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title: "Migrant Labour in the Gig Economy The Intersection of Migrant Labour, Platform Capitalism, and Resistance"
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# Migrant Labour in the Gig Economy The Intersection of Migrant Labour, Platform Capitalism, and Resistance

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In a similar vein, earlier studies consistently show that unionization rates among migrants remain exceptionally low, even in sectors where they constitute a substantial portion of the workforce (Fouskas & Tsevrenis, 2014; Hatziprokopiou & Markova, 2015; Kambouri et al., 2014). For example, in the garment sector in Attica, only 4% of migrants were unionized according to union estimates (Kαψάλης, 2020). These findings underscore the need for Greek trade unions to intensify their efforts to engage and support the migrant workforce and address their specific concerns more effectively.

In a climate of reduced confidence in political reforms and limited institutional support, trade unions in Greece may revise their strategic approaches emphasizing more on targeting hard-to-organize workers, such as migrants who encounter substantial barriers to entering the labour market or securing well-paid, permanent jobs (Hyman, 2001). This strategic shift is expected to lead to more grassroots campaigns and mobilizations in the future, embodying a proactive and confrontational approach.

4 Methodology

Estimating the precise number of migrants in Greece is challenging due to transient populations, insufficient verifiable records, and the intentional avoidance of declaring their presence by individuals aiming to migrate to preferred Northern European countries. For example, according to Kukreja (2023), the estimated number of South Asian men alone does not exceed 200,000. Nevertheless, the official data from the national labour force survey indicate that the number of all non-EU citizens in the Greek labour market in 2023 is something less than 252,300, while according to Κόντης (2017) most migrants in Greece are coming from South Eastern European countries.

To help the current analysis gain a more holistic understanding of the dynamics within the Greek gig economy, particularly regarding the role of migrants, a multifaceted and interpretivist research approach was employed. This approach facilitated the collection of life narratives alongside semi-structured interviews with a purposefully selected, albeit limited, participant pool. This approach yielded valuable insights into the subjective interpretations and lived experiences of gig work within the Greek context. Thematic analysis was subsequently conducted on the interviews (Braun & Clarke, 2006). The data were collected from 25 individual participants.

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To achieve perspectival triangulation, participants were chosen from different seniority levels and held various roles within the transport and delivery industry, the trade union movement, and the Greek economy. The research utilized the snowball sampling method, continuing interviews until data saturation was achieved (Kapitan et al., 2022; Kvale, 1996; Saunders et al., 2018). The detailed profiles of participants are provided in Table 6. The data were collected between June 2022 and May 2023 (approved research ethical form 33747-LR-Apr/2022-39151- 2). Some interviews were conducted online due to time constraints and the preferences of the participants.

To bolster the robustness of the qualitative data obtained from the interviews, a triangulation approach was implemented. This involved integrating the findings with statistical data analysis derived from multiple sources: the Greek Labour Force Survey, the labour statistics system maintained by the Greek Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, and relevant population census survey data, as well as an archival search of delivery workers’ unions’ announcements and press releases.

5 Findings: Statistical Data

Selecting a migration destination is a complex decision-making process influenced by various factors. These include the geographical proximity of the destination country to the origin country, cultural ties, the presence of an ethnic community in the destination country, the economic conditions of the destination country, employment opportunities for foreigners, and the immigration policies of the host country. For example, before the onset of the economic crisis in 2008, Greece was a highly attractive destination for migrants, particularly from neighbouring countries such as Albania and Bulgaria, as well as from various Asian nations (Χολέζας, 2017).

However, since then, significant changes in economic prospects have occurred, which likely influence the migration choices of prospective migrants and those already residing in the country. Consequently, not all countries are equally attractive to migrants, and they do not receive migratory flows to the same extent (European Commission, 2023; Triandafyllidou, 2023). The case of Greece is not significantly different from what is happening in other European countries. Specifically, the proportion of foreigners residing in the country over the past decade barely exceeds 8.3% (European Commission, 2023).

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According to the analysis by Κόντης (2017), migrants represent something like 8% to 10% of the population in Greece during the last two decades, which is by no means higher than the majority of other EU member states. As Eurostat underlines, the number of immigrants per 1.000 inhabitants in Greece is not significantly higher than in most other EU member states.

Nevertheless, Greece presents a unique case in several other respects. For instance, while the population aged 15 to 64 years old across the EU-28 countries increased by 5 million between 2008 and 2017, Greece experienced a reduction in this age group by 210.000 even if the country remains one of the main entry points for African and Asian migrants to Europe. Furthermore, the workforce in Greece has decreased since 2009, a year before the economic crisis intensified, primarily due to the combined effects of an ageing population and a significant brain drain effect (Groutsis et al., 2020; Labrianidis & Sykas, 2021). In 2012, a decrease in the foreign population of the country was recorded for the first time since 1989 (Χαρίσης, 2017). Table 7 presents the population with non-Greek citizenship according to the Population Census surveys since 1971.

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Over the past four decades, non-EU migrants have consistently experienced higher rates of temporary and part-time employment compared to the local population. Research from 1987 to 2017 shows that these rates, along with migrant unemployment, initially increased significantly but later declined, influenced by economic crises and other factors (Kαψάλης, 2020). For example, in 2008, Greece had one of the lowest unemployment rates for non-native population in the EU at 7.2%. However, by 2013, this rate had surged to 40.3%, the highest among member states (Δρεττ´ακης, 2013).

Despite these challenges, the rate of self-employment among migrants has historically been low. Nevertheless, there has been a steady rise in migrant entrepreneurship, which indicates its potential for fostering social integration. Self-employment not only helps ensure family financial stability by potentially increasing household income and employment rates within families (Liargovas & Skandalis, 2012), but also strengthens connections with both immigrant and local communities. This dual benefit highlights migrant entrepreneurship as not just an economic strategy, but also a means of enhancing social cohesion and boosting local economies in Greece (Table 8).

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6 Findings: Interviews

This section is based on in-depth interviews with delivery workers, union leaders, grassroots activists, industry/ media experts, and senior managers. The analysis focused mainly on food delivery workers because the mobilization in e-food is a notable example of successful resistance within the gig economy and, perhaps, the most emblematic victory of trade unions and other grassroots initiatives by gig economy workers to secure effective representation and build collective agency.

As previously mentioned, in September 2021, e-food, the largest food delivery platform in Greece, informed its delivery workers, who were temporary employees, that their contracts would not be renewed. Instead, they were asked to work as freelancers. This decision sparked a massive union response, accompanied by consumer outrage and solidarity through various forms of platform activism (Vrikki & Lekakis, 2024). Facing increasing social pressure and damage to its brand, e-food’s management ultimately agreed to the union’s demands, offering full-time and indefinite contracts to all delivery workers. However, most workers in the food delivery services are now working as freelancers, as initially intended by the management of e-food.

To gain a comprehensive understanding of the union victory and its short-term effects, it is necessary to examine the background of the mobilization, the interplay between social and institutional contexts, as well as the employer strategies within the ongoing transformation of Greek capitalism, and the emergence of the gig economy. An initial observation to note is that the market structure in the Greek food delivery services industry is gradually dominated by two major digital platforms (e-food and Wolt), alongside thousands of small businesses primarily operating as cafeterias, pizza, and souvlaki restaurants. Those online platforms have acted as significant disruptors in the industry.

An interviewed union leader of gig workers in the industry provided a good example of this: “Just before the pandemic the fee for a delivery guy in the market was 4 euros/ hour, but you usually had no insurance at all and you had to say yes to multiple errands and to accept various irrelevant to delivery duties. E-food started to offer jobs with 4 euros per hour net, insurance coverage, voucher tickets to restaurants, and the notion that you do not have a boss over your head. You have just mobile and you just need to download an application. Their target was to seduce all delivery workers from working in other fast food, dining, and eating stores. After a while, the fastfood stores suddenly ran out ofdelivery workers”.

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This should not be particularly surprising, given that the working conditions for delivery workers in most fast-food stores and restaurants are far from ideal. An interviewed delivery worker who works in a local restaurant explained, “Labour law violations occur very often. Right now, 50% ofdelivery workers are uninsured. The recent death ofa young worker, who didn’t even have a driving license, is a good example. Employers never ask for a driving license before hiring you”.

Such narratives underscore the absence of labour inspection mechanisms that are necessary to provide employment conditions of health and safety. Further, they indicate the lack of job security and the strong capacity of employers to control the labour process. As an interviewed worker mentioned: “When you report a violation to the authorities (SEPE), they arrange a meeting with a representative from the employer within 15–30 days. After reporting, you either lose your job immediately or are pressured to resign by being assigned to clean toilets and given undesirable shift schedules, such as working both morning and night shifts on the same day”. He continued by saying that: “You can’tfind justice. Ifyou approach SEPE, you end up on a blacklist, making it difficult to secure employment in the industry”.

In a similar vein, an interviewed motorbike delivery driver mentioned that employers can become extremely upset when receiving official complaints from the labour inspectors: “Some employers might hire bodyguards and bouncers. They could set up a fake order, and you may never return”. He also mentioned a recent violent incident, where: “The employer got angry with a delivery person in the area of Anoixi, hit him, and ran over his motorcycle with his jeep”.

In a similar vein, Alexandros, who has been a delivery worker for more than 20 years, highlighted the already-mentioned inability of workers to claim their rights by saying that “a Pakistani guy was beaten up asking for his salary”.

Apart from the risk of harassment and bullying behaviour from employers reported for misconduct, the courts are also not a very effective way for workers to resolve disputes. According to a delivery worker: “As a worker, it’s not feasible to pay for a lawyer and wait for two years to see what will happen in court”.

It should be noted that most of these workplaces are not unionized because Greek law requires a minimum of 21 members to establish a union, a threshold that is challenging to meet given that 99% of such workplaces have fewer employees. As a rank-and-file activist mentioned: “We have established Worker Committees because the environment is very hostile to unionism. The Committee functions like a trade union, but it is better to have it because it is anonymized. Ifyou plan to engage in formal unionism when most workers are undocumented and unregistered, there is no chance. For example, if you have people from Bulgaria or Georgia working in a pizzeria or grill house under very oppressive conditions, a trade unionist can not survive. He would be laid offthe next day”.

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Another interviewed worker highlighted the dark side of employment in food delivery: “In small businesses, they don’t offer bonuses or provide access to leave entitlements. At times, they even deduct a portion ofour tips. We feel disposable, and undervalued, and frequently find ourselves doing tasks unrelated to our jobs, such as cleaning or shopping. There’s also pressure to work long hours. Ifyou refuse, you risk beingfired”.

In some interviews, the term “neighbourhood capitalists” was employed to characterize the harsh working conditions in fast-food stores, grill houses, and restaurants. Those conditions helped digital platforms attract delivery workers to establish their hegemonic position in the Greek market. Currently, many food restaurants use digital platforms (mainly those of e-food and Wolt) to expand their customer base. A freelance delivery worker, who also works in the Greek army as his main job, mentioned: “Ifthe platform requires me in thefuture to maintain logistical records, I’ll return to working at local stores. I don’t want to do that because the working conditions with the neighbourhood capitalists are tougher than with e-food”.

Similarly, a union leader in a big trade union working in the postal and courier services mentioned: “The working conditions in thousands ofcoffee shops, tavernas, and pizzerias are chaotic. Most people working there perceive this job as a secondary income source. Because ofthis, most delivery workers do not see the reason to unionise. At courier and postal services, work is more intensified, but this is a more regulated working environment with a more established workers’ union. For example, there is less violation ofhealth and safety rules in courier services in comparison to food delivery. Platforms also offer motorbike couriers the opportunity to earn extra income byfreelancing after completing their primary job shift”.

According to a union leader in a big trade union: “it is better to be employed as a food delivery worker in a platform than a small restaurant and coffee shop”. Similarly, as it was argued by a union leader of freelance delivery workers: “In food restaurants and coffee shops today, you often find older, undeclared delivery workers who are not familiar with digital apps. Employers take advantage ofstate regulation, essentially operating without any limits and restrictions”.

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