffice it to say that many economists, myself included, think that the Austrian approach to depressions (although not necessarily to other things) is, to use a technical economic term, bonkers. What's more, the "neoclassical" approach that relies on an increasing real value of the money supply to bring recovery is bonkers squared.

[9] Bootle, R. (2017) Making a Success of Brexit and Reforming the EU, London: Nicholas Brealey.

[10] Reported in the Financial Times, September 6, 2018.

第4章

[23] Jerome, J. K. (1889) Three Men in a Boat–To Say Nothing of the Dog!, London: Penguin.

[24] Reported in The Daily Telegraph, January 19, 2019.

[25] In fact, we should not just lazily extrapolate from the very dramatic increases in life expectancy that have been achieved over the last hundred years. Over this period life expectancy has just about doubled. But, as Yuval Noah Harari has argued, this was not through the extension of a normal human life but rather because of a large reduction in the numbers of people suffering a premature death from malnutrition, infectious diseases and violence. In the distant past, if you escaped these depredations, it was not at all unusual for people to live to a ripe old age. As Harari (2016) points out, Galileo Galilei died at 77, Isaac Newton at 84, and Michelangelo at 88. He says: "In truth, so far modern medicine hasn’t extended our natural life span by a single year."

[26] Bregman, R. (2017) Utopia for Realists, London: Bloomsbury Publishing.

[27] Wilde (1888), The Remarkable Rocket, Reprint 2017, London: Sovereign Publishing.

[28] See Stiglitz (2010), op. cit.

第5章

[14] For a skeptical view of the prospects for driverless vehicles, see Christian Wolmar, "False Start," The Spectator, July 7, 2018 and his book (2017) Driverless Cars: On a Road to Nowhere, London: London Publishing Partnership.

[27] World Economic Forum, in collaboration with The Boston Consulting Group (2018) Toward a Reskilling Revolution A Future of Jobs for All, Geneva: World Economic Forum.

[28] Ford (2015), op. cit., p. 162.

[29] See the report in The Daily Telegraph, February 26, 2018.

[30] Referred to in Ross (2016), op. cit., p. 33.

[31] Quoted in Chace (2016), op. cit., p. 146.

[32] Referred to in Susskind, R. and Susskind, D. (2017) The Future of the Professions: How Technology will Transform the Work of Human Experts, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 45–7.

[33] Adams 2009.

[34] Chace (2016), op. cit., p. 165.

[35] Keynes, J. M. (1936) The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, London: Macmillan.

第6章

[1] Harari, Y. N. (2011) Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind, London: Harvill Secker.

[3] Case, A. and Deaton, A (2015) Rising Morbidity and Mortality in Midlife among White Non-Hispanic Americas in the Twenty-first Century, PNAS, 112(49), Princeton: Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs and Department of Economics, Princeton University, Princeton, September 17.

[4] Bregman, R. (2017) Utopia for Realists, London: Bloomsbury Publishing, p.185.

[5] Income inequality between quintiles has not been as high; it did not rise as much as in the USA during the 1980s, and it has been fairly unchanged since 1990. Between 1980 and 2014 real disposable income in the UK rose by 86 percent. Post-tax incomes of the top quintile doubled, while those of the bottom quintile increased by 62 percent. The top income quintile earned 37 percent of total post-tax income in 1980, with 5 percent going to the top 1 percent. By 1990 these shares had risen to 43 percent and 8 percent, respectively. Since 1990, the top quintile share has not changed very much, while the top 1 percent share continued to rise until 2007. These data come from World Inequality Database, https://wid.world/data/ and Office for National Statistics, Effects of taxes and benefits on household income: historical datasets, https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/personalandhous eholdfinances/incomeandwealth/datasets/theeffectsoftaxesandbenefits onhouseholdincome historicaldatasets.