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# 算法的陷阱：超级平台、算法垄断与场景欺骗

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第12章 行为歧视的社会经济效应

1. Michael Eisen, “Amazon’s \$23,698,655.93 Book about Flies,”It Is NOT Junk（April 22, 2011）, http://www.michaeleisen.org/blog/?p=358.

2. P. T. Leeson and R. Sobel, “Costly Price Discrimination,”EconomicsLetters 99, no. 1（2008）: 206-208,http://www.peterleeson.com/Costly\_Price\_Discrimination.pdf; 文中提到，“我们之所以说‘完美的价格歧视的社会效率低下’，是因为企业需要在实施价格歧视的过程中负担种种开支。这些成本包括细分客户、识别需求弹性、防止转售。不论是在什么行业，这些成本都不菲。由此，也不是所有的企业的会采取如此的定价策略。（学术界）不该在现有的价格歧视理论中忽视这些交易成本。瓦里安（Varian）曾指出，‘一个完整的价格歧视社会福利效应分析不能忽视这种定价策略在施行过程中的交易成本’”。

3. P. Papandropoulos, “How Should Price Discrimination Be Dealt with by Competition Authorities?” Revue des droits de la concurrence 3（2007）: 34-38, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/competition/economist/concurrences\_03 \_2007.pdf.

4. 有一点值得注意，在一项有关航空票价的研究中，研究者发现航空公司的实际策略符合他们对其定价模式的设想：当飞特定航线的航空公司增多时，航空公司会为需求价格弹性较高的旅客提供更优惠的票价，与此同时却维持对需求价格弹性低的旅客的票价。详见：J. Stavins,“Price Discrimination in the Airline Markets: The Effect of MarketConcentration,” Review of Economics and Statistics 83（2001）:200。

5. 比方说，医药行业市场，“在低收入水平国家，当地的民众会仅仅因为价格问题而不愿购买那些药效显著的药剂。这样看来，这些地方更需要价格歧视，特别是大规模的降价销售”。详见：JudithL. Wagnerand Elizabeth McCarthy, “International Differences in Drug Prices,” AnnualReview of Public Health 25（2004）: 475。

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6. 同样还是医药行业市场的例子，由Jerry Hausman和JeffreyK.MacKie-Mason开展的一项研究揭示，由于价格歧视带给企业研发活动的积极影响，整体社会福利效应会在动态变化中得到改善。详见：Jerry A. Hausman and Jeffrey McKie-Mason, “Price Discrimination andPatent Policy,” RAND Journal of Economics 19（1988）: 253。当企业能够通过价格歧视来负担研发活动造成的高昂前期投入成本时，他们也会有更大的创新动力：“如果考虑到动态激励，价格歧视也可以确保企业通过赚取可观的回报来维持长期的研发投资热情。”Papandropoulos,“How Should Price Discrimination Be Dealt with by CompetitionAuthorities?”如果企业具备创新能力，那么创新的动力将被由创新带来的财务收益点燃。这一经济框架“经常与著名经济学家约瑟夫·熊彼特（Joseph Schumpeter）教授联系在一起”，他建议说：“拥有市场力量的公司应该最有动机创新，这是由他们的经营规模与市场地位决定的。”详见：D. L. Weisman and R. B.Kulick, “Price Discrimination, Two-Sided Markets, and Net Neutrality Regulation,” Tulane Journal ofTechnology and Intellectual Property 13（2010）: 81,https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Dennis\_Weisman/publication/22830799Sided\_Markets\_and\_Net\_Neutrality\_Regulation/links/0deec5187eadf2a5c800

7. Josh Wright, “Price Discrimination Is Good, Part I,” Truth on theMarket（November 30, 2008）,http://truthonthemarket.com/2008/11/30/price -discrimination-is-good-part-i/.一般来讲，这种理念与诺贝尔经济学奖获得者肯尼斯·阿罗（KennethArrow）不无关系，他提出“由创新带来的业务扩张多是来源于竞争对手的拱手相让，而寡头企业则可能在很大程度上蚕食自己的业务”。详

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见：Weisman andKulick, “Price Discrimination, Two-Sided Markets, and Net Neutrality Regulation.”

8. “价格歧视之所以会加剧竞争的原因在于：在统一定价策略下，企业只会就边际消费者展开争夺；但通过价格歧视，企业可以争夺市场中的所有客户，包括那些对竞争对手有着强烈忠诚度的顾客。”详见：Papandropoulos, “How Should Price Discrimination Be Dealt with byCompetition Authorities?”

9. 以欧洲的汽车租赁行业为例。2014年，欧盟委员会致函六家国际汽车租赁公司，包括Avis、Europcar和Hertz。原来，这几家租车公司会针对顾客的国别而进行差别化定价。详见：“Car HirePrices ‘UnfairlyVary’ across the EU,” BBC News（August 12,2014）,http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-28756674。美国司法部在2003年的一起并购案中也注意到了这个问题。该案关乎北加州的两大临床实验室测试服务供应商——Quest Diagnostics公司与Unilab公司。“虽然这些服务的购买者不能将服务转售给其他客户并获取经济价值，但服务供应商可以根据医生的供职地确定这些客户还可选择的竞争替代品的多寡。这说明，并购促成后的这个垄断者可以基于客户的所在地进行价格歧视。”详见：Federal Trade Commission and U.S.Department of Justice,Commentary on the Horizontal Merger Guidelines（March 2006）, 8,http://www.justice.gov/atr/commentary-horizontalmerger-guidelines。

10. Commission Decision 85/609 ECS/AKZO, OJ L 374（December 31, 1985）, para. 83.

11. Competition and Markets Authority, The Commercial Use of Consumer Data, CMA38（June 2015）, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system /uploads/attachment\_data/file/435817/The\_commercial\_use\_of\_consumer\_da .pdf, 3.48.

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12. Papandropoulos, “How Should Price Discrimination Be Dealt withby Competition Authorities?”“价格歧视也可以成为实施掠夺性定价的手段。事实上，它还可以降低掠夺性定价的实施成本，从而让在行业中占支配地位的企业通过定价歧视实现掠夺性定价的暴利。

13. Donald S. Clark（secretary of the Federal Trade Commission）, The Robinson- Patman Act: General Principles, Commission Proceedings, and Selected Issues（San Jose, CA: Federal Trade Commission, June 7, 1995）,https://www.ftc.gov /public-statements/1995/06/robinson-patmanact-generalprinciples-commission-proceedings-and-selected.

14. Office of Fair Trading, The Economics of Personalised Pricing,OFT1488（May 2013）, http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140402142426/, http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared\_oft/research/oft1488.pdf; see also Office of Fair Trading, Personalised Pricing: Increasing Transparency to Improve Trust, OFT1489（May 2013）, http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140402142426/, http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared\_oft/markets-work /personalisedpricing/oft1489.pdf.

15. Competition and Markets Authority, The Commercial Use ofConsumer Data, 90（美国公平交易局在2012年曾号召企业在施行个性化定价策略时公布更多内情）。

16. Laura Bach, “Tobacco Company Marketing to Kids,” Campaign for Tobacco- Free Kids（June 4, 2015）, https://www.tobaccofreekids.org/research/factsheets/pdf/0008.pdf。

17. Laura Bach, “Tobacco Company Marketing to Kids,” Campaign for Tobacco- Free Kids（June 4, 2015）, https://www.tobaccofreekids.org/research/factsheets/pdf/0008.pdf

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18. United States v. Brown University, 5 F.3d 658（3d Cir. 1993）.

19. Stacy Dale and Alan B. Krueger, “Estimating the Return to College Selectivity over the Career Using Administrative Earning Data,”Princeton University Working Paper 563（February 16, 2011）, http://Lbnet.com/blogs /ivy-league-study.pdf。

20. Derek Thompson, “Why Smart Poor Students Don’t Apply to Selective Colleges（and How to Fix It）,” The Atlantic, January 24, 2013, http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2013/01/whysmart-poorstudents-dont-apply-to-selective-colleges-and-how-to-fixit/272490/; Caroline M. Hoxby and Christopher Avery, “The Missing‘One-Offs’: The Hidden Supply of High-Achieving, Low Income Students,” NBER Working Paper 18586（December 2012）, http://www.nber.org/papers/w18586（数据显示 大量出身贫寒的优秀高中生没有向那些精英学府提交入学申请……即便 这些学校会通过慷慨的奖学金制度向他们收取更低的学费）。

21. Maurice E. Stucke, “Is Intent Relevant?” Journal of Law,Economics& Policy 8（2012）: 801, 822-828（文中提及了很多可以验证这个结论的研究文献）; see also Lynn A. Stout, Cultivating Conscience: How GoodLaws Make Good People（Princeton, NJ:Princeton University Press,2011）, 238-240（文中讨论了公平与亲社会行为的社会规范在市场经济中的常见性和必要性）；ThomasJ. Horton, “Unraveling the Chicago/Harvard Antitrust Double Helix:Applying Evolutionary Theory to GuardCompetitors and Revive Antitrust Jury Trials,” University of Baltimore LawReview 41（2012）: 615, 653654 ［引用了“公平是如何成为维持经济关系中社会和谐的稳定策略”的研究成果以及神经生物学方面的研究：“（资源）分配上的公平性是人类情绪处理过程中的关键”］，详见：Joan Roughgarden, The Genial Gene: Deconstructing Darwinian

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Selfishness（Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009）, 160; Michael Shermer, The Mind of the Market: Compassionate Apes, Competitive Humans, and Other Tales from Evolutionary Economics（New York: Times Books, 2008）, 11。

23. Ellen Garbarino and Sarah Maxwell, “Consumer Response to Norm-Breaking Pricing Events in E-Commerce,” Journal of Business Research 63（2010）: 1066, 1069.

24. Lan Xia and Kent B. Monroe, “Is a Good Deal Always Fair? Examining the Concepts of Transaction Value and Price Fairness,”Journal of Economic Psychology 31（2010）: 884, 891.

25. Joseph Turow, Lauren Feldman, and Kimberly Meltzer, “Open to Exploitation: American Shoppers Online and Offline,” Report from the Annenberg Public Policy Center of the University of Pennsylvania（June 1, 2005）, 4, http://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi? article=1035&context=asc \_ papers.

26. Joseph Turow, Lauren Feldman, and Kimberly Meltzer, “Open to Exploitation: American Shoppers Online and Offline,” Report from the Annenberg Public Policy Center of the University of Pennsylvania（June 1, 2005）, 4, http://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi? article=1035&context=asc \_ papers.

27. Executive Office of the President, Big Data and Differential Pricing（Washington, DC: Executive Office of the President, February

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28. Federal Trade Commission, Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability,（May 2014）, 20, https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents /reports/data-brokers-calltransparency-accountability-reportfederal-trade-commission-may-2014/140527databrokerreport.pdf.

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2014/140527databrokerreport.pdf.

33. Federal Trade Commission, Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability,（May 2014）, 20, https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents /reports/data-brokers-calltransparency-accountability-reportfederal-trade-commission-may-2014/140527databrokerreport.pdf.，56; Article 21, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union; Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of July 5, 2006, 强调应在就业和职业问题上 贯彻男女平等机会和平等待遇的原则。

35. Julia Angwin, Surya Mattu, and Jeff Larson, “The Tiger Mom Tax: Asians Are Nearly Twice as Likely to Get a Higher Price from Princeton Review,” ProPublica（September 1, 2015）, https://www.propublica.org/article/asians-nearly-twice-as-likely-to-gethigher-pricefrom-princeton-review.

37. Amit Datta, Michael Carl Tschantz, and Anupam Datta,“Automated Experiments on Ad Privacy Settings: A Tale of Opacity,Choice, and Discrimination,” Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies 2015，

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92。

38. Amit Datta, Michael Carl Tschantz, and Anupam Datta,“Automated Experiments on Ad Privacy Settings: A Tale of Opacity,Choice, and Discrimination,” Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies 2015， 92。

39. Amit Datta, Michael Carl Tschantz, and Anupam Datta,“Automated Experiments on Ad Privacy Settings: A Tale of Opacity,Choice, and Discrimination,” Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies 2015， 93。

41. Amit Datta, Michael Carl Tschantz, and Anupam Datta,“Automated Experiments on Ad Privacy Settings: A Tale of Opacity,Choice, and Discrimination,” Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies 2015， 93。

43. University of Washington, “Who’s a CEO? Google Image Results Can Shift Gender Biases,” ScienceDaily（April 9, 2015）, www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2015/04/150409143143.html.

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44. Latanya Sweeney, Online Ads Roll the Dice, Federal Trade Commission（September 25, 2014）, https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/blogs/techftc/2014/09 /online-ads-roll-dice.

45. Frank Pasquale, The Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms that Control Money and Information（Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015）, 38-42.

46. Aniko Hannak, Gary Soeller, David Lazer, Alan Mislove, and Christo Wilson, “Measuring Price Discrimination and Steering on E-Commerce Web Sites,” Proceedings of the 2014 Conference on Internet Measurement Conference, New York, 5, http://www.ccs.neu.edu/home/cbw/pdf/imc151-hannak.pdf。

47. Matthew A. Edwards, “Price and Prejudice: The Case againstConsumer Equality in the Information Age,” Lewis & Clark Law Review10（2006）: 559, 580; “即使是在最自由的现行解释下，《鲁宾逊-帕特曼法》也难以庇护普通消费者的权益。由于消费者之间并不构成对于产品优惠价格的竞争，所以法律并不会对零售商提出明确要求，命令他们对消费者平等相待”。

48. 《鲁宾逊-帕特曼法》禁止卖方在同类商品的交易中对两个或多个相互竞争的买方之间的价格进行区分，在这种情况下，歧视的影响是“从实质上减少竞争”或是“损害、破坏或防止与明知交易中存在价格歧视的企业竞争，进而酿成买方对于终端客户的竞争”；Federal TradeCommission, The Robinson- Patman Act: General Principles, CommissionProceedings, and Selected Issues（June 7,1995）,https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/1995/06/robinson-patmanact-general-principles-commission-proceedings-and-selected。

49. Ross E. Elfand, “The Robinson-Patman Act,” American Bar

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