奎克的藏经阁 · MinerU 解析内容

算法的陷阱:超级平台、算法垄断与场景欺骗

428 个 PDF 物理页 · 本页显示文件第 301–310 页

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  1. Suzanne Kapner, “Black Friday Shopping — with Thinner Crowds,” Wall Street Journal, November 28, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/blackfriday-shoppingwith-thinner-crowds-1448639398.
  1. Suzanne Kapner, “Black Friday Shopping — with Thinner Crowds,” Wall Street Journal, November 28, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/blackfriday-shoppingwith-thinner-crowds-1448639398.
  1. Suzanne Kapner, “Black Friday Shopping — with Thinner Crowds,” Wall Street Journal, November 28, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/blackfriday-shoppingwith-thinner-crowds-1448639398.
  1. Andrew McAfee and Erik Brynjolfsson, “Big Data: The Management Revolution,” Harvard Business Review, October 2012,https://hbr.org/2012/10/big-data-the-management-revolution/ar/.
  1. President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology,Report to the President, Big Data and Privacy.
  1. McAfee and Brynjolfsson, “Big Data.”
  1. Executive Office of the President, Big Data and Differential Pricing, 5.
  1. Samuel B. Hwang and Sungho Kim, “Dynamic Pricing Algorithm for E-Commerce,” in Advances in Systems, Computing Sciences and Software Engineering, Proceedings of SCSS05, Tarek Sobh and Khaled Elleithy, eds.(Dordrecht: Springer, 2006), 149-155; N. Abe and T.Kamba. “A Web Marketing System with Automatic Pricing,” Computer Networks 33(2000): 775-78; L. M. Minga, Y. Q. Fend, and Y. J. Li,“Dynamic Pricing: E- Commerce—Oriented Price Setting Algorithm,”Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Machine Learning and Cybernetics, Xi’an,China, 2003, vol. 2.

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  1. Mehra, “Antitrust and the Robo-Seller.”

第3章 点到为止的反垄断监管

  1. Alan Greenspan, “The Effects of Mergers(Testimony before the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate),” Federal Reserve Bulletin, 84(June 16, 1998): 643, 646, at 5.
  1. A. Ezrachi, EU Competition Law: An Analytical Guide to the Leading Cases(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2016). For statistics on US enforcement, see Maurice E. Stucke and Allen P. Grunes, Big Data and Competition Policy(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).
  1. United States v. Syufy Enterprises, 903 F.2d 659, 662-63(9th Cir.1990).
  1. Order of the President of the People’s Republic of China No. 68,Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China, Chapter 1, Article 1,http://www .china.org.cn/china/2011-02/ll/content\_21900178.htm.
  1. U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division, Antitrust Division Manual, 4th ed., chap. 5(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice,March 2008).
  1. Unilateral Conduct Working Group, Report on the Objectives of Unilateral Conduct Laws, Assessment of Dominance/Substantial Market Power, and State-Created Monopolies(Moscow: International Competition Network, May 2007), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads /library/doc353.pdf.

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  1. Posner, “The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis.”
  1. Justin Fox, The Myth of the Rational Market(New York: Harper Business/ HarperCollins, 2009), 89—107.
  1. Case No. T-79/12, Cisco Systems Inc. v. Commission [December 11, 2013] 612 TJ 0079, para. 69.
  1. Thomas O. Barnett, “Maximizing Welfare through Technological Innovation,” George Mason Law Review 15(2008): 1191, 1200.
  1. Maureen K. Ohlhausen, A Smarter Section 5(Washington DC:U.S. Federal Trade Commission, September 25, 2015), 12, https://www.ftc.gov/system/files /documents/public\_statements/804511/150925smarter section5.pdf.
  1. J. Thomas Rosch, I Say Monopoly, You Say Dominance:The Continuing Divide on the Treatment of Dominant Firms, Is It the Economics? (Florence: International Bar Association, Antitrust Section Conference, September 8, 2007), 5, https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public\_statements/i-saymonopoly-you-say-dominancecontinuing-divide-treatment-dominant-firmsit-economics/070908isaymo nopolyiba\_0.pdf.

第4章 穿透竞争的表象

  1. Viktor Mayer-Schonberger and Kenneth Cukier, Big Data: A Revolution That Will Transform How We Live, Work, and Think(London:John Murray, 2013), 35.
  1. C. M. Bishop, Pattern Recognition and Machine Learning(New York: Springer-Verlag, 2006).

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  1. “Pricing Algorithms: Is the Price You Pay Right?” Bloomberg(May 12, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.eom/news/videos/b/02d3f0f0e653-4cal-8bdd -0f95a5a81212.
  1. Sarah Griff iths, “Facebook Ads to Become More Intrusive: Site Will Soon Show Promotions for Products You’ve Looked at across the Web,”Daily Mail, June 13, 2014, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article2657043/Facebook-adsintrusive-Site-soon-promotions-products-youvesearched-web. html.
  1. Executive Office of the President, Big Data: Seizing Opportunities,Preserving Values,(May 2014), 5, https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs /big\_data\_privacy\_report\_may\_1\_2014.pdf; see also Facebook, Announcing New Product Ads on Facebook(February 17,2015), https://www.facebook.com/business/news/product-ads.
  1. European Data Protection Supervisor, Towards a New Digital Ethics: Data, Dignity and Technology, Opinion 4/2015(September 11,2015), 6.
  1. 举例来看,“一个由数据驱动的性格分析应用网站Crystalknows.com可以为人们提供打造定制版领英网站个人页面的服务,并且教授用户应该如何与潜在的雇主交谈、发送邮件或者展示自己。说起来可能会令人多少有些不安,这个由数学模型打造的算法竟可以做到精确地向用户传授与用人单位沟通时的措辞、语言风格和腔调,以期能够更好地契合用人单位的喜好”。Elle Hunt, “Crystal Knows Best... or Too Much? The Disconcerting New Email Advice Service,” TheGuardian, May 19, 2015,http://www.theguardian.com/media/2015/may/19/crystal-knowsbest-or-too-much-the-disconcerting-new-email-advice-service.

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  1. Allen Grunes, “Tracking Not Allowed(Unless You’re Google),” Politico(October 1, 2015), http://wwwpolitico.com/agenda/story/2015/10/tracking -not-allowed - unlessyoure -google - 000261.
  1. “消费者剩余”是微观经济学中的专有名词,指的是消费者购买一定数量的某种商品愿意支付的最高价格与这些商品的实际市场价格之间的差额。
  1. 详见:French Autorite de la concurrence and the German Bundeskartellamt,Competition Law and Data, May 10, 2016, http://www.bundeskartellamt .de/SharedDocs/Publikation/DE/Berichte/Big%20 Data%20Papier.pdf?\_ \_blob=publicationFile&v=2; U.K. House of Lords,Select Committee on European Union “Online Platforms and the Digital Single Market,” April 20,2016,10th Report of Session 2015-16, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201516/ldselect/ldeucom/129/129 Keynote Remarks of FTC Commissioner Terrell McSweeny,“Competition Law: Keeping Pace in a Digital Age,” 16th Annual Loyola Antitrust Colloquium, Chicago, IL, April 15, 2016. 正如英国上议院在题为“线上平 台与数字化单一市场”的报告中指出的,“大数据技术的飞速发展已为社 会福利的下降与不正当竞争行为的新变化埋下了伏笔。不易为人察觉的 品质下降、独家获取用户数据库以排挤其他竞争对手、新形式的共谋层 出不穷……虽然其中一部分的控诉还只是假设,但却值得引发对现有反 垄断政策是否充分有效的关注”(详见报告原文第178段)。
  1. 2015年8月10日,原谷歌公司宣布将对企业架构进行调整,成立一家名为Alphabet的控股平台公司,将旗下搜索业务、创新研发、风险投资等部门分离出来各自成立子公司。但在本书中,在谈及Alphabet公司旗下所有业务时,我们仍沿用谷歌这个旧说法。对这家新公司的新动向,详见:Google, “G Is for Google,” Google Official Blog(August 10,2015), https://googleblog.blogspot.co.uk/2015/08/google-alphabet.html。

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第二部分共谋场景

  1. 研究发现,卡特尔组织的存续期呈现出了两极分化的态势:部分卡特尔组织往往无法坚持一年以上,而另外通常能维系4 \~ 6年的合作关系。详见:M. C. Levenstein and V. Y. Suslow, “What Determines CartelSuccess?,” Journal of Economic Literature 44(2006): 43, 51-52。这种背地里的勾结(甚至是由十几个合作伙伴一同参与)可以持续数年时间,详见:J. M. Connor, “Cartels and Antitrust Portrayed: Internal Structure —Private International Cartels 1990-2008,” American Antitrust InstituteWorking Paper No. 09-06(2009), 4,8, ssrn.com/abstract=1372849(文中曾提及,卡特尔组织的存续期的中位数与平均数分别是57个月与82个月。相应地,世界级的卡特尔组织通常更加“长寿”)。调查发现,在1983—1994年被成功告倒的国际卡特尔组织的存续期均值接近90个月;1995—1999年,这个指标下降到了80个月以下,而在此后的数年间又再一次上升到了从前的水平。《华尔街日报》(Wall Street Journal )曾撰文称,“如果共谋者将价格抬得过高,那么组织中的背叛者与市场中的新进入者将矫正这种错误”。然而,一位美国司法部的官员则对这种说法做出了驳斥,据他所言——“从实证研究来看,这套逻辑并不成立,很多与我们打过交道的卡特尔组织往往已经成立了十年有余”。详见:W. J. Kolasky(美国司法部助理总检察长), Antitrust CompliancePrograms: The Government Perspective, Speech at Corporate Compliance2002 Conference of the Practising Law Institute(San Francisco:U.S.Department of Justice, July 12, 2002)。
  1. Scott D. Hammond(美国司法部副助理总检察长,主管反垄断案 件的刑事执法), Recent Developments, Trends, and Milestones in the

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Antitrust Division’s Criminal Enforcement Program(Washington,DC: U.S.Department of Justice, March 26, 2008), http://www .justice.gov/atr/speech/recent- developments- trends -and -milestones -antitrustdivisions- criminal-enforcement。本文认为,对阻止反垄断罪行而言,现有的沉重刑罚是一个次优解。在过去的40年中,美国政府提高了《谢尔曼法》(ShermanAct)的刑事处罚力度——违反该法案的个人最高将被判处10年监禁,同时个人与企业都将受到巨额罚款。

  1. 一位美国司法部的官员表示,“操纵价格者往往都是惯犯”。Kolasky, Antitrust Compliance Programs; J. M. Connor and C. G.Helmers,“Statistics on Modern International Cartels 1990-2005,” AAI Working PaperNo. 07-01(January 10, 2007) , 23。文中提到,作为研究样本的283个国际卡特尔组织中的170家企业均是操纵价格的惯犯,其中更有11家企业被逮到了不止10次。在司法部将全球四大粮商之一——美国阿彻丹尼尔斯米德兰公司(Archer DanielsMidland Company)—— 的价格操纵案件作为警示教材大为宣传之后,大多数的卡特尔组织并未有所收敛。
  1. “核心卡特尔”是一种国际社会公认的危害最大的反竞争行为,它主要包括:操纵定价、划分市场、串通投标、限制产量等市场竞争对手之间达成的反竞争协议。这种行为不仅限制了市场竞争机制的发挥,还将损害消费者利益并阻碍国际贸易的发展。

第5章 信使场景

  1. 引言: Bill Baer(美国司法部助理总检察长), Former E-Commerce Executive Charged with Price Fixing in the Antitrust Division’s First Online Marketplace Prosecution(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, April 6, 2005), 15-421, http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press\_releases/2015/313011.docx。
  1. Scott D. Hammond(美国司法部反垄断司刑事执法部门主任),The Fly on the Wall Has Been Bugged— Catching an InternationalCartel in the Act(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, May 15,2001),http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/8280.htm(ADMcase)。

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  1. 这五家银行将为此支付合计25亿美元的罚款。不仅如此,由于瑞银集团与巴克莱银行违背了各自在2012年签订的不起诉协议而还需分别额外支付2.03亿美元和6,000万美元的罚款。See ElaiKatz, “U.S. BringsComputerized Price- Fixing Charges,” New York Law Journal 254, no.120(December 23, 2015).
  1. U.S. Department of Justice, Five Major Banks Agree to ParentLevel Guilty Pleas: Citicorp, JPMorgan Chase & Co., Barclays PLC, the Royal Bank of Scotland PLC Agree to Plead Guilty in Connection with the Foreign Exchange Market and Agree to Pay More than \$2.5 Billion in Criminal Fines(May 20, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/fivemajor-banksagree-parent-level-guilty-pleas.
  1. 美国司法部向花旗集团、巴克莱银行、摩根大通、苏格兰皇家银行分别开出了9.25亿美元、6.5亿美元、5.5亿美元以及3.95亿美元的罚单。数据引用来源同上。
  1. 美国司法部向花旗集团、巴克莱银行、摩根大通、苏格兰皇家银行分别开出了9.25亿美元、6.5亿美元、5.5亿美元以及3.95亿美元的罚单。
  1. Carrefour Marinopoulos原是希腊本土最大的零售连锁企业。1995年,它由希腊Marinopoulos集团与法国家乐福集团各自占有50%股份出资成立。但是在2012年,由于希腊经济危机,家乐福决定撤出合资公司。

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  1. 维持转移售价(Resale Price Maintenance,RPM)是指产品制造商或批发商因为试图控制自己的商品或服务的最终售价而与零售商达成的一种协议。这种协议不被欧盟反垄断法所接纳,但在美国,虽然RPM已在过去95年的时间里被视为违法协议,但是美国联邦最高法院推翻了自己之前的决定。对于垂直价格限制的反垄断裁定,美国联邦最高法院将依据更为宽松的“合理原则”标准做出裁决。Leegin Creative LeatherProducts, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 882(2007).
  1. Lia Vitzilaiou, “The Hellenic Competition Commission Fines a Retailer for Resale Price Maintenance and Other Infringements within Its Franchise Network(Carrefour Marinopoulos),” e-Competitions(February 2011), http://www .lambadarioslaw.gr/publications/2011/en/article\_33885.pdf.
  1. Hellenic Competition Commission. Decision Concerning Infringements of Articles 1 of Law 703/77 and Article 101 TFEU by the Retailer Carrefour Marinopoulos S.A. in Connection with the Franchise Network for the Operation of “5 Marinopoulos”Retail Stores(Athens:Hellenic Competition Commission, July 15, 2010), http://www.epant.gr/img/x2/news/news270\_1 \_1279200461.pdf.
  1. Vitzilaiou, “The Hellenic Competition Commission Fines a Retailer.”
  1. Hellenic Competition Commission, Decision Concerning Infringements.
  1. United States v. Airline Tariff Publ’g Co., 836 F. Supp. 9,12(D.D.C. 1993).
  1. 详见:Case 40/73, Suiker Unie and Others v. Commission, [1975]ECR 1663, para. 26, and Case C-89/85 I, [1993] ECR I-1307, para. 63;commission decision in Case IV/37.614/F3 PO, Interbrew and AlkenMaes, [2003] OJ L200/1, para. 221.

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  1. 判例制度(Case Law)是英美法系国家的主要法律渊源。它指的是基于典型的案例判决作为判例,为法官审理同类案件提供借鉴和指导。这种判例对以后的法院判决具有法律规范效力,能够作为法院判案的法律依据。
  1. Power Conversion, Inc. v. Saft Am., Inc., 672 F. Supp. 224, 227(D.Md. 1987). “不论是抬高还是压低市场价格、共谋协议运作成功抑或失败、价格合理与否,价格操纵行为具有本身违法性。”按照美国反垄断基本准则的《谢尔曼法》的规定,所有以抬高、压低、盯住、抑制价格为目的或者是起到上述效果的行为都被纳入了反垄断监管范畴。详见:Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 222, 224。
  1. Maurice Stucke, “Morality and Antitrust,” Columbia Business Law Review(2006): 443.
  1. Songfacts, “Milgram’s 37(We Do What We’re Told),” by Peter Gabriel, http://www.songfacts.com/detail.php?id=772.
  1. S. Milgram, “Behavioral Study of Obedience,” Journal of Abnormal & Social Psychology 67, no. 4(1963): 371.
  1. DP DenkProducties, “Milgram Experiment—Jeroen Busscher,” YouTube(June 2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yr5cjyokVUs.
  1. S. Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View(New York: Harper & Row, 1974), 30—31.
  1. Milgram, “Behavioral Study of Obedience.”

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