--- schema_version: "library-reader-v1" source_type: "original_book" title: "算法的陷阱：超级平台、算法垄断与场景欺骗" author: null edition: null publisher: null year: null isbn: "5782509031" library_document_id: "93dd68d8-deb3-4b6e-8e8f-10358bb7e85c" source_sha256: "72c054220dd02025832eeb59adabf3c3beb83f1437c1bf4bef822413f5d3aee1" pdf_physical_page_count: 428 pdf_physical_page_index_base: 0 range_start: 400 range_count: 10 html_url: "https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/93dd68d8-deb3-4b6e-8e8f-10358bb7e85c?start=400&limit=10" markdown_url: "https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/93dd68d8-deb3-4b6e-8e8f-10358bb7e85c.md?start=400&limit=10" previous_url: "https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/93dd68d8-deb3-4b6e-8e8f-10358bb7e85c.md?start=390&limit=10" next_url: "https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/93dd68d8-deb3-4b6e-8e8f-10358bb7e85c.md?start=410&limit=10" --- # 算法的陷阱：超级平台、算法垄断与场景欺骗 > 页码规则：PDF_PHYSICAL_PAGE_INDEX 是从 0 开始的权威文件物理页索引；PRINTED_PAGE 是页面中识别出的印刷页码，可能为空，二者不得混用。 ## PDF_PHYSICAL_PAGE_INDEX=400 | PRINTED_PAGE=NOT_DETECTED ## PDF_PHYSICAL_PAGE_INDEX=401 | PRINTED_PAGE=NOT_DETECTED 11. Hayek, “Competition as a Discovery Procedure,” 9. 12. Hayek, “Competition as a Discovery Procedure,” 10. 13. The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 1975, Leonid Vitaliyevich Kantorovich, Tjalling C.Koopmans, “Mathematics in Economics: Achievements, Difficulties,Perspectives,” http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel\_prizes/economicsciences/laureates/1975/kan lecture.html. 14. Travis Kalanick, “NYE Surge Pricing Explained,” Uber（December 31, 2011）, http://newsroom.uber.com/2011/12/nye-surgepricing-explained/; see also Annie Lowrey, “Is Uber’s Surge-Pricing an Example of High-Tech Gouging?” New York Times, January 10, 2014,http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/12/magazine/is-ubers-surge-pricinganexample-of-high-tech-gouging.html; 优步前任首席执行官特拉维斯·卡兰 尼克曾为溢价政策辩护，“为了让更多优步司机甘于在交通最繁忙的时 段上路，溢价策略是十分必要的”。 15. Nicholas Diakopoulos, “How Uber Surge Pricing Really Works,”Washington Post, April 17, 2015,http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonkblog/wp/2015/04/17/howuber-surge-pricing-really-works/. 16. Min Kyung Lee, Daniel Kusbit, Evan Metsky, and Laura Dabbish,“Working with Machines: The Impact of Algorithmic and Data-Driven Management on Human Workers,” Proceedings of the 33rd Annual ACM Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems（New York: ACM,2015）, http://www.cs.cmu.edu/mklee/materials/Publication/2015- CHI\_algorithmic\_management.pdf. 更多电子书请搜索「慧眼看」www.huiyankan.com 微信：huiyankan ## PDF_PHYSICAL_PAGE_INDEX=402 | PRINTED_PAGE=NOT_DETECTED 17. Min Kyung Lee, Daniel Kusbit, Evan Metsky, and Laura Dabbish,“Working with Machines: The Impact of Algorithmic and Data-Driven Management on Human Workers,” Proceedings of the 33rd Annual ACM Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems（New York: ACM,2015）, http://www.cs.cmu.edu/mklee/materials/Publication/2015- CHI\_algorithmic\_management.pdf. 18. Uber, Interested in Driving with Uber? https://get.uber.com/drive/. 19. John Kenneth Galbraith, The Essential Galbraith（Boston:Mariner Books, 2010）, 72. 20. John Kenneth Galbraith, The Essential Galbraith（Boston:Mariner Books, 2010）, 72. 21. Eden Medina, Cybernetic Revolutionaries: Technology and Politics in Allende’s Chile（Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2011）. 22. Evgeny Morozov, “The Planning Machine: Project Cybersyn and the Origins of the Big Data Nation,” New Yorker, October 13, 2014,http://www.newyorker .com/magazine/2014/10/13/planning-machine. 23. Eden Medina, “The Cybersyn Revolution,” Jacobin 17（Spring 2015）, https://www.jacobinmag.com/2015/04/allende-chile-beermedinacybersyn/. 24. Eden Medina, “Designing Freedom, Regulating a Nation:Socialist Cybernetics in Allende’s Chile,” Journal of Latin American Studies 38（2006）: 571-606, http://www.informatics.indiana.edu/edenm/EdenMedinaJLAS August2006.pdf. ## PDF_PHYSICAL_PAGE_INDEX=403 | PRINTED_PAGE=NOT_DETECTED 25. Laura Tam, “Smart Cities, Limited Resources,” SPUR（October 10, 2012）, http://www.spur.org/publications/article/2012-10-10/smartcitieslimited-resources. 26. Laura Tam, “Smart Cities, Limited Resources,” SPUR（October 10, 2012）, http://www.spur.org/publications/article/2012-10-10/smartcitieslimited-resources. 27. San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency, SFpark Sensors（2016）, http://sfpark.org/how-it-works/the-sensors/. 28. San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency, SFpark Pilot Project Evaluation Summary（June 2014）, http://sfpark.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/06/SFpark\_Eval\_Summary\_2014.pdf. 29. San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency, SFpark Pricing（2016）, http://sfpark.org/how-it-works/pricing/. 30. San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency, SFpark Sensors. 31. San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency, SFpark Pilot Project Evaluation Summary. 32. San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency, SFpark PilotProject Evaluation Summary。“洛杉矶停车计划使用的智能停车场管理系统令司机寻找公共停车位的时间缩短了近43%。 33. San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency, SFpark PilotProject Evaluation Summary。“在洛杉矶停车计划的试点区域，寻找车位的轿车每天会排放7吨的温室气体。到了2013年，这一观测数据下降了30%。对比来讲，在非试点区域，温室气体排放仅下降了6%。” 更多电子书请搜索「慧眼看」www.huiyankan.com 微信：huiyankan ## PDF_PHYSICAL_PAGE_INDEX=404 | PRINTED_PAGE=NOT_DETECTED 34. San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency, SFpark PilotProject Evaluation Summary。“洛杉矶停车计划鼓励人们错峰出行，并大为改进了公共停车场的利用效率。数据显示，高峰时段的停车场使用效率提升了22%。在洛杉矶停车计划运营的停车场，早晚高峰时段的车位占用率都有相应的提升，这说明洛杉矶停车计划有效地化解了高峰时段的城市交通拥堵，令路上司机的行驶过程更加顺畅。” 35. San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency, SFpark Pilot Project Evaluation Summary。“试点区域的双重泊车现象减少了22%，对 比之下，非试点区域只减少了5%。 , 36. San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency, SFpark PilotProject Evaluation Summary。“不论是试点区域还是非试点区域，但凡是车位情况得到改善的地方，监测系统都能观察到明显的车流量减少现象。” 37. San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency, SFpark PilotProject Evaluation Summary。“随着司机绕圈寻找车位情况的改善，试点区域里汽车行车距离从2011年的8,134英里/天下降到了5,721英里/天。对比非试点区域，这个数据只下降了6%。 ,, 38. Michael Emmett Brady, “Comparing J. M. Keynes’s and F.Von Hayek’s Differing Definitions of Uncertainty as It Relates to Knowledge: Keynes’s Unavailable or Missing Knowledge Concept versus Hayek’s Dispersal of Knowledge Concept,” International Journal of Applied Economics and Econometrics 19, no. 3（January 2011）,http://ssrn.com/abstract=1751569. 39. Steve Lohr, “Can Apple Find More Hits Without Its Tastemaker?”New York Times, January 18, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/19/technology/companies/19innovate.html? ## PDF_PHYSICAL_PAGE_INDEX=405 | PRINTED_PAGE=NOT_DETECTED 40. Peter Noel Murray, “How Steve Jobs Knew What You Wanted,”Psychology Today, October 13, 2011, https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/inside-the-consumermind/201110/how-steve-jobs-knew-whatyou-wanted. 42. Francois Moreau, “The Role of the State in Evolutionary Economics,” Cambridge Journal of Economics 28（2004）: 847, 850. 43. Adrienne LaFrance, “People’s Deepest, Darkest Google Searches Are Being Used against Them: On the Internet, Search Queries Are Used to Target Vulnerable Consumers,” The Atlantic, November 3,2015, http://www .theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/11/googlesearches-privacydanger/413614/. 44. Adrienne LaFrance, “People’s Deepest, Darkest Google Searches Are Being Used against Them: On the Internet, Search Queries Are Used to Target Vulnerable Consumers,” The Atlantic, November 3,2015, http://www .theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/11/googlesearches-privacydanger/413614/. 45. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Expenditure Survey（September 2015）, http://www.bls.gov/cex/2014/standard/multiyr.pdf. 第19章 执法工具箱 更多电子书请搜索「慧眼看」www.huiyankan.com 微信：huiyankan ## PDF_PHYSICAL_PAGE_INDEX=406 | PRINTED_PAGE=NOT_DETECTED 1. House of Lords, Select Committee on European Union, “Online Platforms and the Digital Single Market”（April 20, 2016）, 10th Report of Session 2015-16, para.373, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201516 /ldselect/ldeucom/129/129.pdf. 5. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34（D.C. Cir. 2001）;Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601. 6. European Commission, Guidance on the Commission’s EnforcementPriorities in Applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to Abusive ExclusionaryConduct by Dominant Undertakings（February 24, 2009）, http://eur-lex.europa.eu /legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52009XC0224（01）&from=EN; “欧盟在反垄断执法过程中对于排他性活动的重视是为了保障欧盟内部市场的市场竞争秩序，确保占有市场地位的企业围绕展品与服务的质量优化来与其他竞争对手展开竞争，而非利用其他竞争手段压制竞争对手。”U.S. Department ofJustice, Single-Firm Conduct and Section 2 of the Sherman Act: AnOverview（June 25, 2015）, http://www.justice.gov/atr/competition-and-monopoly-single-firm-conduct-under-section-2sherman-act-chapter-1; “《谢尔曼法》第2条条款既无意消灭市场垄断，也非禁止那些通过合法渠道取得垄断地位的企业行使自己的市场力量。这条条款意在保护市场竞争机制发挥作用，从而促进市场繁荣。《谢尔曼法》鼓励所有企业——包括垄断企业和向其发起挑战的挑战者——去追求事业上的起色。” ## PDF_PHYSICAL_PAGE_INDEX=407 | PRINTED_PAGE=NOT_DETECTED 7. J. McCarthy and P. Hayes, “Some Philosophical Problems from the Standpoint of Artificial Intelligence,” Machine Intelligence 4（1969）:463505; G. F. Luger, Artificial Intelligence: Structures and Strategies for Complex Problem Solving, 5th ed.（New York: Addison-Wesley, 2005）,chap. 1 and 17. 8. Claire Cain Miller, “When Algorithms Discriminate,” New York Times, July 9, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/10/upshot/whenalgorithmsdiscriminate.html?\_r0. 9. United States v. Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d 540, 559（S.D.N.Y.2014）. 10. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP,540 U.S. 398, 415（2004）, quoting Phillip Areeda, Essential Facilities:An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, 58 Antitrust L.J. 841, 853（1989）. 11. 详见：Ariel Ezrachi, “Sponge,” Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 16/2015（March 1, 2015）, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2572028; Harry First and Spencer Weber Waller, “Antitrust’s Democracy Deficit,” Fordham Law Review 81（2013）: 2543, 2544 n.5（“反托拉斯执法理所应 当有其政治目标，这是一种政治价值导向的体现”）; John B. Kirkwood,“The Essence of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers and Small Suppliers from Anticompetitive Conduct,” Fordham Law Review 81（2013）:2425, 2453（addressing and critiquing total welfare standard）; Robert H.Lande, “A Traditional and Textualist Analysis of the Goals of Antitrust:Efficiency, Preventing Theft from Consumers, and Consumer Choice,”Fordham Law Review 81（2013）: 2349, 2360 n.54; Barak Orbach, “How Antitrust Lost Its Goal,” Fordham Law Review 81（2013）: 2253, 2273;Maurice E. Stucke, “Should Competition Policy Promote Happiness?”Fordham Law Review 81（2013）: 2575。 更多电子书请搜索「慧眼看」www.huiyankan.com 微信：huiyankan ## PDF_PHYSICAL_PAGE_INDEX=408 | PRINTED_PAGE=NOT_DETECTED 12. U.S. Department of Justice, Competition and Monopoly: SingleFirm Conduct under Section 2 of the Sherman Act（2008）, https://www.justice.gov /atr/competition-and-monopoly-single-firm-conductundersection-2-sherman-act. 13. Pamela Jones Harbour et al., Statement of Commissioners Harbour, Leibowitz and Rosch on the Issuance of the Section 2 Report by the Department of Justice（2008）, 5, http://www.ftc.gov/os/2008/09/080908section2stmt.pdf. 14. U.S. Department of Justice, Justice Department Withdraws Report on Antitrust Monopoly Law: Antitrust Division to Apply More Rigorous Standard with Focus on the Impact of Exclusionary Conduct on Consumers,Press Release（May 11, 2009）, http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justicedepartment-withdraws-report-antitrustmonopoly-law. 15. U.S. Department of Justice, “Justice Department Reaches Settlement with Texas Hospital Prohibiting Anticompetitive Contracts with Health Insurers Department Says United Regional’s Contracts Unlawfully Maintain ## PDF_PHYSICAL_PAGE_INDEX=409 | PRINTED_PAGE=NOT_DETECTED Monopoly Power,” press release（February 25,2011）, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-reachessettlement-texashospital-prohibiting -anticompetitive-contracts. 16. Maurice E. Stucke and Allen P. Grunes, Big Data and Competition Policy（Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016）. 17. Barry C. Lynn, “Amazon’s Book Monopoly: A Threat to Freedom of Expression?” New America（January 27, 2016）, https://www.newamerica.org/open -markets/amazons-book-monopoly/. 18. Margrethe Vestager, Competition in a BigData World（Munich:European Commission, January 17. 2016）, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/2014- 2019/vestager/announcements/competition-big-dataworld\_en. 19. 比如，英国竞争与市场管理局有权对市场参与者的反竞争行为介入调查、收集证据并评估风险。并在必要时，采取一定的监管措施，以矫正市场失灵现象。详见：Guidelines for Market Investigations: TheirRole, Procedures, Assessment and Remedies, CC3（Revised）（April2013）, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachmen\_data/file/by the CMA Board）。在世界其他国家，反垄断执法机构也拥有相似的（但更为有限的）执法权限，从而对经济活动中的某一行业开展介入调查。比如，欧盟有权在《欧盟竞争法》第1/2003号规则的权限范围内发起行业调查。 20. 行业守则可能脱胎于业界各家企业的通力合作，并且涵盖了企业对企业的争端解决机制。它在特定的市场背景下，考虑到竞合场景中的很多动态因素并妥善化解了相关问题。详见：Writtenevidence to theHouse of Lords from IMPALA, and Comments by Hon. Ed Vaizey MP. 更多电子书请搜索「慧眼看」www.huiyankan.com 微信：huiyankan 下一段：[继续读取](https://workshop.closeclaw.top/api/ai/read/93dd68d8-deb3-4b6e-8e8f-10358bb7e85c.md?start=410&limit=10)