--- schema_version: "library-reader-v1" source_type: "original_book" title: "算法的陷阱：超级平台、算法垄断与场景欺骗" author: null edition: null publisher: null year: null isbn: "5782509031" library_document_id: "93dd68d8-deb3-4b6e-8e8f-10358bb7e85c" source_sha256: "72c054220dd02025832eeb59adabf3c3beb83f1437c1bf4bef822413f5d3aee1" pdf_physical_page_count: 428 pdf_physical_page_index_base: 0 range_start: 360 range_count: 10 html_url: "https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/93dd68d8-deb3-4b6e-8e8f-10358bb7e85c?start=360&limit=10" markdown_url: "https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/93dd68d8-deb3-4b6e-8e8f-10358bb7e85c.md?start=360&limit=10" previous_url: "https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/93dd68d8-deb3-4b6e-8e8f-10358bb7e85c.md?start=350&limit=10" next_url: "https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/93dd68d8-deb3-4b6e-8e8f-10358bb7e85c.md?start=370&limit=10" --- # 算法的陷阱：超级平台、算法垄断与场景欺骗 > 页码规则：PDF_PHYSICAL_PAGE_INDEX 是从 0 开始的权威文件物理页索引；PRINTED_PAGE 是页面中识别出的印刷页码，可能为空，二者不得混用。 ## PDF_PHYSICAL_PAGE_INDEX=360 | PRINTED_PAGE=NOT_DETECTED Association（n.d.）, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/young\_lawyers/publications/the\_101\_201 50. Ross E. Elfand, “The Robinson-Patman Act,” American Bar Association（n.d.）, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/young\_lawyers/publications/the\_101\_201 citing Feesers, Inc. v. Michael Foods, Inc., 591 F.3d 191,198（3d Cir. 2010）（这份案卷中讨论了近来美国高等法院的法理学研究进展）； Ryan Luchs, Tansev Geylani, Anthony Dukes, and Kannan Srinivasan, “The End of the Robinson- Patman Act? Evidence from Legal Case Data,” Management Science 56, no. 12（2010）:2123-2133, http://wwwbcf.usc.edu/dukes/Papers/Dukes13\_EndofRP\_MgtSci\_10.pdf. Federal Trade Commission, Price Discrimination:Robinson-Patman Violations（n.d.）, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrustlaws/price-discrimination-robinsonpatman; see also Robert J. Toth, “A Powerful Law Has Been Losing a Lot of Its Punch,” Wall Street Journal, May 1, 2002, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527023047466045773801727 54953842。 51. Edwards, “Price and Prejudice,” 596, quoting Howard J.Alperin and Roland F. Chase, Consumer Law: Sales Practices and Credit Regulation, 2004 Supplement（St. Paul, MN: West Pub. Co.,2004）39-40. 52. C-209/10, Post DanmarkA/S v. Konkurrenceradet. 53. C-209/10, Post DanmarkA/S v. Konkurrenceradet.，para. 30。 54. Competition and Markets Authority, The Commercial Use of Consumer Data, 2.120. ## PDF_PHYSICAL_PAGE_INDEX=361 | PRINTED_PAGE=NOT_DETECTED 55. Mac Macmillan, “European MEP Calls for Investigation of Online Price Discrimination,” Hogan Lovells Chronicle of Data Protection,September 13, 2013, http://www.hldataprotection.com/2013/09/articles/ consumerprivacy/european-mep-calls-for-investigation-of-online-pricediscrimination/. Rafaele Rivais, “Why the Prices of Trains and Planes Vary from One Minute to the Next（Continued）,” SOS Conso Blog, Le Monde（January 24, 2013）, translation. 56. Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of October 24, 1995, European Parliament, Parliamentary Questions, P- 001257/13, E-001574/13, E-000956/13, April 18, 2013,http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E- 2013-000956&language=EN. 57. See Dana Mattioli, “On Orbitz, Mac Users Steered to Pricier Hotels,” Wall Street Journal, August 23, 2012, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052 702304458604577488822667325882. 58. Pasquale, The Black Box Society, 32, discusses how runaway data can lead to cascading disadvantages; Katherine Noyes, “The EU Will Examine Banks’ Use of Customer Data for Profiling and Marketing Campaigns,” PCWorld, October 5, 2015, pcworld.com/article/2989048/privacy/banks-use-of-big-data-to-bescrutinzed-by-eu-regulators.html. 59. Sydney Ember and Rachel Abrams, “On Instagram and Other Social Media, Redefining ‘User Engagement,’ ” New York Times, September 20, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/21/business/media/retailers-use-oftheir-fans-photos-draws-scrutiny.html?smprod=nytcore- 更多电子书请搜索「慧眼看」www.huiyankan.com 微信：huiyankan ## PDF_PHYSICAL_PAGE_INDEX=362 | PRINTED_PAGE=NOT_DETECTED iphone&smid=nytcore-iphone-share; Vindu Goel, “Flipping the Switches on Facebook’s Privacy Controls,” New York Times, January 29, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/30/technology/personaltech/on-facebookdeciding-who-knows-youre-a-dog. html?\_r=0. 60. Mattioli, “On Orbitz, Mac Users Steered to Pricier Hotels”.Article referred to in Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius, “Online Price Discrimination and Data Protection Law,” Amsterdam Law School Research Paper No. 2015-32（August 28, 2015）, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2652665. 第13章 衡短论长的中间人 1. J. Yannis Bakos, “Reducing Buyer Search Costs: Implications for Electronic Market Places,” Management Science 43, no. 12（1997）: 1, 5. 2. OFT Statement of Objections, para. 1.14-1.15, as cited in the Competition Appeal Tribunal judgment, Skyscanner Limited v.Competition and Markets Authority, Case No. 1226/2/12/14（September 26, 2014）, （2014）CAT 16,31-32. 3. Ariel Ezrachi, “The Competitive Effects of Parity Clauses on Online Commerce,” European Competition Journal 11, no. 2-3（2015）. 4. A. Ezrachi and Maurice E. Stucke, “Online Platforms and the EU Digital Single Market,” University of Tennessee Legal Studies Research Paper No. 283（October 16, 2015）, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2677267;see also Maurice E. Stucke and Ariel Ezrachi, “When Competition Fails to Optimize Quality: A Look at Search Engines,” Yale Journal of Law and Technology 18（2016）, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id =2598128. ## PDF_PHYSICAL_PAGE_INDEX=363 | PRINTED_PAGE=NOT_DETECTED 5. Marina Lao, “Networks, Access, and ‘Essential Facilities’: FromTerminal Railroad to Microsoft,” Southern Methodist University LawReview 62（2009）: 557, 560-561; “网络产业的特点是随着用户数量的增多，其产品对用户的价值越来越高，这种现象也可被称作‘网络效应’或需求侧规模经济”。价值增长的实现方式或直接或间接，它既可以由用户基数增大而产生的彼此互联带来，也可以由用户基数增大带动的周边产品兴盛而实现（如Windows操作系统的例子）。详见：United States v.Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 20（D.D.C. 1999）（本案讨论了由媒体播放器所产生的间接网络效应）。 6.据报道，2016年1月，一位供职于Oracle的律师向加利福尼亚州奥克兰市当地法院披露，一位谷歌公司高管曾郑重起誓，称谷歌每年会向苹果支付近10亿美元，以确保后者将自己的搜索服务设定为苹果iPhone手机的默认搜索程序。详见：Mike Swift, “Oracle Pushes Judge to ForceGoogle to Disclose Terms of Deals with Apple,Other Mobile Competitors,”mLex Market Insight（January 14, 2016）,http://mlexmarketinsight.com/category\_editors/digital-risk/。 7. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, DataDriven Innovation for Growth and Well-Being, Interim Synthesis Report（October 2015）, 29. 8. Ioannis Lianos and Evgenia Motchenkova, “Market Dominance andSearch Quality in the Search Engine Market,” Journal of Competition Law &Economics 9（2013）: 419, 422（advance access publication,April 17,2013）, 文中讨论了搜索引擎作为“信息的把关者”所发挥的作用；它们提供了用户所需要的资讯（相当于是黄页），同时也是“每个人畅游互联网世界时初涉的领地”。 9. Scott McCartney, “How Booking Sites Infiuence Which Hotels You Pick,” Wall Street Journal, January 27, 2016, http://www.wsj.com/articles/ how -booking-sites-infiuence-which-hotels-you-pick-1453921300. 更多电子书请搜索「慧眼看」www.huiyankan.com 微信：huiyankan ## PDF_PHYSICAL_PAGE_INDEX=364 | PRINTED_PAGE=15. 10. Scott McCartney, “How Booking Sites Infiuence Which Hotels You Pick,” Wall Street Journal, January 27, 2016, http://www.wsj.com/articles/ how -booking-sites-infiuence-which-hotels-you-pick-1453921300. 11. Competitive Enter. Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 856 F.2d 1563,1564-65（D.C. Cir. 1988）. 12. Competitive Enter. Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 856 F.2d 1563,1564-65（D.C. Cir. 1988）. 13. Doreen Carvajal, “Amazon.com Plans to Revise Its Ad Program,”New York Times, February 10, 1999, http://www.nytimes.com/1999/02/10/business /amazoncom-plans-to-reviseits-ad-program.html. 14. 与之相似，对于一些比价网站在默认搜索结果上的排序问题， 社会各界也有不少非议。由于用户无法分辨出有机搜索结果和赞助式搜 索结果的不同，所以由拥有市场力量的互联网平台向商家征收的这笔广 告投放位置费一直饱受外界批评。详见：James Maguire,“Case Study: BizRate,” ECommerce-Guide（January 2, 2003）, http://www.ecommerce - guide.com/news/news/article.php/1563011/CaseStudy-BizRate.htm; “How Shopping Bots Really Work,” Loginworks（December 18, 2014）, http://www.loginworks.com/informative/shopping-bots-really-work/; Leslie Walker, “What Shopping Guides Don’t Advertise,” Washington Post, November 6, 2003, http://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/2003/ll/06/what-shoppingguidesdont-advertise/9c387768-f228-4356-850e-78a2afc60b47/。 完整的研究报告与相关材料，详见： 15. ## PDF_PHYSICAL_PAGE_INDEX=365 | PRINTED_PAGE=NOT_DETECTED http://www.marktwaechter.de/pressemeldung/buchungs-undvergleichsportale-bieten-zuwenig-nutzen-fuer-verbraucher; http://www.verbraucherzentrale.de/vergleichsportale#header。 16. Rachel Rickard Straus, “Price Comparison Website Bosses under Attack from MPs for Not Showing Customers the Best Deals,” This Is Money（February 4, 2014）, http://www.thisismoney.co.uk/money/bills/article-2939364/Pricecomparison-website-bosses-attack-MPs.html. 17. Rachel Rickard Straus, “Price Comparison Website Bosses under Attack from MPs for Not Showing Customers the Best Deals,” This Is Money（February 4, 2014）, http://www.thisismoney.co.uk/money/bills/article-2939364/Pricecomparison-website-bosses-attack-MPs.html. 18. European Commission Case No. Comp/M. 5727, Microsoft/Yahoo! Search Business Regulation（EC）No. 139/2004 Merger Procedure（February 18, 2010）, para. 100. 19. European Commission Case No. Comp/M. 5727, Microsoft/Yahoo! Search Business Regulation（EC）No. 139/2004 Merger Procedure（February 18, 2010）, para. 100.。para. 35, 45. 20. Andrea Amelio and Dimitrios Magos, “Economic Background of theMicrosoft/Yahoo! Case,” Competition Policy Newsletter 2（2010）:51. “比如，区别于直接在有机搜索结果提供相关商家的链接，搜索引擎可以把一些‘资讯类’的网站放上去或是选取那些既掏了广告投放位置费又是有机搜索结果的链接，以弱化有机搜索结果与付费结果之间的替代关系。” Federal Trade Commission, FTC Staff Report,Google Inc., File No.111-0161（August 8, 2012）, 92, 根据《华尔街日报》的报道（详见： 更多电子书请搜索「慧眼看」www.huiyankan.com 微信：huiyankan ## PDF_PHYSICAL_PAGE_INDEX=366 | PRINTED_PAGE=NOT_DETECTED http://graphics.wsj.com/google-ftc-report/img/ftcocr-watermark.pdf），FTC出具的有关谷歌涉嫌操纵搜索结果的调查报告中曾提及，“通过将那些高品质的垂直网站驱逐出自己的搜索结果，显而易见，谷歌的搜索引擎已显现出了质量恶化的威胁，又或者说，它们原本就有意如此”。对于这份调查报告，仍是疑点重重。首先，《华尔街日报》的记者只是拿到了这份报告中偶数页的内容，遗失的奇数页或许还隐含了其他重要内容；其次，其他关于这起调查的报告尚未公开，所以问题还没有定论；最后，虽然反垄断执法部门建议FTC提起公诉，但是该委员会并未就此行事。 21. 欧盟委员会宣称，用户“往往无法在搜索引擎上查询到与自己所寻最相关的商品信息，除此以外……当谷歌的竞争对手意识到即便自己如何投入创新、优化用户体验也无法超越谷歌时，他们的创新热情也会减弱”。European Commission, Antitrust: Commission Sends Statement ofObjections to Google on Comparison Shopping Service,MEMO/15/4781（April 15, 2015）, http://europa.eu/rapid/pressrelease\_MEMO-15-4781\_en.htm. 22. European Commission, Statement by Commissioner Vestager on Antitrust Decisions Concerning Google, STATEMENT/15/4785（April 15, 2015）, http:// europa.eu/rapid/press-release\_STATEMENT-15- 4785\_en.htm. 23. 考虑到正文中的三个条件，我们还在其他著作中也有涉及谷歌如何有意拉低产品质量的内容（通常是通过向用户提供不甚相关的搜索结果而实现）。详见：Maurice E. Stucke and Ariel Ezrachi, “WhenCompetition Fails to Optimize Quality: A Look at Search Engines,” YaleJournal of Law and Technology 18（2016）,http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=2598128。 24. 根据苹果对系统的设置，出版商可以自由为iBooks上出售的电子书定价，并且提取70%的销售收入，剩余30%则作为佣金归苹果所有。详见：United States v. Apple, Inc, 791 F.3d 290, 303（2d Cir.2015）,cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1376（2016）。其他的分销模式还包括批发销售与代理分销的结合。举例来看，就混合批发模式，也就是净价模式来讲（hybrid wholesale model），交易双方已在合同中约定了一个固定的加成。在这种分销模式下，上游的供货商设定一个批发价格，而交易双方则另就产品在销售给终端客户时产生的成本利润率达成一致协定。 ## PDF_PHYSICAL_PAGE_INDEX=367 | PRINTED_PAGE=NOT_DETECTED 25. United States v. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d 290, 304（2d Cir. 2015）,cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1376（2016）. 26. United States v. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d 290, 304（2d Cir.2015）,cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1376（2016），305。 27. A. Ezrachi, “The Competitive Effects of Parity Clauses on Online Commerce,” Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 55/2015（October 11, 2015）, http://papers.ssrn. com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=2672541. 28. Benjamin Edelman and Julian Wright, “Price Coherence and Excessive Intermediation,” Harvard Business School Working Paper No.15- 030（March 2015）, 3, http://www.benedelman.org/publications/pricecoherence -2015-03-12.pdf. 29. Competition and Markets Authority, Private Motor Insurance Market Investigation: Final Report（September 24,2014）, 8.42, 8.14, https://assets.digital.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/5421c2ade5274a1314000001/Final\_report.pdf. 30. Competition and Markets Authority, Private Motor Insurance Market Investigation: Final Report（September 24,2014）, 8.42, 8.14, https://assets.digital.cabinet- 更多电子书请搜索「慧眼看」www.huiyankan.com 微信：huiyankan ## PDF_PHYSICAL_PAGE_INDEX=368 | PRINTED_PAGE=NOT_DETECTED office.gov.uk/media/5421c2ade5274a1314000001/Final\_report.pdf，8.13。 31. Douglas Fraser, “Heat Is On: Why Are Energy Bills so High?”BBC News（January 15, 2014）, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ukscotlandscotland-business -25743336. 32. Douglas Fraser, “Heat Is On: Why Are Energy Bills so High?”BBC News（January 15, 2014）, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ukscotlandscotland-business -25743336. 33. 根据公布的数字，拥有市场力量的比价网站每年的利润水平大致在5,390万英镑（Money Super Market网站）到6,970万英镑（CompareThe Market网站），另有一些网站介于980万英镑（Confused.com网站和uSwitch网站）与1,980万英镑（Go Compare网站）。详见：Straus, “PriceComparison Website Bosses under Attack.” 34. Fraser, “Heat Is On.” 35. Fraser, “Heat Is On.” 36. U.K. Parliament Energy and Climate Change Select Committee,Protecting Consumers: Making Energy Price Comparison Websites Transparent（March 26, 2015）, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415 /cms ele ct/cmen ergy/1145/114502. htm. 37. 英国天然气和电力市场办事处在提交给英国能源和气候变化委员会的报告中提到，比价网站征收的佣金高低并不会直接影响到终端消费者在变更自家能源供应商时的资费。正如政府报告中所言，“不论消费者是在比价网站的鼓动下调整能源供应商还是直接做出的决定，这并不会对资费水平造成差异”。U.K. Parliament Energy and Climate Change ## PDF_PHYSICAL_PAGE_INDEX=369 | PRINTED_PAGE=NOT_DETECTED Select Committee,Protecting Consumers: Making Energy Price Comparison Websites Transparent（March 26, 2015）, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415 /cms ele ct/cmen ergy/1145/114502.htm，Appendix 1:Government Response, Recommendation 3。 38. U.K. Parliament Energy and Climate Change Select Committee,Protecting Consumers: Making Energy Price Comparison Websites Transparent（March 26, 2015）, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415 /cms ele ct/cmen ergy/1145/114502. htm. 39. U.K. Parliament Energy and Climate Change Select Committee,Protecting Consumers: Making Energy Price Comparison Websites Transparent（March 26, 2015）, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415 /cms ele ct/cmen ergy/1145/114502. htm. 40. HRS-Hotel Reservation Service B 9-66/10（December 20,2013）, http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidung/EN/Entscheidunge 66-10.pdf; United States v. Apple Inc.,952 F. Supp. 2d 638, 15 647（S.D.N.Y. 2013）; Case COMP/AT-39.847,E-Books（July 25, 2013）. 41. 若有兴趣继续了解有关广义MFN条款与狭义MFN条款的效应问 题，详见：Ariel Ezrachi, “The Competitive Effects of Parity Clauses on Online Commerce.” 第四部分竞合关系 1. 有关网络效应所能发挥的作用详见：Report by the House of Lords, 更多电子书请搜索「慧眼看」www.huiyankan.com 微信：huiyankan 下一段：[继续读取](https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/93dd68d8-deb3-4b6e-8e8f-10358bb7e85c.md?start=370&limit=10)