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# Zombie Capitalism Global Crisis and the Relevance of Marx

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In the early stages of capitalism this was not a problem. It was not a closed system. Precisely because it grew up within a precapitalist world it was surrounded by people who were not part of it-artisans, the remnants of feudal ruling classes and vast numbers of subsistence peasants. They could absorb the surplus goods, providing raw materials in return. But the more capitalism came to dominate in a particular country, the more it would be faced with this contradiction-unless it expanded outwards to seize control of other, pre-capitalist, societies. Colonisation was in this way essential for the continued functioning of the system. Without it capitalism would collapse.

Luxemburg did not simply produce this argument in an analytical form. She supplemented it with chapter after chapter showing in horrifying detail how the historical development of capitalism in Europe and North America had been accompanied by the subjugation and exploitation of the rest of the world. Her conclusion, like Lenin and Bukharin's, was that socialist revolution was the only alternative to imperialism and war.

Her analysis was, however, subject to trenchant and devastating critiques, most notably by the Austrian reformist Marxist Otto Bauer and by Bukharin. Bauer produced his own versions of the reproduction tables, claiming that there was no problem getting the inputs and outputs to balance properly over several rounds of production. Bukharin concentrated on refuting points Luxemburg made in her "anti-critique" reply to Bauer. She had argued that there had to be something outside capitalism to provide an incentive to the capitalists to keep investing. It was not good enough for ever increasing amounts of investment to absorb the growing output of society, since, she argued, this would provide no gain to the capitalists to justify such investment:

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Production to an ever greater extent for production's sake is, from the capitalist point of view, absurd because in this way it is impossible for the entire capitalist class to realise a profit and therefore to accumulate.48

Bukharin's reply, in essence, amounted to pointing out that it was precisely such apparently absurd accumulation for the sake of accumulation that characterised capitalism for Marx.49 Capitalism did not need a goal outside itself. It could be added that it is precisely this which epitomises the extreme alienation of human activity in the system: it is driven forward not by the satisfaction of human need, not even by the human need of the capitalist, but by its own dynamic.

Bukharin did not deny that discrepancies arise in the course of capitalist development between production and consumption. He insisted in his comments on Luxemburg that they are inevitablebut it is precisely the capitalist crisis that overcomes them. Over-accumulation and overproduction occur, but not all the time. They arise in the course of the crisis and are liquidated by its further development. And Bukharin quoted Marx: "There is no permanent crisis" .5° For him imperialism was not to be explained by the problems of overproduction, but by the way in which it aids the capitalist pursuit of higher profits.

Bukharin's argument against Luxemburg cannot be faulted. But he and Lenin do leave something unexplained: why the export of capital during the high tide of imperialist expansion was able to lead capitalism out of the Great Depression. For all its problems, Rosa Luxemburg's theory did attempt to find a link between imperialism and the temporary mitigation of crisis, which Lenin and Bukharin failed to.

Writing in the 1 920s, Henryk Grossman, critical both of Rosa Luxemburg and her detractors,51 did point to a way of making the link. The flow of capital from existing centres of accumulation to new ones overseas could ease the pressure leading to a rising organic composition of capital and a falling rate of profit, even if such a solution would "only have a short time effect" .51

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This insight can make sense of the actual pattern of economic development during the high tide of imperialism at the end of the 19th century. Had the half of British investment that went overseas been invested domestically it would have raised the ratio of investment to labour (the organic composition of capital) and so lowered the rate of profit. As it was, estimates suggest that the capital-output ratio actually fell from 2.16 in 1 875-83 (the years of the first "Great Depression" ) to 1 . 82 in 1 891-1 901,53 and that the early 1 890s were a period of rising profit rates (following a fall from the 1860s to the 1 880s).54 And in these years what happened in Britain still had a major impact on the rest of the system.

This points to a wider and very important insight into the dynamic of capitalism in the 20th and 21st centuries to which we will return in later chapters. For the moment it is sufficient to recognise that imperialism arose out of the competitive drive of capitals to expand beyond national frontiers-and led, as a temporary side-effect, to a lessening of the pressures otherwise driving up the organic composition of capital and so lowering the rate of profit. But it could only be a temporary effect because eventually investments made in the new centres of accumulation would produce new surplus value seeking investment and exerting a downward pressure on profit rates. As that happened the old contradictions in the system would return with a vengeance, opening up a new period of economic instability which would lead to intensified competition, not only of an economic but also of a military sort. This is effectively what happened in the first decades of the 20th century, with an international tendency towards falling profit rates and increased tensions between states. Amended in this way, the insistence by Lenin, Bukharin and Luxemburg on the connection between capitalism and war could be made theoretically watertight.

A problem Marx left behind

The classic theory of imperialism has one important implication. It raises the question of the relation between states and the capitals within them. Marx left the question unresolved. He took up some of its aspects in his non-economic writings,55 but did not get as far as integrating them into his analysis of the capitalist system as a whole. But the question is not one that any serious analysis of capitalism in the century after his death can avoid. A quick glance at the growth of state expenditure shows why (see the graph below for the United States). From its share of national output being more or less static through the 1 9th century, except at times of allout war, it started growing in the second third of the 20th century and has never stopped doing so.

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US Government Spending as Proportion of Gross Domestic Product56

The most common view of the state, among Marxists and non-Marxists alike, has been to see it as something external to the capitalist economic system. This approach has long been accepted by the mainstream "Realist" school in the academic discipline of international relations. It sees states as self-contained entities clashing internationally according to a logic which has nothing to do with the economic form of organisation existing within them.57 A somewhat similar approach is to be found in some Marxist writings.

Capitalism, in this view, consists of the pursuit of profits by firms (or, more accurately speaking, the self-expansion of capitals) without regard to where they are based geographically. The state, by contrast, is a geographically based political entity, whose boundaries cut across the operations of individual capitals. The state may be a structure that developed historically to provide the political prerequisites for capitalist production-to protect capitalist property, to police the dealings of different members of the ruling class with each other, to provide certain services which are essential for the reproduction of the system, and to carry through such reforms as are necessary to make other sections of society accept capitalist rule-but it is not to be identified with the capitals that operate within it.

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Those who view the state as simply external to capitalism tend to refer to the "state" in the singular-and often to "capital" in the singular as well. This way of putting it may make sense when providing an account of capitalism at the most abstract level, with the state providing a level playing field on which different capitals compete on equal terms. But the actually existing capitalist system is made up of many states58 and many capitals.59

But even those who see states as existing in the plural, as does Ellen Wood, often conclude that they serve the interests of capital in general, not of particular capitalists based within them. "The essential role of the state in capitalism", she argues:

is not to serve as an instrument of appropriation, or a form of "politically constituted property", but rather as a means of creating and sustaining the conditions of accumulation at arms length, maintaining the social, legal and administrative order necessary for accumulation. 60

As against these views, there are those whose analyses start from the classic theories of imperialism, with their language about the state "merging" with capital, of "state monopoly capitalism", or simply of "state capitalism", and their view of the clashes between states as an expression of international competition of the capitals operating within them.

A bowdlerised version of this view became part of the orthodoxy of Stalinised Marxism in the years from the 1 930s to the 1970s, known for short as "stamocap". A more serious attempt to describe the world system as composed of state capitals in the decades after the Second World War was made by Mike Kidron. 61 In his account individual states and individual capitals became completely congruent with each other: every state acted at the behest of a set of nationally based capitals, and every significant capital was incorporated in a particular state. Any exceptions, for Kidron, were a hangover from the past, relics which would disappear with the further development of the system.

A parallel attempt to see the world in terms of states representing capitals was developed in the early 1970s in debates between German Marxists.62 Claudia von Braunmuhl, for instance, wrote:

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it is not the state in general that must be analysed but "the specific political organisation of the world market in many states" . . . the role of the state in question in its specific relationship with the world market and with other states must always be included in the analysis from the outset. 63

Few people have followed through such attempts to develop such insights into a rigorous interpretation of the world system. But some of their presuppositions are taken for granted in everyday ways of talking and writing about the world. People habitually speak of "the economic interests" of this or that state, of how one is doing compared with another, of the "profits" of one or other country. So the recent very useful account of capitalism since the Second World War by Robert Brenner emphasises the interactions of "US capitalism", "Japanese capitalism" and "German capitalism", with negotiation by states playing a central role.64 There is the implication of a tight alignment of interest between a particular national state and a particular sector of the international capitalist system.

The view of national states as wholly congruent with "national" capitals is a big oversimplification, especially in today's world, with multinational corporations operating in scores of countries, as we shall see later. But this does not mean that states simply stand at "arms length" from particular capitals, or that states do not act at the behest of particular nationally based groupings of capital. They remain tied to them in complex ways.

The genesis of the capitalist state

A starting point for understanding this can be found in the relationship between the development of modern states and capitalism. This was not dealt with explicitly by Marx, and it was Engels who first did so in a manuscript written after Marx's death and not published until 1935. His studies led him to conclude that as merchants and tradespeople of the towns (the "burghers" ) grew in importance at the end of the Middle Ages they allied themselves with the monarchy against the rest of the feudal ruling class: "Out of the confusions of the people that characterised the early Middle Ages, there gradually developed the new nationalisms"-and the beginnings of national states very different to the earlier political structures.65

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Lenin further theoretically elaborated similar insights as the revolutionary movement in Russia tried to come to terms with the demand for independent states arising among the Tsarist empire's minority nationalities on its borders in south eastern Europe and in the colonial possessions of the West European powers.

He spelt out the deep connections between the struggle to establish national states and the emergence of groups in the pre-capitalist world who wanted to base themselves on capitalist forms of economic organisation:

Throughout the world, the period of the final victory of capitalism over feudalism has been linked up with national movements. For the complete victory of commodity production, the bourgeoisie must capture the home market, and there must be politically united territories whose population speak a single language, with all obstacles to the development of that language and to its consolidation in literature eliminated . . . Therefore, the tendency of every national movement is towards the formation of national states, under which these requirements of modern capitalism are best satisfied . . . The national state is typical and normal for the capitalist period.66

Modern states have not developed, according to this conception, as external to the capitals (or at least, to most of the capitals) based within them. They have been shaped historically by the process by which capitalist methods of accumulating wealth began to take root, first in parts of Europe and then in the rest of the world. Those groups identifying with such methods needed to protect themselves against the various social forces associated with the pre-capitalist society in which they developed-and very soon against other capitalist groups located elsewhere. This meant seeking to shape political structures to defend their common interests, by force if necessary, in what could be a hostile world. Where old pre-capitalist state forms existed, they had to get control of them and reorganise them to fit their own interests (as in England or France) or break apart from them to form new states (as with the Dutch Republic, the United States and the ex-colonial countries of the second half of the 20th century). By the late 19th century it was not only existing capitalist interests which sought to build such states. So too did elements from old exploiting classes in places like Germany, Tsarist Russia and japan who wanted to survive in a world increasingly dominated by capitalist powers on the one hand, and the middle class intelligentsia who came to play a leading role in many of the national movements in the colonial world on the other.

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This picture has been rejected by some Marxists on the grounds that states existed before the rise of capitalism. The "system of states" is then seen as something completely distinct from the system of capitalism, and there is a "logic of states" that differs from the "logic of capital". But the old states were not left as they were with the rise of capitalism. They were reshaped fundamentally, with a redrawing of old territorial boundaries and the establishment for the first time of centralised structures that reached down into the lives of every inhabitant (for the first time they were all "citizens").67 The fact that the new structures functioned through the deployment of force, not the production of commodities for sale, did not stop them being shaped by the changing relations of production and exploitation created by the rise of capitalism. And they were from the beginning-and remain today-structures that feed back into the organisation of production by capitals, influencing the tempo and direction of their accumulation. The logic of states was a product of the wider logic of capitalism, even if it frequently came into contradiction with other elements in the system. <sup>68</sup>

Capital exists in three forms-as productive capital, as commodity (or merchants') capital and as money capital.69 Every process of capital accumulation under fully developed capitalism involves repeated changes from one form to another: money capital is used to buy means of production, raw materials and labour power; these are put together in the production process to turn out commodities; these commodities are then exchanged for money; this money is then used to buy more means of production, raw materials and labour power, and so on. The forms of capital are continually interacting as one changes into the other. But there can also be a partial separation of these three different forms. The organisation of direct production, the selling of commodities and the supply of finance can devolve upon different groups of capitalists.

Money capital and commodity capital can be continually mobile, moving from place to place and across national boundaries, unless obstructed by the state or other bodies exercising force. Things are rather different with productive capitals. Regarded simply as accumulations of value, they differ from each other only in their size. But each individual capital, like each individual commodity, has a twofold character. As well as being measurable in terms of exchange value, it is also a concrete use value-a concrete set of relations between people and things in the process of production. Each particular capital has its concrete ways of bringing together labour power, raw materials and means of production, of raising finance and getting credit, and of maintaining networks for distributing and selling its output. These all involve interaction with other people and with nature, interactions of a physical sort, which take place on a day to day basis in fixed geographical locations.

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No productive capital can function without, on the one hand, a guarantee of its control of its own means of production (a guarantee which, in the last resort, relies upon "armed bodies of men"), and, on the other, a labour force that is doubly "free"-free from coercion by non-capitalist exploiters on the one hand and free from any way of making a livelihood than by selling its labour power on the other. The productive capitalists in any particular locality necessarily act together to try to shape its social and political conditions, that is to exercise influence over the state. As sociologist Neil Brenner puts it:

In its drive to accumulate surplus value, capital strives to . . . overcome all geographical barriers to its circulation process. Yet to pursue this continual dynamic . . . capital necessarily depends upon relatively fixed and immobile territorial infrastructures, such as urban regional agglomerations and territorial states . . . Capital's endemic drive . . . is intrinsically premised upon the production, reproduction, and reconfiguration of relatively fixed and immobile configurations of territorial organisation, including urban regional agglomerations, transportation networks, communication systems, and state regulatory institutions.70

Most capitalist enterprises operate not simply on market calculations, but also on the long-term relations they establish with other enterprises that sell to them and buy from them. Otherwise they would live in continual fear that any change in market conditions would cause their suppliers to sell elsewhere and those who transport and retail their goods suddenly to lose interest in them. They seek to "lock in" these other firms by a combination of financial incentives, business favours and personal contact. To this extent

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production does not take place in individual firms, but in "industrial complexes", which have grown up over time.71 The market models of classical and neo-classical economics portray capitals as isolated atoms which engage in blind competition with other capitals. In the real world capitalists have always tried to boost their competitive positions by establishing alliances with each other and with ambitious political figures-alliances cemented by money but also by intermarriage, old boy networks and mutual socialising.72 Even the fluidity of money capital does not diminish the importance of the particular national states for particular financial institutions. As Costas Lapavitsas has noted in his analysis of money under capitalism, "Trade credit depends on trust among individual capitalist enterprises that is subjective and private, since such trust draws on knowledge that enterprises have accumulated about each other in the course of their commercial relations" .73 And the networks that provide such knowledge have to a very high degree been organised on a national basis, with the state, through the central bank, playing a key role. "The institutions and markets of the credit system, regulated and managed by the central bank, place social power and trust at the service of capitalist accumulation" .74 The relationship between states and capitals are relationships between people, between those engaged in exploiting the mass of the population and those who control bodies of armed men. Personal contact with the leading personnel of the state is something every capitalist aims at-just as every capitalist seeks to cultivate ties of trust and mutual support with certain other capitalists. The "connections" Lenin referred to75 are immensely important. Such interactions inevitably leave an imprint on the interna make up of each capital, so that any particular capital would find it very difficult to cope if it were suddenly to be torn apart from the other capitals and the state with which it has co-existed in the past. The national state and different nationally based capitals grow up together, like children in a single family. The development of one inevitably shapes the development of the others. The groups of capitals and the state with which they are associated form a system in which each affects the others. The specific character of each capital is influenced by its interaction with the other capitals and the state. It reflects not only the general drive to expand value, to accumulate, but also the specific environment in Beyond Marx: Monopoly, War and the State Beyond Marx: Monopoly, War and the State 109 109

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