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# Marx and the Concept of Historical Time
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The total circuit presents itself for each functional form of capital as its own specific circuit, and indeed each of these circuits conditions the continuity of the overall process; the circular course of one functional form determines that of the others. It is a necessary condition for the total-production-process [Gesamtproduktionsprozeß], in other words for the social capital, that this is at the same time a reproduction-process, and therefore the circuit of each of its moments. Different fractions of the capital successively pass through the different stages and functional forms. Each functional form thus passes through its circuit simultaneously with the others, though it is always a different part of the capital that presents itself in it. A part of the capital exists as commodity capital that is being transformed into money, but this is an ever-changing part, and is constantly being reproduced; another part exists as money capital that is being transformed into productive capital; a third part as productive capital being transformed into commodity capital. The constant presence of all three forms is mediated by the circuit of the total capital through precisely these three phases.
As a whole, then, the capital is simultaneously present, and spatially coexistent, in its various phases. But each part is constantly passing from one phase or functional form into another, and thus functions in all of them in turn. The forms are therefore fluid forms, and their simultaneity is mediated by their succession. Each form both follows and precedes the others, so that the return of one part of the capital to one form is determined by the return of another part to another form. Each part continuously describes its own course, but it is always another part of capital that finds itself in this form, and these particular circuits simply constitute simultaneous and successive moments of the overall process.
It is only in the unity of the three circuits that the continuity of the total-process is realised...total social capital always possesses this continuity, and its process always contains the unity of the three circuits. 15
12 Of interest here is the manner in which, from the standpoint of total social capital, ‘production’ (the circuit of productive capital) simply represents the capacity of the living organism to preserve/maintain itself, not the sense in which this being reproduces itself as more than itself– as ‘giving birth’ to more than what it already is (this is the function of the circuit of money capital). To put this a different way, whereas the production-process in the first volume of Capital obviously corresponds to the production of surplus-value, this is, from the standpoint of the second volume of Capital, expressed by the circuit of money capital, not the circuit of productive capital. As Marx expresses it, ‘the general form of the movement P…P’ is the form of reproduction, and does not indicate, as does M…M’, that valorisation is the purpose of the process.’ Marx, Capital 2, 172.
13 Tombazos, Time in Marx, 140.
14 Ibid. 144.
15 Karl Marx, Das Kapital: Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, Zweiter Band: Der Zirkulationsprozeß des Capitals [1885], herausgegeben von Friedrich Engels (hereafter Kapital 2), in Marx and Engels, MEW, Band 24 (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1963), 108 (Capital 2, 184). Consider also Marx, Capital 2, 180: ‘if we take all three forms together, then all the premises of the process appear as its result, as premises produced by the process itself. Each moment appears as a point of departure, of transit, and of return.
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This passage raises many questions which might foster some speculative conclusions. Namely, is Marx’s concept of accumulation – at the level of ‘total social capital’ – a model of historical time? That is, does total social capital secure the manner in which the expansion of human needs can be understood as history? Is total social capital ultimately what totalises and temporalises history? Is it the comprehensive historicalising, and therefore de-historicalising, subject? These questions may come across as unrelentingly abstract and hence as orientating human history and its ‘real material basis’ in precisely the opposite direction which Marx and Engels desire in The German Ideology. Indeed, they may seem to disregard Marx and Engels’s exhortation in The Holy Family that ‘history does nothing, it does not “possess vast wealth”, it does not “fight battles”! Rather, it is humans, actual, living humans, who do all that, who possess and fight; it is not “history” that uses humans as a means to pursue its own ends, as if it were a person apart. History is nothing but the activity of humans pursuing their ends.’16 Yet to read these questions as complicit in the mystification of ‘history’ is to forget precisely what kind of ‘subject’ capital – total social capital – is. It is to forget that, in capitalism, total social capital is the comprehensive subject which makes human historical acts possible, which provides the unity of the human act with its historical intelligibility. As Marx declares, after the passage quoted above: ‘those who consider the autonomisation [Verselbstständigung] o value as a mere abstraction forget that the movement of industrial capital is this abstraction in action.’17 The point to take from this is not that this autonomisation is not produced by human beings, but rather that human beings are equally, and in fact asymmetrically, produced by this autonomisation, such that this autonomisation makes possible the idea that ‘history is nothing but the activity of humans pursuing their ends.’ ‘Human history’ is only conceivable because, in capitalism, human beings produce and satisfy their needs as the personifications and bearers of the ‘movement of independent value, acting with the force [Gewalt] of an elemental naturalprocess.’18 In this way, if total social capital and its process is the unity of the production- and circulation-processes proper19, its time, which might be characterised as ‘the time of the totalprocess of capitalist production’, or indeed as ‘the unity of the time of production and the time of circulation’, is not, after Tombazos, the ‘organic time of capital’, but rather the historical time of capital, a historical time whose material basis is introduced (albeit in highly abstract terms) in the second volume of Capital, and subsequently concretised in the third volume of Capital.20
16 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Die heilige Familie, oder Kritik der kritischen Kritik. Gegen Bruno Bauer und Konsorten [1845], in Marx and Engels, MEW, Band 2 (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1962), 98 (Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Holy Family, or Critique of Critical Criticism. Against Bruno Bauer and Company, in MECW, Volume 4, Marx and Engels, 1844-1845, trans. Richard Dixon and Clemens Dutt (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975), 93).
17 Marx, Capital 2, 185.
18 Marx, Kapital 2, 109 (Capital 2, 185).
19 Marx, Capital 2, 180.
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However – and this point guides the second part of this conclusion – it is impossible to imagine the ‘historical time of capital’ – the concepts of history and historical time which exist because of total social capital – in isolation from Marx’s concept of crisis. Inasmuch as capital is, as Tombazos describes it, a ‘rich and complex organisation of rhythms’, it is, and because of this, equally the permanent tendency towards crisis, such that its rhythmic unity contains, within itself, the permanent possibility of ‘a kind of “arrhythmia”…a momentary disturbance of the system’s coherence.’21 Generally speaking, we must attend to three different levels at which ‘crisis’ operates in Marx’s work, but which, when taken together as a whole, casts considerable doubt on the unity of Marx’s understanding of crisis, such that it is questionable whether one can identify a ‘concept’ of crisis in Marx.22 The first two levels are immanent to capitalism. They proceed from Marx’s position that, at their core, crises are manifestations of the ineradicable contradictions of capital: they bring ‘to the surface’ the barriers [Schranken] ‘to the free development of the productive forces’, barriers which capitalism ‘contains within itself’.23 This begins – and this is the first level – with the fact that the potential for crisis is immanent to the value-form itself. Even the most simple metamorphosis of the commodity, the ongoing separation, in time and space, between its purchase and sale24, contains the seeds of crisis within itself, because when the ‘assertion of [the] external independence [äußerliche Verselbstständigung]’ of the two processes ‘which lack internal independence’ ‘proceeds to a certain critical point, their unity violently makes itself felt by producing – a crisis.’25 In this regard, ‘crisis’ can be understood as the enforced movement of interdependent processes that have become immobile. Crisis is therefore not just the lack of the essential movement which is capital, but so too ‘the forcible establishment of unity between elements that have become independent and the enforced separation from one another of elements which are essentially one.’26 ‘Alongside the interrupted circulation’, as Marx puts it elsewhere, ‘a forced circulation takes place.’27
20 Tombazos’s ‘organic time’ is the comprehensive concept of the third and final section of his Time in Marx. It is the culminating conceptual formulation which unites ‘the time of production’ and ‘the time of circulation’ as, respectively, a ‘linear time’ and ‘cyclical time’. The problems with this reading aside, we must note that it goes hand-in-hand with a systematic lack of an analysis of the concept of need, a fact which results in the separation, for Tombazos, of the ‘logical’ and ‘historical’ time of capital. 21 Tombazos, Time in Marx, 145.
22 Much of the discussion that follows is indebted to Peter Osborne’s recent article ‘A sudden topicality: Marx, Nietzsche and the politics of crisis’, Radical Philosophy 160 (March/April 2010), 19-26, which proceeds from the premise that whereas Marx is undoubtedly a thinker of crisis, it is unclear whether he is a theorist of crisis, whether, that is to say, he ‘propound[s] something that might legitimately be called a “crisis theory”.’ Ibid. 19. This dovetails with Tombazos’s argument that Marx only analyses ‘periodical crises linked to the industrial cycle, which are therefore “normal”, necessary and inevitable moments of capitalist production’, but leaves unanalysed ‘the structural crises that are abnormal or extraordinary in that they cannot be overcome by the spontaneous or endogenous mechanisms of the system.’ Tombazos, Time in Marx, 274. However, what Tombazos calls a ‘structural crisis’ is not the same thing as what Osborne calls ‘the all-pervasive, general-historical character of the concept of crisis in its modern form’, a concept of crisis which Tombazos leaves unanalysed and with which, as we will learn, the concept of historical time must reckon. See Osborne, ‘A sudden topicality: Marx, Nietzsche and the politics of crisis’, 20.
23 Karl Marx, Economic Manuscripts of 1861-63 (Continuation), in MECW, Volume 32, Marx: 1861- 1863, trans. Renate Simpson (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1989), 157. See also Karl Marx, Theories of Surplus-Value, Part 2 [1861-63], trans. Renate Simpson (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1969), 528. 24 Marx, Economic Manuscripts of 1861-63 (Continuation), in MECW, Volume 32, 140, 145.
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However, and Marx regularly stresses this point, this understanding of crisis is nothing but the formal possibility of crisis, ‘the general, abstract possibility of crisis [that] denotes no more than the most abstract form of crisis, without content, without a compelling motivating factor.’28 In capitalism, the ‘content’ which transforms the formal possibility of crisis into an actual crisis is a conjunctural question, and consequently can only be known through actual political-economic events. Yet what, on Marx’s terms, each and every specifically capitalist crisis registers – and this is the second level to which we must attend – are the ‘periodic’ crises which characterise the cycles of industrial capital, crises which are, as Tombazos expresses it, ‘“normal”, necessary and inevitable moments of capitalist production.’29 Osborne summarises this understanding of crisis nicely:
1. Crises are modes of appearance of structural contradictions within the process of capitalist production – they bring contradictions ‘to the surface’, as Marx says.
2. Crises are means for the temporary solution, and hence new forms of mediation, of such contradictions, which restore the conditions for accumulation.
3. The restoration of conditions for accumulation is at the same time the renewal of the terms of the contradictions within the system that gave rise to the crisis in the first place.30
From this standpoint, a crisis is a functional aspect of the expanded reproduction of industrial capital. At the level of total social capital, crisis can be comprehended as the manifestation of contradiction within one or many of the ‘life-cycles’ of capital, and the temporary (enforced) resolution of the consequent ‘arrhythmia’, such that crisis is in fact reproductive of the broader turnover-time [Umschlagszeit] of capital.31 In this sense, a crisis is simultaneously a disruption of the unity of production- and circulation-time and also a condition of the renewal of what is already always a contradictory unity. At the level of both the potentiality (the value-form) and actuality (the industrial cycle) of the accumulation of capital, therefore, crisis is constitutive of history and historical time. The idea that ‘history’ constitutes – in and of itself – the ongoing self-expansion of time is (to date) predicated on capitalist crises.
25 Marx, Capital 1, 209. The point here is that the value-form in no way ensures that the movement of valorisation is continuous. Marx’s well-known critique of Say’s law summarises this: ‘no one can sell unless someone else purchases. But no one directly needs to purchase because he has just sold.’ Ibid. 208-9.
26 Marx, Economic Manuscripts of 1861-63 (Continuation), in MECW, Volume 32, 144.
27 Marx, Grundrisse, 600. See also ibid. 443-44.
28 Marx, Economic Manuscripts of 1861-63 (Continuation), in MECW, Volume 32, 140.
29 Tombazos, Time in Marx, 274.
30 Osborne, ‘A sudden topicality: Marx, Nietzsche and the politics of crisis’, 20.
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However, neither of these levels take in what Osborne calls ‘the all-pervasive, generalhistorical character of the concept of crisis in its modern form (including the historico-political notion of a crisis of the capitalist system as a whole, as a condition of a transition to a new mode of production – a notion which clearly motivated Marx).’32 In opposition to this concept of crisis (the third and final level to which we must attend), the second level (and by extension the first level, which is simply the formal possibility of the second) possesses a ‘restrictedly conjunctural character and relatively narrow political-economic basis.’33 The difference – or rather the disjunction – between these three levels is crucial, because it cuts to the core of the philosophical and political problem that the introduction to this thesis first raised, and to which we can finally return: namely, capital is the condition of thinking history and hence historical time, but the philosophical concept of history must register the possibility (but by no means the inevitability) of social and historical time after capitalism. The thought of history, in other words, necessarily unsettles its ongoing comprehensive condition of possibility, because the realisation of history’s ‘true’ teleological end (there are several ways of grasping this in Marx: e.g. the flourishing of the ‘true’ realm of freedom, or the emergence of the ‘genuinely’ social individual, or the ‘absolute’ movement of becoming) hinges on the speculative chronological end of capitalism. In a word, the concept of historical time compels us to think ‘the time of history’ beyond the historical time of capital, as inclusive, that is to say, of the historical time of communism and its subjects. This does not mean that, unlike the historical time of capital, the ‘time of history’ is not grounded by the ongoing expansion of human needs and productive forces, or that it is not a form of self-expanding time. Far from it. It just means that capital is sublated as the comprehensive subject of historical time. We might put it this way: the ‘time of history’ must be thought from the standpoint of the sublation of the contradiction that, for Marx, human beings simultaneously live (to date) in pre-history and history. Hence the need to realise the end of ‘pre-history’ (a political category) within history; that is, to negate (which is reversible…it can regress) the ‘pre-history’ of the ongoing historical present and, therefore, usher in the beginning of a new unified kind of history, which is, as Pierre Vilar puts it, ‘the task of another mode of production.’34 This is what the concept of crisis must register, which Marx’s concept of crisis does not. Politically and philosophically, ‘crisis’ is here a historical category, not simply a political-economic concept specific to capitalism. This is the context in which Osborne states that ‘analysis of the historical process demands not merely an account of fundamental contradictions and their expression in conflicts and crises, but an account of crisis as a condition of possibility of the new, in this case the qualitatively historically new: new forms of social production, new relations of production and forms of organisation.’35 And yet, despite the fact that capitalist crises intrinsically point beyond the confines of the political economy of capitalism (and therefore beyond the political-economic scope of Marx’s concept of crisis), the repetitive nature of these crises is precisely what makes it so difficult to imagine how the qualitatively historically new can be realised, such that this new is already structured, and thereby foreclosed, by the historicalising temporality of capital.36
31 ‘…a crisis is always the starting-point of a large volume of new investment. It is also, therefore, if we consider the society as a whole, more or less a new material basis for the next turnover cycle. Marx, Capital 2, 264.
32 Osborne, ‘A sudden topicality: Marx, Nietzsche and the politics of crisis’, 20. Osborne goes on to define this concept of crisis as ‘its fundamental political meaning at the level of its greatest historical generality…the generality and fundamentally historical character of the concept of crisis.’ Ibid. 22. 33 Ibid. 20.
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The crisis which brings Tombazos’s Time in Marx to a close – the ‘structural crisis’ – does not provide us with a solution to this problem. Framed by the promise to ‘examine the conceptual link between the totality-capital and historical time’37, this conception of crisis38 actually obscures the relationship between capital and historical time39, and thus precludes the possibility of developing a general-historical concept of crisis out of, and in relation to, the endemic crises of capitalism. Yet this is precisely what must be done, insofar as ‘the political significance of the concept of crisis…depends upon some projected articulation of these two levels, some conjunctural political effectivity at the level of the mode of production, in response to “periodic” crisis.’40 We might go so far as to say that this is the only possible way to think, let alone actualise, the possibility of social and historical time after capitalism. This returns us to the philosophical – and brings into the conversation the political – importance of the category of life in Marx’s work. If ‘crisis’ can, on some level, be understood as a crisis of the ‘life’ of something, such that it signals the possibility of the end of this life as such, then the politics of historical time (a politics structured both by the understanding of capital as the condition of thinking history and the process of realising historical time after capitalism) must treat the recurring crises of capitalism (whether ‘normal’ or ‘abnormal’) from the standpoint of their disruption of the life-time of capital. And this ‘life-time’ is not just the (unknowable) duration of the life of capital, such that crises enable, but only potentially, the chronological end of capitalism, but, and more fundamentally, the historicalising time of the life of capital as it is presented in this thesis (a time which is itself the ontological ground of measuring the ‘duration’ of capitalism41). This is, despite the absence of politics surrounding its presentation, the distinct political importance of the concept of ‘total social capital’ in the second volume of Capital. What this concept begs is not just a concept of historical time whose philosophical scope matches the systematicity of total social capital, but a concept of historical time whose political scope is equally systematic, such that political practice can, on some level, be thought in relation to total social capital itself. The development of a historical concept of crisis is the necessary first step towards such a philosophy and politics of historical time.
34 Pierre Vilar, ‘Marxist History, a History in the Making: Towards a Dialogue with Althusser,’ New Left Review I/80 (July/August 1973), 105.
35 Osborne, ‘A sudden topicality: Marx, Nietzsche and the politics of crisis’, 21. Osborne continues: ‘crisis “theory” is thus in principle inadequate to thinking the historico-political meaning of crises – and this includes Marx’s own account (or “theory”) of capitalist crises, however central to such a thinking it might be. Hence my reluctance to think of Marx as a crisis “theorist”, with respect to the politics of crises, which was his ultimate concern.’ Ibid.
36 For Osborne, ‘with regard to the temporality of crisis, the cyclical character of crises of accumulation tends to instil less a sense of possibility than of repetition. This serves to reinforce the main form of temporal abstraction associated with the experience of commodities in capitalist societies: “the new”. The periodic character of crisis and the commodity-form each produce modes of experience of temporal abstraction that undermine or erode the historical experience of crises and, thereby, function to repress the political possibilities they contain.’ Ibid. 24.
37 Tombazos, Time in Marx, 275.
38 See ibid., Chapter 24, ‘The Structural Crises’, 291-305, which, along with its appendix, does little in the way of constructing a concept of ‘structural crisis’ as an ‘abnormal or extraordinary’ (ibid. 274) crisis of capitalism, instead offering an empirical history of business cycles over roughly the past 150 years. Why structural crises are ‘structural’, and intelligible as such as against ‘periodical crises’ (which would equally seem to be part of the structure of capitalist accumulation), is thus left at a descriptive level.
39 Tombazos’s grasp of the relationship between capital and historical time comes out of his analysis of ‘structural crises’. He states: ‘far from acting in a social environment that it only conquers, capital produces its objective contents that are this environment. It produces its own history. Each particular stage of capitalism, each recovery from a structural crisis, is the peace that capital concludes with itself.’ Ibid. 300. After Hegel, ‘this correspondence between “subjectivity” and “objectivity” is not that
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of the conceptual totality of capital with an external empirical reality, with a neutral historical time. Rather, it is the relative correspondence of the former with the objective determinations it produces. Ibid. Thus, ‘capital as an “Idea” is the correspondence of a logical order of time – obeying its own immanent criteria – with historical time. This correspondence is a permanent relation of tension and conflict, a relation of sometimes hidden and sometimes evident contradiction. Crises, particularly structural crises, are violent moments of confrontation between antagonistic forces. They open up various possibilities, among which is that of a new “peace” between the “subjective side” and “objective side” of capital. This is why capitalism is a coherent system of determinations, at the same time completed and open, dynamic and in movement.’ Ibid. There are two problems with this reading. First, history/historical time are reduced to the ‘objective side’ of the dialectic of capital, the ‘empirical world’ that is dialectically tied to the ‘subjective side’ – the ‘thought’ or ‘universal reason’ – of capital, wherein a ‘mutual fertilisation’ and ‘contradictory unity’ between the universal logic and particular history of capital exists. Ibid. 303. This stands against the idea of this thesis that history/historical time are the manifestations of the dialectic of capital itself– from both the standpoint of its objectivity and subjectivity. Second, Tombazos’s concept of crisis (both ‘periodical’ and ‘structural’) thus precludes the possibility of constructing a historical concept of crisis: the fundamentally historical character of crisis is here not simply limited to capital, but to the objective side of capital at that. The ‘various possibilities’ of crises thus become one possibility: historical repetition.
40 Osborne, ‘A sudden topicality: Marx, Nietzsche and the politics of crisis’, 21. The ‘two levels’ here are the ‘historical development of the mode of production beyond its own limits, on the one hand, and political economy of capital, on the other’. Ibid. For Osborne, ‘the failure to adhere to the disjunction’ between these two levels ‘generates the quasi-theological notion of a “final” crisis of the capitalist system, as a whole, as some kind of event, rather than a process with a duration of many decades, if not centuries, appropriate to the idea of a “social” rather than a merely “political” revolution. And it is this notion that lies behind the substitution of a theory of breakdown for a (generational) politics of transformation.’ Ibid.
41 See Chapter 4, footnote 11.
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