算法的陷阱：超级平台、算法垄断与场景欺骗

1. White v. R.M. Packer Co.。虽然潜在的市场竞争者会被岛上加油站的高利润所吸引，但他们却需要面对一个监管障碍：取得岛上加油站的营业牌照非常困难。自1997年以来，马撒葡萄园岛委员会（Martha’sVineyard Commission）已经拒绝所有开设加油站的申请。这在一定程度上也造成了岛上加油站市场的寡头垄断局面。

1. White v. R.M. Packer Co.。虽然潜在的市场竞争者会被岛上加油站的高利润所吸引，但他们却需要面对一个监管障碍：取得岛上加油站的营业牌照非常困难。自1997年以来，马撒葡萄园岛委员会（Martha’sVineyard Commission）已经拒绝所有开设加油站的申请。这在一定程度上也造成了岛上加油站市场的寡头垄断局面。

1. White v. R.M. Packer Co.。虽然潜在的市场竞争者会被岛上加油站的高利润所吸引，但他们却需要面对一个监管障碍：取得岛上加油站的营业牌照非常困难。自1997年以来，马撒葡萄园岛委员会（Martha’sVineyard Commission）已经拒绝所有开设加油站的申请。这在一定程度上也造成了岛上加油站市场的寡头垄断局面，579。

1. White v. R.M. Packer Co.。虽然潜在的市场竞争者会被岛上加油站的高利润所吸引，但他们却需要面对一个监管障碍：取得岛上加油站的营业牌照非常困难。自1997年以来，马撒葡萄园岛委员会（Martha’sVineyard Commission）已经拒绝所有开设加油站的申请。这在一定程度上也造成了岛上加油站市场的寡头垄断局面。

1. White v. R.M. Packer Co.。虽然潜在的市场竞争者会被岛上加油站的高利润所吸引，但他们却需要面对一个监管障碍：取得岛上加油站的营业牌照非常困难。自1997年以来，马撒葡萄园岛委员会

（Martha’sVineyard Commission）已经拒绝所有开设加油站的申请。这在一定程度上也造成了岛上加油站市场的寡头垄断局面。

1. Bundeskartellamt, Fuel Sector Inquiry Final Report in Accordance with § 32e GWB（Bonn: Bundeskartellamt, May 2011）, section 5,http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Publikation/EN/Sector%20 Inquiries/Fuel%20Sector%20Inquiry%20-%20Final%20Report.pdf? blob=publicationFile&v=14.

1. Federal Trade Commission and U.S. Department of Justice,Horizontal Merger Guidelines（August 10, 2010）, para. 7.2,https://www.ftc.gov/sites/ default/files/attachments/merger-review/10 0 819hmg.pdf.

1. Federal Trade Commission and U.S. Department of Justice,Horizontal Merger Guidelines（August 10, 2010）, para. 7.2,https://www.ftc.gov/sites/ default/files/attachments/merger-review/10 0 819hmg.pdf.

1. Case T-342/99, Airtours,（2002）ECR 2585,（2002）5 CMLR 317, para. 61.

1. European Commission, Guidelines on the Assessment of Horizontal Mergers under the Council Regulation on the Control of Concentrations between Undertakings, 2004/C 31/03（February 5,2004）, para. 49-50.

1. Ivaldi et al., “The Economics of Tacit Collusion,” 5.

1. Federal Trade Commission and U.S. Department of

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Justice,Horizontal Merger Guidelines, para. 7.

1. Roland Moore-Colyer, “Predictive Analytics Are the Future of Big Data,” V3（October 9, 2015）,http://www.v3.co.uk/v3- uk/analysis/2429494/predictive-analytics-are-the-future-of-big-data.

1. Roland Moore-Colyer, “Predictive Analytics Are the Future of Big Data,”，citing Larry Augustine, chief executive at Sugar CRM。

1. Samuel B. Hwang and Sungho Kim, “Dynamic Pricing Algorithm for E-Commerce,” in Advances in Systems, Computing Sciences and Software Engineering, Proceedings of SCSS05, Tarek Sobh and Khaled Elleithy, eds.（Dordrecht: Springer, 2006）, 149-155; N. Abe and T.Kamba, “A Web Marketing System with Automatic Pricing,” Computer Networks 33（2000）: 775-788; L. M. Minga, Y. Q. Fend, and Y. J. Li,“Dynamic Pricing: E-Commerce-Oriented Price Setting Algorithm,”International Conference on Machine Learning and Cybernetics 2（2003）.

1. 届时，计算机会开展平行协作行动。“经营者对于竞争对手的市场策略所采取的回应都是理性的，而非报复性的反击或者心怀共谋协议的退让。但是计算机算法依旧可以实现抬高市场价格，削弱市场竞争机制的目的。”详见：Federal Trade Commission and U.S.Department ofJustice, Horizontal Merger Guidelines, para. 7。

1. Salil K. Mehra, “Antitrust and the Robo-Seller: Competition in the Time of Algorithms,” Minnesota Law Review 100（March 10,2015）, http://ssrn.com /abstract=2576341, on how pricing algorithms can promote tacit collusion under a Cournot model.

1. Christopher Chabris, “High-Tech Chess Cheaters Charge Ahead,”Wall Street Journal, October 9, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/hightech-chess -cheaters-charge-ahead-1444404660.

1. Michael Lewis, Flash Boys: A Wall Street Revolt（New York: W.W. Norton, 2014）.

1. 原告可以宣称，被告企业是蓄谋使用同样的定价算法。特别是他们之间达成了某种协议，约定使用同样的辅助工具用于促成默许共谋。详见：Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191（2d Cir. 2001）。这种诉讼策略的好处是易于证明市场参与者的确就使用定价算法达成了共识。但坏处就是，基于“合理原则”向被告发起指控时，调查取证的难度较高，法院有时还可能得出事与愿违的判决结果。

1. 按照一般意义上的理解，竞争法包括反不正当竞争法与反垄断法。

1. Case C-199/92, P Huls AG v. Commission,（1999）ECR I-4287, （1999）5 CMLR 1016; Joined Cases C-89, 104, 114, 116, 117, 125,129/85,Ahlstrom Osakeyhtio and others v. Commission（Wood Pulp II） ,（1993）ECR I-1307,（1993）4 CMLR 407; Cases T-442/08, CISAC v Commission,（2013）5 CMLR 15（General Court）. Note that our focus is on nondominant firms.

1. Federal Trade Commission and U.S. Department of Justice,Horizontal Merger Guidelines, para. 7.

1. In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 782 F.3d 867, 874（7th Cir.） cert. denied sub nom.; Aircraft Check Servs. Co. v. Verizon Wireless, 136 S. Ct. 524（2015）.

1. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Administrative

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Proceeding File No. 3-16199（October 16, 2014）, http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2014/34 -73369.pdf.

1. 据称，Athena公司的高频交易算法“在6个月的时间里，在每一个交易日收盘前的两秒钟内进行自动化交易。该公司的交易系统投入巨额资金，以庞大的交易规模直接操纵了在纽约纳斯达克市场中上市的数千只股票的收盘价”。详见：U.S. Securities andExchange Commission,SEC Charges New York-Based High Frequency Trading Firm withFraudulent Trading to Manipulate Closing Prices,October 16, 2014,http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370543184457#出处同上。

1. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-16199（October 16, 2014）, http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2014/34 -73369.pdf.

1. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-16199（October 16, 2014）, http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2014/34 -73369.pdf.

1. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-16199, para.34.

1. Peter J. Henning, “Why High-Frequency Trading Is so Hard to Regulate,” New York Times, October 20, 2014, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/10/20/why-high-frequency-trading-is-sohard-to-regulate/.

1. Steve Goldstein, “High-Frequency Trading Firm Fined for Wave of Last- Minute Trades,” Market Watch（October 16, 2014）, http://www.marketwatch.com/story/high-frequency-trading-firm-fined-for-

1. 请留意一点：算法也可能被用来阻碍其他竞争者进入市场、传递复杂的信号以向潜在盟友暗示利润空间、参与限制定价等行为。

1. 从实践中看，默许共谋在市场参与者众多的情况下同样易于确 立。详见：R. Selten, “A Simple Model of Imperfect Competition,Where Four Are Few and Six Are Many,” International Journal of Game Theory 2（1973）: 141; Steffen Hucka, Hans-Theo Normannb, and Jorg Oechssler, “Two Are Few and Four Are Many: Number Effects in Experimental Oligopolies,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 53, no. 4（2004）:435—446。

1. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441n.16（1978）; See also Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law, 2nd ed.（Chicago:University of Chicago Press, 2001）, 160. 一般来讲，如果卖方能够掌握更多有关于竞争对手的价格与产出信息，那么市场运行效率也将得到提升。

第8章 人工智能、“上帝视角”与电子眼

1. Johana Bhuiyan and Charlie Warzel, “ ‘God View’: Uber Investigates Its Top New York Executive for Privacy Violations,”BuzzFeed News（November 18, 2014）, http://www.buzzfeed.com/johanabhuiyan/uber-is-investigating-its-top-newyork-executive-forprivacy#.fcOoXKDMw.

1. Federal Trade Commission and U.S. Department of Justice,Horizontal Merger Guidelines（August 10, 2010）, para. 7.2, https://www.ftc.gov/sites/ default/files/attachments/merger-review/10 0 819hmg.pdf.

wave-oflast-minute-trades -2014-10-16.

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1. Natalie Mortimer, “Amazon Launches Platform to Build IoT Apps for Cars, Lightbulbs and More,” The Drum（October 9, 2015）, http://www.thedrum.com/news/2015/10/09/amazon-launches-platformbuildiot-apps-cars-lightbulbs-and-more.

1. Natalie Mortimer, “Amazon Launches Platform to Build IoT Apps for Cars, Lightbulbs and More,” The Drum（October 9, 2015）, http://www.thedrum.com/news/2015/10/09/amazon-launches-platformbuildiot-apps-cars-lightbulbs-and-more.

1. 如果没有这些限制性原则，那么默许共谋将与信使场景中的情景无异。

1. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554（2007）.

1. Avinash Dixit and Barry Nalebuff, Thinking Strategically: The Competitive Edge in Business, Politics, and Everyday Life（New York: W.W. Norton, 1991）, 108.

1. Avinash Dixit and Barry Nalebuff, Thinking Strategically: The Competitive Edge in Business, Politics, and Everyday Life（New York: W.W. Norton, 1991），111。

1. 战略性行为指的是企业旨在增加利润所采取的因影响市场环境进而影响竞争对手预期，使竞争对手在预期的基础上做出对自己有利的决策行为。主要类型包括非合作型战略性行为与合作型战略性行为。

1. Don Ross, “Game Theory,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy（Winter 2014 ed.）, Edward N. Zalta, ed., http://plato.stanford.edu/archives /win 2014/entries/game-theory/.

1. 如果想对卡特尔组织如何培育成员互信这个课题有更全面深入的理解，详见：Christopher R. Leslie, “Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust,”TexasLaw Review 82（2004）: 515。

1. 在一项有关卡特尔组织成员个数的实证研究中，研究人员调取了1910—1972年所有被成功起诉的卡特尔组织案例。其中，在以同业协会的方式辅助共谋的例子里，平均有33.6家企业参与其中（中位数则是14家企业）。另外，以价格操纵组织（企业之间未成立同业协会）辅助共谋的例子里，以上两个指标的数据分别为8.3家与6家。详见：ArthurG. Frass and Douglas F. Greer, “Market Structure and Price Collusion: AnEmpirical Analysis,” Journal of Industrial Economics 26（1977）: 21, 25,36—41。

1. Federal Trade Commission and U.S. Department of Justice,Horizontal Merger Guidelines, para. 7.

1. Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow（New York: Farrar,Straus and Giroux, 2011）.

1. Federal Trade Commission and U.S. Department of Justice,Horizontal Merger Guidelines, para. 7; Casey C. Sullivan, “As Machines Learn, Will They Learn the Law? Will They Follow It?” FindLaw（September 8, 2015）, http://blogs.findlaw.com/technologist/2015/09/asmachines-learn-will-theylearn-the-law-will-they-follow-it. html.

1. A. Ezrachi, “Sponge,” University of Oxford Centre for Competition Law and Policy Working Paper CCLP（L）42（March 1, 2015）, http://ssrn.com/abstract =2572028.

第三部分行为歧视

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1. Jennifer Valentino-Devries, Jeremy Singer-Vine, and Ashkan Soltani, “Websites Vary Prices, Deals Based on Users’ Information,”Wall Street Journal, December 24, 2012,

http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142412788732377720457818939181388

第9章 对价格歧视的简要说明

1. Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark D. Janis, Mark A. Lemley, Christopher R. Leslie, and Michael A. Carrier, IP and Antitrust: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles Applied to Intellectual Property Law, 2nd ed.（Frederick, MD: Aspen Publishers, 2010）, Appendix F.

1. Deven R. Desai, Ioannis Lianos, and Spencer Weber Waller, eds.,Brands Competition Law and IP（Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015）.

1. Federal Trade Commission and U.S. Department of Justice,Horizontal Merger Guidelines（August 10, 2010）, para. 3, https://www.ftc.gov/sites/ default/files/attachments/merger-review/10 0 819hmg.pdf.

1. Peter Schmidt, “At Elite Colleges—Dim White Kids,” Boston Globe, September 28, 2007, http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial\_opinion/oped/articles/2007/09/2 dim\_white\_kids/?page=full.

1. Federal Trade Commission and U.S. Department of Justice, Horizontal Merger Guidelines, para. 3.

1. Federal Trade Commission and U.S. Department of Justice, Horizontal Merger Guidelines, para. 3.

1. Barry C. Smith, John F. Leimkuhler, and Ross M. Darrow, “YieldManagement at American Airlines,” Interfaces 22, no. 1（1992）: 8-31;PaulDavies, “Airline Ties Profitability Yield to Management,” SIAM News 27,no. 5（1994）, cited in R. Preston McAfee and Vera te Velde“DynamicPricing in the Airline Industry”.“出于以下几个原因，这个数字（指正文中提到的‘5亿美元’）可能被高估。首先，这个数字包括美国航空公司售卖自己独家的收益管理策略的获利，但只占到总金额的很小部分；其次，在‘星期六晚停留政策’（Saturday-nightstay-over restrictions）的安排下，航空公司往往认为商务旅客会情愿付出高票价而换取及早回家过周末的机会，而休闲游乘客的价格敏感度更高，他们会为了买到低廉机票而宁愿在目的地停留一个周末。于是，航空公司会故意抬高周末的机票价格，从而实现对乘客的区分。这类价格政策有利于企业开展价格歧视，但这方面的影响力却被其他因素淹没，而被严重低估（Deneckere andMcAfee 1996）。无论如何，有一点毫无疑问：定价歧视对于企业而言，的确有着重要的经济意义。对于普通消费者而言，美国大型航空公司使用的定价政策都是非常不透明的。因此，如果有种说法声称美国航空公司会在每天之中对近50万单机票的价格做出调整，那么也并不令人感到惊讶了。”详见：

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