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算法的陷阱:超级平台、算法垄断与场景欺骗

428 个 PDF 物理页 · 本页显示文件第 421–428 页

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  1. Frank Pasquale, “Beyond Innovation and Competition: The Need for Qualified Transparency in Internet Intermediaries,” Northwestern University Law Review 104(2010): 105, 143.
  1. Stucke and Grunes, Big Data and Competition Policy.
  1. Sapienza Paola and Luigi Zingales, “Trust and Finance,” NBER Reporter 2(2011): 16(“然而,对于匿名市场的发展而言,重要的是 广义的信任:即人们对一个可识别群体的随机成员的信任”);Lynn A.Stout, “Trust Behavior: The Essential Foundation of Securities Markets,” in Behavioral Finance: Investors, Corporations, and Markets, H. Kent Baker and John R. Nofsinger, eds.(Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2010), 513(信任,或 更准确地说信任是证券市场顺利发展的基石);see also Thomas J.Horton, “The Coming Extinction of Homo Economicus and the Eclipse of the Chicago School of Antitrust: Applying Evolutionary Biology to Structural and Behavioral Antitrust Analyses,” Loyola University Chicago Law Journal 42(2011): 474, 476, 502, 520(文中提到,公平和互惠的基本价值观不 仅能够增进互信,还能创造一个更健康、更稳定、更高效的经济生态系 统);Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer, “Does SocialCapital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation,”Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, no. 4(November 1997):1251,1252, 1260(对29个市场经 济样本的回归分析表明,强劲的经济表现与公民互信与合作高度相 关);Stephan M. Wagner, Linda Silver Coley, and Eckhard Lindemann, “Effects of Suppliers’ Reputation on the Future of Buyer-Supplier Relationships: The Mediating Roles of Outcome Fairness and Trust,” Journal of Supply Chain Management 47(April 2011): 42(值得注意的是,实证 研究表明“信任是商业关系中最重要的调节者”)。

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  1. 参见:Maurice E. Stucke, “Is Intent Relevant?” Journal of Law,Economics & Policy 8(2012): 801(collecting studies).
  1. Lynn Stout, Cultivating Conscience: How Good Laws Make Good People(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010).
  1. Ellen Garbarino and Sarah Maxwell, “Consumer Response to Norm-Breaking Pricing Events in E-Commerce,” Journal of Business Research 63(2010): 1067(“[T]rust will be destroyed when a trusted seller does not behave according to the social norms of fairness”);Wagner et al., “Effects of Suppliers’ Reputation on the Future of BuyerSupplier Relationships,” 35(文中提到了公平的重要性与商业关系中互信的重要性)。
  1. Devesh Rustagi, Stefani Engel, and Michael Kosfeld,“Conditional Cooperation and Costly Monitoring Explain Success in Forest Commons Management,” Science 330(2010): 964.
  1. U.K. Competition and Markets Authority, “The Commercial Use ofConsumer Data: Report on the CMA’s Call for Information”(June 2015),103(“CMA Report”). 波士顿咨询公司最近进行的一项全球调查显示,全球76%的受访者表示,他们对在线分享个人信息持谨慎态度。
  1. CMA Report, 103-106.
  1. 例如,2015年,英国上诉法院维持了用户起诉谷歌的权利,因为后者涉嫌开发了一种变通方法,使其得以绕过Safari用户的隐私设置。详见:Google Inc. v. Vidal-Hall & Ors, [2015] EWCA Civ 311。
  1. Darlene Storm, “Nissan Leaf Secretly Leaks Driver Location,Speed to Websites,” Computer World, June 14, 2011, http://www.computerworld.com /article/2470123/endpoint-security/nissanleafsecretly-leaks-drier-location-speed-to-websites.html.

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  1. CMA Report, 11.
  1. CMA Report,12。
  1. Nir Kshetri, “Big Data’s Impact on Privacy, Security and Consumer Welfare,” Telecommunications Policy 38, no. 11(2011):1134-1145.
  1. 有关经济力量与反托拉斯的相关内容,详见:Adi Ayal,“TheMarket for Bigness: Economic Power and Competition Agencies’ Dutyto Curtail It,” Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 1, no. 2(2013): 221—246。
  1. Center for Responsive Politics, “Lobbying Database”(2016),http://www .opensecrets.org/lobby.
  1. “UBER vs. Mayors: When Astroturfing Becomes Political Browbeating,” Who’s Driving You?(January 15, 2016), http://www.whosdrivingyou.org/blog /uber-vs-mayors-astroturfing-becomespoliticalbrowbeating.
  1. “Business in America,” The Economist.
  1. Brody Mullins, “Google Makes Most of Close Ties to White House: Search Giant Averages a White House Meeting a Week during Obama Administration,” Wall Street Journal, March 24, 2015.
  1. Jonathan D. Salant, “Google’s Increased Lobbying Belies Cut in Total Spending,” Bloomberg Technology, January 30, 2013, http://www.bloomberg .com/news/articles/2013-01-30/google-s-increasedlobbyingbelies-cut-in -total-spending.

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  1. Mullins, “Google Makes Most of Close Ties to White House.”
  1. David Dayen, “The Android Administration,” The Intercept,(April 22, 2016), https://theintercept.com/2016/04/22/googlesremarkably-closerelationship-with-the-obama-white-house-in-twocharts/.
  1. 2013年初,美国联邦贸易委员会在谷歌自愿同意改变其商业惯 例后,停止了对后者的反垄断调查。详见:Federal TradeCommission, “Google Agrees to Change Its Business Practices to Resolve FTC Competition Concerns in the Markets for Devices Like Smart Phones, Games and Tablets, and in Online Search: Landmark Agreements Will Give Competitors Access to Standard-Essential Patents; Advertisers Will Get More Flexibility to Use Rival Search Engines,” Press Release(January 3, 2013), https://www.ftc.gov /news-events/pressreleases/2013/01/google-agreeschange-its-business-practices-resolveftc。
  1. Federal Trade Commission, FTC Staff Report, Google Inc., File No.111-0161(August 8, 2012), 92, released by the Wall StreetJournal,http://graphics.wsj. com/google-ftc-report/img/ftc-ocr-watermark.pdf.“谷歌通过反竞争手段加强了对搜索和搜索广告的垄断,进而阻止了竞争对手(和潜在竞争对手)挑战自己的能力,此举将对消费者福利产生持久的负面影响。”出处同上。
  1. Mullins, “Google Makes Most of Close Ties to White House.”
  1. William Alden, “Email Shows How Google Gets Things Done in Washington,” BuzzFeed,(May 14, 2015), https://www.buzzfeed.com/williamalden /how-googles-lobbyists-get-thingsdone-inwashington?utm\_term=.qsKDMjLnX#.ypLAW9PNn .
  1. William Alden, “Email Shows How Google Gets Things Done in

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Washington,” BuzzFeed,(May 14, 2015), https://www.buzzfeed.com/williamalden /how-googles-lobbyists-get-thingsdone-inwashington?utm\_term=.qsKDMjLnX#.ypLAW9PNn .

  1. William Alden, “Email Shows How Google Gets Things Done inWashington,” BuzzFeed,(May 14, 2015),https://www.buzzfeed.com/williamalden /how-googles-lobbyists-get-things-done-inwashington?utm\_term=.qsKDMjLnX#.ypLAW9PNn。还有一点值得注意的是,谷歌“聘用了几名前欧盟官员作为内部游说人士,并为与自己立场一致的欧洲智库和大学研究提供了资金支持”。详见:“Revealed: How Google Enlisted Members of US Congress ItBankrolled to Fight \$6bn EU Antitrust Case,” The Guardian, 17 December2015. theguardian .com/world/2015/dec/17/google-lobbyists-congress-antitrust-brussels-eu。
  1. Jeffry A. Frieden, Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise in the Twentieth Century(New York: W. W. Norton, 2006), 102; Darren Bush, “Too Big to Bail: The Role of Antitrust in Distressed Industries,”Antitrust Law Journal 77(2010): 277, 286.
  1. “联合公民诉联邦选举委员会”一案是由美国联邦最高法院判决的一场具有重要意义的诉讼案。最高法院于2010年1月21日做出判决,认定限制商业机构资助联邦选举候选人的两党选举改革法案的条款违反宪法中的言论自由原则。自此以后,企业政治献金支出的限制被大大放宽,从而极大地提高了参选者取悦捐赠者以赢得选举的重要性。在审理过程中,大多数最高法院大法官都对现代科技表达出了极大的信心。他们相信,得益于现代技术令信息披露大大提速且内容也大为丰富,股东通过公司民主程序提出的反对意见可能会更有效。因此,迅速披露公司支出的行为可以为股东和公民提供所需信息,促使企业和民选官员对自己的立场和支持者负责。有关本案的详细内容,详见:Citizens United

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v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 370, 130 S. Ct. 876, 916, 175 L. Ed.
2d 753(2010)。

  1. 合理原则(rule of reason)并不是企业和消费者能够轻易理解和内化的指令(如明确禁止与竞争对手达成价格一致)。相反,这个词包含了反垄断的大多数开放式原则。详见:Am. Needle, Inc. v.Nat’lFootball League, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2217(2010) [quoting Board of Trade ofChicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238(1918)] 。“根据商业协议与市场环境的变化,合理原则也会适当地调整自己的关注焦点。”详见:Federal Trade Commission and U.S. Department of Justice, AntitrustGuidelines for Collaborations among Competitors(2000) §1.2, at 4,http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/04 /ftcdojguidelines.pdf。
  1. David Graeber, “On the Phenomenon of Bullshit Jobs,” Strike!Magazine, August 17, 2013, http://strikemag.org/bullshit-jobs.
  1. Barry C. Lynn, “What We Have Is Capture of the Regulators’Minds, a Much More Sophisticated Form of Capture Than Putting Money in Their Pockets,” published in Pro-Market Blog, Stigler Center,University of Chicago Booth School of Business, https://promarket.org/what-we-have-iscapture-of-the-regulators-minds-a-much-moresophisticated-form-of-capturethan-putting-money-in-their- pockets /.
  1. Dayen, “The Android Administration.”
  1. David Dayen, “Google’s Insidious Shadow Lobbying: How the Internet Giant Is Bankrolling Friendly Academics — and Skirting Federal Investigations,” Salon(November 24, 2015), http://www.salon.com/2015/11/24/googles\_insidious\_shadow\_lobbying\_how \_friendly\_academics\_and\_skirting\_federal\_investigations/.

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  1. David Dayen, “Google’s Insidious Shadow Lobbying: How the Internet Giant Is Bankrolling Friendly Academics — and Skirting Federal Investigations,” Salon(November 24, 2015), http://www.salon.com/2015/11/24/googles\_insidious\_shadow\_lobbying\_how \_friendly\_academics\_and\_skirting\_federal\_investigations/.
  1. Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “Microsoft Fights Back,” Washington Post, October 21, 1998, A01.
  1. Leah Nylen and Lewis Crofts, “To Many, Europe Has Overtaken US as Intellectual Leader on Monopolization,” mLex(January 29,2016).

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图书在版编目(CIP)数据

算法的陷阱 : 超级平台、算法垄断与场景欺骗 / (英) 阿里尔·扎拉奇, ( 美) 莫里斯·E.

斯图克著;余潇译.--北京:中信出版社,2018.5

书名原文: Virtual Competition:The Promise and Perils of the Algorithm-Driven

Economy

ISBN 978-7-5086-8752-0

Ⅰ.①算…Ⅱ.①阿…②莫…③余…Ⅲ.①电子计算机-算法理论-影响-世界经济-研究Ⅳ.①F11

中国版本图书馆CIP数据核字(2018) 第048688号

算法的陷阱 : 超级平台、算法垄断与场景欺骗

著者:[英]阿里尔·扎拉奇[美]莫里斯·E.斯图克

译者:余潇

出版发行:中信出版集团股份有限公司

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