InventingtheFuturePostcapitalismandaWorldWithoutWorkNickSrnicekAlexWilliamsZLibrary的全文翻译

1. Susantu Basu and John Fernald, Information and Communications Technology as a General-Purpose Technology: Evidence from U.S. Industry Data (San Francisco: Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Working Paper, 2006), p. 17, pdf available at frbsf.org

1. However, emerging research suggests industrial robots have already contributed around 16 per cent of recent labour productivity growth. Georg Graetz and Guy Michaels, Robots at Work (London: Centre for Economic Performance, 2015), p. 21, pd available at events.crei.cat.

1. Frey and Osborne, Technology at Work, p. 40.

1. Frey and Osborne, Future of Employment, p. 38; Stuart Elliott, Anticipating a Luddite Revival’ , Issues in Science and Technology 30: 3 (2014), at issues.org.

1. The standard Marxist response to full automation is to point to its objective’ limits by arguing that capitalism will never eliminate its source of surplus value (i.e. labour). But this argument confuses a systemic outcome with an individual incentive, an internal barrier with an absolute limit, and a political struggle with a theoretical tension. In the first place, the individual imperatives are to increase the productivity of technology in order to gain extra surplus value relative to other capitalists. The systemic outcome of this is detrimental for all capitalists (less surplus value being produced), but still remains beneficial for individual capitalists, and will therefore continue. In the second place, the limits of the capitalist mode of production are mistakenly taken to be the limits of any possible change. If capitalism cannot survive with full automation, it is deemed that full automation must not be possible. Such a position makes capitalism the end-point of history, rejecting in advance any postcapitalist possibility. Finally, the theoretically derived tension between increased productivity, rising organic composition and a reduced rate of profit is taken to present a situation that capital will never allow to occur because of its systemic effects. Missing from this account is a political movement that would struggle to push capitalism beyond itself. In other words, the argument that full automation will never occur simply posits that political struggle is ineffective. In the end, such a line of reasoning gives up on every critical account of capitalism, and accepts it as the final stage of history. As Ramin Ramtin bluntly puts it, The fact that [full automation] would result in explosive socioeconomic and political contradictions does not make it impossible’ (Ramtin, Capitalism and Automation, p. 103). The simple wager of the demand for full automation is that wealth can be produced in non-capitalist ways. For representative critiques of full automation, see Ernest Mandel, Late Capitalism (London: Verso, 1998), p. 205; George Caffentzis, The End of Work or the Renaissance of Slavery? A Critique of Rifkin and Negri’ , in In Letters of Blood and Fire (Oakland, CA: PM Press, 2012), p. 78

1. It should be mentioned that, increasingly, tacit knowledge tasks are being automated through environmental control and machine learning, with more recent innovations eliminating even the need for a controlled environment. Frey and Osborne, Future of Employment, p. 27; Autor, Polanyi's Paradox; Sarah Yang, New “Deep Learning" Technique Enables Robot Mastery of Skilǐs via Trial and Error', Phys.org, 21 May 2015, at phys.org.

1. As Marx notes, because of this the field of application for machinery would therefore be entirely different in a communist society from what it is in bourgeois society.’ Marx, Capital, Volume I, p. 515 n. 33.

1. Silvia Federici, Permanent Reproductive Crisis: An Interview’, Mute, 7 March 2013, at metamute.org

1. For an excellent overview of historical experiences of alternative domestic arrangements, see Dolores Hayden, Grand Domestic Revolution: A History of Feminist Designs for American Homes, Neighbourhoods and Cities (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996).

1. However, it is important to recognise that, historically, domestic labour-saving devices have tended to place greater demands on household maintenance, rather than allowing more free time. Ruth Schwartz Cowan, More Work for Mother: The Ironies of Household Technology from the Open Hearth to the Microwave (New York: Basic Books, 1985); Leopoldina Fortunati, The Arçane of Reproduction: Housework, Prostitution, Labor and Capital (Brooklyn: Autonomedia, 1995), p. 145; Silvia Federici, The Reproduction of Labor Power in the Global Economy and the Unfinished Feminist Revolution' , in Revolution at Point Zero: Housework, Reproduction, and Feminist Struggle (Oakland, CA: PM Press, 2012), pp. 106–7.

1. Robot Capable of Sorting Through and Folding Piles of Rumpled Clothes’ Phys.org, 16 March 2015, at phys.org.

1. Thanks to Helen Hester for emphasizing this point to us.

1. Shulamith Firestone, The Dialectic of Sex: The Case for Feminist Revolution (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2003), pp. 180– 1.

1. E. P. Thompson, Time, Work-Discipline, and Industrial Capitalism' , Past & Present 38: 1 (1967), p. 85; Stanley Aronowitz, Dawn Esposito, William DiFazio and Margaret Yard, The Post-Work Manifesto' , in Stanley Aronowitz and Jonathan Cutler, eds, Post-Work: The Wages of Cybernation (New York: Routledge, 1998), pp. 59–60; David Graeber, 'Revolution at the Level of Common Sense' , in Federico Campagna and Emanuele Campiglio, eds, What We Are Fighting For: A Radical Collective Manifesto (London: Pluto, 2012), p. 171.

1. Roland Paulsen, Non-Work at Work: Resistance or What?’, Organization, 2013, at sagepub.com.

7.一个新的常识

明尼苏达出版社，2006);J.K.吉布森-格雷厄姆，《后资本主义政治》(明尼阿波利斯:明尼苏达大学出版社，2006)。

8.有许多对霸权的批评，包括理查德·戴，葛兰西已死:最新社会运动中的无政府主义潮流(伦敦:冥王星，2005);斯科特·拉什(ScottLash)，《霸权之后的权力:变异中的文化研究?》《理论，文化与社会》24:3(2007)；《当代世界的权力、抵抗和冲突:社会运动、网络和等级制度》(伦敦/纽约:劳特利奇出版社，2010);乔恩·比斯利-穆雷，《后神权:政治理论与拉丁美洲》(明尼阿波利斯:明尼苏达大学出版社，2010)。足以说明的是，这些批评大多建立在对霸权的错误建构之上，要么等同于统治(在其所有后葛兰西的表述中，霸权显然不是)， 要么依赖于积极的同意(霸权并非如此)。虽然其他关于权力的理论理解—一比如福柯、德勒兹、瓜塔里和布迪厄等思想家提出的理论理解——可能被有效地应用于霸权观念所提供的观点的补充，但我们不同意最近那些认为它们可以有效地取代霸权的人的观点。

9.在这里需要注意的是，虽然霸权治理通常是在(至少是被动的)同意的范围内，但它并不意味着完全没有统治或强制力量。它仅仅表明了一种情况，在这种情况下，强制力必须披着令人尊敬的共识外衣。参见葛兰西，《监狱笔记选集》，第80页。这种澄清是必要的，以避免批评者对葛兰西霸权理论的那种指责，这些批评者想要证明这一思想的历史文化特殊性，特别是考虑到它与非常不同的政治形势(如英国殖民统治下的印度)明显不相容，或奴隶制时期的美国。参见RanajitGuha，《没有霸权的统治:殖民印度的历史与权力》(Cambridge,MA: Harvard UniversityPress,1998);弗兰克·怀尔德森: 《葛兰西的黑色马克思:公民社会中的奴隶向何处去?》《社会身份》(SocialIdentities)9:2(2003)。我们将假定，在本章中概述的广义意义上的霸权将适用于任何统治不是主要治理模式的复杂社会。

10.“我们可以”党领导人Pablo Iglesias也提出了这一观点。Pablo Iglesias，“左派能赢”，雅各宾，2014年12月9日，jacobinmag.como

12.虽然葛兰西主义经常与欧洲共产主义政治倾向联系在一起，但我们将把霸权理论的基本政治分析和战略洞见与这一特定的历史表现区分开来。的确，在我们看来，公开关注选举主义而不是实现更广泛的霸权转型，似乎是对霸权本身的基本见解的放弃一一其中最重要的是对权力的理解，认为权力存在于多个互锁的位点中，而国家只是其中之一。

13.虽然我们赞同埃内斯托·拉克劳和尚塔尔·墨菲著作中所包含的霸权概念的扩展，特别是其中所包含的政治主体性范围的扩展，但这并非没有问题。话语理论作为社会本体论的使用导致了一种有效的反现实主义解释，这对理解政治世界的复杂性这一更广泛的项目造成了不必要的伤害。参见埃内斯托·拉克劳和尚塔尔·墨菲，霸权和社会主义战略(伦敦/纽约:Verso，1985);埃内斯托·拉克劳：《对我们时代革命的新思考》(伦敦/纽约:Verso出版社，1990)。关于拉克劳和墨菲基于话语的霸权理论的长篇批判，请见杰夫·鲍彻，《意识形态的魔圈:拉克劳和墨菲、巴特勒和iek批判》(墨尔本:出版社，2009年)。

1. For more information, see wea.org.uk.

1. There is an extensive literature on this political nature in the field of science and technology studies, bu we would also add research on skill-biased and class-biased technical change. David Autor, Frank Levy and Richard Murnane, ‘The Skill Content of Recent Technological Change: An Empirical Exploration’ , Quarterly Journal of Economics 118: 4 (2003); Amit Basole, Class-Biased Technical Change and Socialism: Some Reflections on Benedito Moraes-Neto' s “On the Labor Process and Productive Efficiency: Discussing the Socialist Project"’, Rethinking Marxism 25: 4 (2013).

1. For one of the earliest arguments to this effect, see Raniero Panzieri, ‘The Capitalist Use of Machinery: Marx Versus the “Objectivists”’, in Slater, Outlines of a Critique of Technology.

1. David F. Noble, Forces of Production: A Social History of Industrial Automation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume I, transl. Ben Fowkes (London: Penguin, 1990), p. 526.

1. Melvin Kranzberg, ‘Technology and History:‘Kranzberg’s Laws"’, Technology and Culture 27:3 (1986), p. 545.

1. George Basalla, The Evolution of Technology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 7.

1. On how users shape technology, see Nellie Ooudshorn and Trevor Pinch, eds, How Users Matter: The Co-Construction of Users and Technology (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005).

1. Harry Cleaver, Technology as Political Weaponry’ , in The Responsibility of the Scientific and Technological Enterprise in Technology Transfer, American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1981, pdf available at academia.edu.

1. Even if never used, nuclear weapons are still fundamentally premised on this function.

1. For an incisive reflection on cognitive workers and their relation to other figures of the working class, see Matteo Pasquinelli, To Anticipate and Accelerate: Italian Operaismo and Reading Marx’ s Notion of the Organic Composition of Capital' , Rethinking Marxism 26: 2 (2014).

1. 建筑动力

1. By power’ , we mean the capacity to bring about one’ s interests. Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View, 2nd edn (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).

1. John Holloway, Change the World Without Taking Power: The Meaning of Revolution Today (London/Sterling, VA: Pluto, 2002).

1. We focus on these three factors here, but there are undoubtedly numerous others -not least, unpredictable elements like luck and individual vision.

1. In terms of traditional class struggle, this category includes associational power, marketplace bargaining power and workplace bargaining power. Beverly Silver, Forces of Labor: Workers' Movements and Globalization Since 1870 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 13–16.

1. Indeed, the unique feature of class conflict under capitalism was argued to be its tendency to simplify the antagonism. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto', in Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, and the Communist Manifesto (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1988), p. 210.

1. The Holding Pattern: The Ongoing Crisis and the Class Struggles of 2011–2013’, Endnotes 3 (2013), at endnotes.org.uk, pp. 49-50.

1. Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward, Poor People's Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail (New York: Random House, 1988), p. 194.

1. Marx and Engels, Communist Manifesto', pp. 217–18.

1. As Beverly Silver reminds us, though, we should not assume that these tactics and leverage points were obvious from the beginning. They had to be invented and built up through practice and experimentation. Silver, Forces of Labor, p. 6.

1. ‘Editorial’, Endnotes 3 (2013), p. 7.

1. Göran Therborn, New Masses? Social Bases of Resistance', New Left Review II/85 (January-February 2014), p. 9.

1. Ching Kwan Lee, Against the Law: Labor Protests in China's Rustbelt and Sunbelt (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2007); Kevin Hamlin, Ilya Gridneff and William Davison, Ethiopia Becomes China' s China in Global Search for Cheap Labor' , Business Week, 22 July 2014.

1. Silvia Federici, Caliban and the Witch: Women, the Body and Primitive Accumulation (New York: Autonomedia, 2004), pp. 63– 4; Zak Cope, Divided World, Divided Class: Global Political Economy and the Stratification of Labour Under Capitalism (Montreal: Kersplebedeb, 2012).

1. To give just a sample of how this topic has been broached, we can point to the problem of building the common, the problem of articulating a hegemony, the problem of the party, the problem of composition and the problem of framing. See, respectively, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire (New York: Penguin, 2005); Ernesto Laclau,, On Populist Reason (London: Verso, 2007); Jodi Dean, The Communist Horizon (London: Verso, 2012); ‘The Holding Pattern’ ; Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, 2nd edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

1. Badiou, for example, offers a critique of the tendency of minimal rights to reduce the human down to its animalistic basis. Alain