Marx and the Concept of Historical Time

the combination of…labour appears just as subservient to and led by an alien will and an alien intelligence – having its animating unity elsewhere – as its material unity appears subordinate to the objective unity of…machinery, of fixed capital, which, as animated monster, objectifies the scientific idea, and is in fact the coordinator, does not in any way relate to the individual worker as his instrument; but rather he himself exists as an animated individual punctuation mark; as its living isolated accessory... 101

in conjunction with this passage in The German Ideology, in which the ‘social power’ being characterised here could very well be understood as history itself:

The social power, i.e. the multiplied productive force, that arises with the cooperation of different individuals as it is determined by the division of labour, appears to these individuals, since their cooperation is not voluntary but has come about naturally, not as their own united power, but as an alien force existing outside them, of the origin and goal of which they are ignorant, which they thus cannot control, which on the contrary passes through a peculiar series of phases and stages independent of the will and the action of men and women, nay even being the prime governor of these.¹⁰²

¹⁰⁰ Ibid. 107.

¹⁰¹ Marx, Grundrisse, 470.

¹⁰² Marx and Engels, DI, 34 (GI, 54).

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Take note of Marx and Engels’s deliberate use of a fetishised conception of nature in the latter passage; this conception is essential to the idea that Marx’s analysis of the production-process of capital allows the basic relationship between alienation and history to come to light. If, after The German Ideology, the human is a natural-historical being and nature is a human-historical means of life, what Marx’s analysis of the valorisation-process and real subsumption reveals is not that the capitalist division of labour and private property (The German Ideology depicts these as ‘identical expressions’¹⁰³) render nature and history as ‘unnatural’ and ‘unhistorical’, such that alienation has ‘taken away’ the previously rich totality of human powers and needs, that alienation has fractured what in human beings was previously whole. Rather, the situation is more complex than this. On the one hand, the division of labour and private property which constitute, and are constituted by, real subsumption register the sense in which human powers and needs are separated off from human beings, inasmuch as these powers and needs are not possessed and actualised by individuals. In this regard:

The division of labour is the economic expression of the social character of labour within…estrangement. Or, since labour is only an expression of human activity within alienation, of the living of life as the estrangement of life, the division of labour…is therefore nothing else but the estranged, alienated positioning of human activity as a real activity of the genus or as the activity of men and women as genus-beings. 104

This passage should be retroactively read from the standpoint of Marx’s examination of real subsumption from the early 1860s onwards, since this is the only way in which the specifically capitalist division of labour can be understood as constitutive of a conception of ‘history’ (and ‘nature’) as a productive force in its own right – independent and divorced from individuals – wherein, as previously cited, ‘knowledge appears as alien, external’ to workers. Thus ‘history’ exists because the expansion of human needs is predominantly not actualised within, and thus not possessed by, the majority of human beings. However, and on the other hand, this grasp of alienation needs to be reconciled with the sense in which, albeit through alienated property relations, human powers and needs are actively developed by capital within human beings, in that these powers and needs are possessed and actualised by individuals:

¹⁰³ Marx and Engels, GI, 53. They state: ‘in the one the same thing is affirmed with reference to activity as is affirmed in the other with reference to the product of the activity.’ Ibid. ¹⁰⁴ Marx, OPM, 557 (EPM, 159).

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…[capital] creates the material elements for the development of the rich individuality, which is as all-sided in its production as in its consumption, and whose labour also therefore appears no longer as labour, but as the full development of activity itself, in which natural necessity in its immediate form has disappeared; because a historically created need has taken the place of a natural need. This is why capital is productive; i.e. an essential relation for the development of the social productive forces. 105

There is a distinct tension in Marx – from the Grundrisse onwards – between two discourses: alienation both is and is not the separation and dispossession of the human from the expansion of its needs. Yet this tension is precisely that through which we must comprehend the relation between alienation and the materialist concept of history. These discourses are dialectically bound to one another: if there was no development of these needs and powers by capital there would be no possibility of their active reappropriation (no possibility, that is, of communism). This tension – dialectic – cuts to the heart of the meaning of the ‘social individual’ in Marx (which, as Chapter 2 argues, Mészáros does not grasp): the notion of history as the ‘expansion of productive forces’ is predicated on the existence of a mode of production in which, ‘on the one hand, we have a totality of productive forces, which have…taken on a material form and are for the individuals no longer the forces of the individuals but of private property, and hence of the individuals only insofar as they are owners of private property themselves’¹⁰⁶ (that is, only insofar as labour-power is commodified); and in which, on the other hand, the productive powers of social individuals are being actively developed by capital in the production-process (indeed in capitalist society more generally). This tension and dialectic are complicated further by Capital, such that the deeply structuralist dimension of human beings as the ‘bearers’ and ‘personifications’ of alienated social relations simultaneously registers the distance of human beings from the structures that they personify, to the point where they are overdetermined by these structures, and yet – at the same time – these human beings are these structures. In other words, ‘the capitalist’ may just be the personification of capital, but he is no less an individual because of this, just as ‘the worker’ may be the personification of ‘variable capital’, but he is likewise no less an individual because of this.

We are now at the point where the constitutive place of class and class struggle¹⁰⁷ must be reassessed in relation to Marx’s philosophical concept of history. Chapter 1 briefly raises the question of whether category of ‘class’ can, on some level, be grasped in transhistorical terms, and suggests that whereas something like ‘the differentiation and grouping of humans in relation to the surplus product’ might be understood as transhistorically valid (that is, in all human history up to the present), classes and the struggles they constitute cannot, in the last instance, and as much as some Marxists would reject this, be comprehended as ontologically originary in the same way that labour and need can and must. Class and the division of labour are ontologically ‘down the line’ from labour and need, such that class and class struggle can only be logically comprehended as a ‘motive force’ or ‘engine’ of history after needs and the labours which satisfy these needs have been established as the basic intelligibility of history. 108 However, once capital is established as the condition of thinking history (once abstract labour becomes the condition of thinking ‘labour in general’ and once capital’s need to self-expand becomes the condition of thinking the expansion of human needs), class takes on a constitutive function that previously – at a transhistorical level – was impossible for us to justify. This is because the formation of classes specific to capitalism – the formation of classes not just from the ownership of the means of producing life, but from the exclusive ownership of these means by one class as against another – is a material basis without which alienation and estrangement, and hence ‘history’, would not exist. The non-ownership of all facets of the labour-process (the activity, means and products of labour) by the producers is, in other words, a direct condition of thinking history. The specifically capitalist aspect of this is crucial. If, as The German Ideology contends, there is (to date) no consciousness in isolation from the originary division between spiritual and material labour, which is to say in isolation from the existence of a ruling class, Marx’s analysis of the subsumption of the labour-process by the valorisationprocess implicitly reworks this, and reveals that there is (to date) no historical consciousness, no consciousness of history in itself and as such, in isolation from the division of labour and consequent creation of classes within capitalism. Hence when Balibar states, as earlier cited, that ‘Marx…[extends] the scheme of the division of labour to its fullest extent…’ whereby he ‘accord[s] existence to classes on the dual plane of the division of labour and consciousness, and therefore also [makes]…the division of society into classes a condition or a structure of thought’¹⁰⁹, we must specify this and declare that only the capitalist division of society into classes gives the thought of ‘history’ its possibility. If for Marx and Engels class ‘achieves an independent existence over against…individuals,’ and if these individuals ‘become subsumed under it [class],’¹¹⁰ this must be understood as an essential condition of history, in both thought and actual existence. Yet this condition is only valid from the standpoint of the subsumption of the labour-process (individuals) under the valorisation-process (‘class’, a category whose intelligibility relies on abstract labour).¹¹¹

¹⁰⁵ Marx, Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, 244 (Grundrisse, 325).

¹⁰⁶ Marx and Engels, GI, 92.

¹⁰⁷ These two terms should be understood synonymously. In Marx, ‘class’ is not a static category which is subsequently put into motion through struggle. ‘Class’ is already always class struggle, which is to say that, so long as classes exist, they only ever exist through struggle. To rearticulate the relationship between needs and the means of their satisfaction in Chapter 1, there is no chronological succession here: one moment (the existence of a class) is not subsequently followed by another (the struggle of this class).

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¹⁰⁸ The essential point here is that if, famously, ‘the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles’, this proclamation can only be sustained after the needs of capital, or more precisely, after the real subsumption of the labour-process under capital, has been established as the condition of thinking ‘the history of all hitherto existing society’. See Marx and Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party, 34. The historical importance of class struggle is not thereby diminished: it is simply given its ontological and epistemological basis.

¹⁰⁹ Balibar, The Philosophy of Marx, 46, 44.

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¹¹⁰ Marx and Engels, GI, 82.

¹¹¹ Like ‘labour in general’, the category of ‘class’ is the creation of abstract labour and the valorisationprocess, for how else is the surplus product yielded by ‘surplus-labour’, in capitalism or any other mode of production, imaginable in isolation from abstract labour and the valorisation-process? This dovetails with, even as it is not the immediate context of, Marx and Engels’s assertion in The German Ideology that ‘the emergence of the class…is itself a product of the bourgeoisie.’ Ibid. 84. This does not mean that the separation of the means of production from the producers is not a condition of abstract labour and the valorisation-process, but it does mean that the latter are the condition of thinking the former as constitutive of ‘classes’.

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4.1.4 So-called Originary Accumulation

Automation and alienation form the two axes around which the production-process of capital can be established as the condition of thinking the materialist concept of history. Nevertheless, this chapter would be incomplete without an examination of so-called originary accumulation [die sogenannte ursprüngliche Akkumulation]¹¹², the final part of the first volume of Capital. Marx’s concept of originary accumulation is a direct, critical response to the place of ‘previous accumulation’ in political economy – above all Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations¹¹³ – but it is also, and more fundamentally, a confrontation with the seemingly circular logic that structures the production-process of capital; namely: ‘the accumulation of capital presupposes surplusvalue; surplus-value presupposes capitalist production; capitalist production presupposes the availability of considerable masses of capital and labour-power in the hands of commodity producers’¹¹⁴, which is to say the accumulation of capital. At the basis of this presuppositional circle – that which enables this apparently seamless circularity to exist and which, and as we will see, is erased from it – is the originary accumulation of capital. In mocking opposition to the ‘insipid childishness’¹¹⁵ of the morality tale which political economy tells itself – e.g. that capitalism sprung from the difference between, on the one hand, the ‘frugal elite’ and, on the other, the ‘lazy rascals’ who squandered their money in ‘riotous living’– Marx presents his readers with a systematic account of originary accumulation, one which registers the fact that, ‘in actual history, …conquest, enslavement, robbery, murder, in short, violence [Gewalt], play the greatest part.’¹¹⁶ He summarises this accumulation in the following terms:

¹¹² ‘Primitive accumulation’ is of course the predominant English language translation of ursprüngliche Akkumulation. In contrast to this, this thesis argues that ‘originary’ is a better rendition of ursprüngliche than ‘primitive’, first and foremost because ‘primitive accumulation’ conjures up, as Osborne suggests, ‘a nineteenth-century anthropological imagery, which would consign the process to a past time; or at least, identifies its methods with those of pre-history.’ How to Read Marx, 104-5. As Osborne notes, ‘primitive accumulation’ obscures the contribution that Marx’s ursprüngliche Akkumulation makes to the concept of the origin – the Ursprung – in the German philosophical tradition more generally. Ibid. 105. Thus originary accumulation might be grasped as constitutive of a kind of ‘originary temporality’, in ways that converge with and radically depart from Heidegger’s use of the term. Finally, ‘originary is preferable to ‘original’, because the former registers the ongoing constitutive function of originary accumulation, and hence the sense in which, as we will see, capital cannot exist without it.

¹¹³ Without doubt, Michael Perelman’s The Invention of Capitalism: Classical Political Economy and the Secret History of Primitive Accumulation (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000) is the preeminent investigation of political economy’s simultaneous support and dismissal of originary accumulation. The ‘so-called’ within ‘so-called originary accumulation’ registers Marx’s direct response to political economy, but it also, this thesis suggests, can be extended to the permanence of originary accumulation within capitalism.

¹¹⁴ Marx, Capital 1, 873.

¹¹⁵ Ibid. After Jason Read, this tale is ‘the idealized memory of an individual capitalist’s accumulation.’ Jason Read, ‘Primitive Accumulation: the Aleatory Foundation of Capitalism’, Rethinking Marxism 14:2 (Summer 2002), 27. As Read points out, this is the context of Balibar’s comment that ‘the analysis of primitive accumulation thus brings us into the presence of the radical absence of memory which characterises history (memory being only the reflection of history in certain pre-determined sites – ideology or even law – and as such, anything but a faithful reflection).’ Balibar, ‘Elements for a Theory of Transition’, 283.

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The process, therefore, that creates the capital-relation can be nothing other than the process that separates the worker from the ownership of the conditions of his own labour; it is a process that operates two transformations, whereby the social means of life and production are turned into capital, and the immediate producers are turned into wage-labourers. So-called originary accumulation, therefore, is nothing else than the historical process of separating the producer from the means of production. It appears as “originary” [Er erscheint als „ursprünglich“] because it constitutes the pre-history [Vorgeschichte] of capital, and of the mode of production corresponding to capital.¹¹⁷

Marx’s concept of originary accumulation brings to centre stage, as some commentators have convincingly argued¹¹⁸, a – if not the – essential logic underlying the accumulation of capital: the logic ofseparation [Scheidung]. This separation (between the producer and the conditions of production, thus between the wage-labourer and the capitalist) constitutes, as Marx puts it across his work, ‘the actual formation-process of capital [den eigentlichen Bildungsprozeß des Kapitals]’¹¹⁹ and ‘the concept of capital.’¹²⁰

The conventional – although increasingly less so – reading of originary accumulation understands this concept within the terms of historical periodisation, which is to say that this accumulation is read as a chronologically distinct span of historical time that, centuries ago, gave rise to capitalism. Quite similar to the conception of formal subsumption as historically ‘preceding’ real subsumption, originary accumulation is, on this reading, not just a category of historical periodisation but a category of historical transition: it encompasses (15^th – 18^th century England being the archetype) the period of transition from feudalism to capitalism, and therefore more or less ‘ends’ after capitalism established itself on the world stage.¹²¹ This reading consequently highlights the empirical histories that Marx provides in the final chapters of the first volume of Capital: particularly the expropriation of the agricultural peasantry from the land they cultivated and collectively owned (and the acts of Parliament which sanctioned this expropriation), the manifold development of the state and the mechanisms through which it wields power¹²², and, outside the confines of the European nation-state, the global reach of colonial accumulation and imperialist war.¹²³ As De Angelis shows, Lenin’s The Development of Capitalism in Russia (1899) arguably inaugurates this reading as the predominant reading of originary accumulation, which is subsequently appropriated in different manners by Rosa Luxemburg’s The Accumulation of Capital (1913) and the infamous ‘Dobb-Sweezy debates’ on the transition from feudalism to capitalism.¹²⁴ These readings are not at all surprising, nor are they necessarily without merit, insofar as they are faithful to Marx’s position that originary accumulation ‘precedes capitalist accumulation’, that it ‘is not the result of the capitalist mode of production but its point of departure.’¹²⁵

¹¹⁶ Marx, Kapital 1, 742 (Capital 1, 874).

¹¹⁷ Marx, Kapital 1, 742 (Capital 1, 874-75). ‘This historical act is the historical genesis of capital, the historical process of separation which transforms the conditions of labour into capital and labour into wage-labour. This provides the basis for capitalist production.’ Marx, Theories of Surplus-Value, Part 3, 315.

¹¹⁸ See, in particular, Massimo De Angelis, ‘Marx and primitive accumulation: The continuous character of capital’s “enclosures”’, The Commoner, Volume 2 (September 2001),

http://www.commoner.org.uk/02deangelis.pdf (accessed 21 May 2015), and Werner Bonefeld, ‘The Permanence of Primitive Accumulation: Commodity Fetishism and Social Constitution’, The

Commoner, Volume 2 (September 2001), http://www.commoner.org.uk/02bonefeld.pdf (accessed 21 May 2015).

¹¹⁹ Marx, Theorien über den Mehrwert, Dritter Teil, 414 (Theories of Surplus-Value, Part 3, 422). ¹²⁰ Marx, Capital 3, 354. See also Marx, Theories of Surplus-Value, Part 3, 311.

¹²¹ This is, at least at the level of the ‘diachronic analysis’, the framework of Balibar’s ‘Elements for a Theory of Transition’.

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Yet there is undeniably something – something quite significant – which is lost by this reading of originary accumulation. What is lost (and this is increasingly a point of emphasis, if not consensus, in the secondary literature) are the various dimensions of the continuous, in fact the permanent, character of originary accumulation within capitalism, such that originary accumulation is a necessarily ongoing feature of the capitalist mode of production. And this is not – or at least not primarily – an empirical point, which is to say a point about the ongoing introduction and expansion of capital into parts of the world (China being the contemporary exemplar) previously outside, if only ever relatively, the reach of capital. Although important, this point merely reproduces the conception that ‘originary accumulation’ is a chronologically distinct span of historical time, and thus a ‘one-off act’ (no matter when, where, nor how long this act lasts, and despite the fact that it contains innumerable singular acts within itself). The point, rather, is one which must be understood at the level of ‘capital in general’ or ‘universal capital’ (which, to be sure, dialectically manifests itself through singular capitals): this is the sense in which originary accumulation stands in an ontologically, and thus logically, necessary relationship to capitalist accumulation (‘proper’¹²⁶), such that originary accumulation marks an essential and constantly reproduced foundation of the systematic dialectic (and thus, as we will soon consider, the historical dialectic) expressed by Marx’s concept of ‘capital’. The crux of the issue here, as earlier alluded to, is the separation (between the producer and the means of production, and between the wage-labourer and the capitalist) without which there can be no commodification of labour-power, and thus no production-process of capital. There are a number of passages across Marx’s work that reveal the sense in which capitalist accumulation ontologically and logically relies on originary accumulation.¹²⁷ In the third volume of Capital, as part and parcel of his analysis of the centralisation of capital, whereby big capital ‘swallows up’ – it ‘decapitalises’ – small capital, Marx contends that ‘this is simply the separation of the conditions of labour from the producers raised to a higher power.’¹²⁸ In the third volume of the Theories of Surplus-Value (the 1861-63 Manuscripts), he depicts capitalist accumulation – the ‘accumulation of capital on the basis of capital itself’ – as ‘[reproducing] the separation and the independent existence of objective wealth [gegenständlichen Reichtums] as against labour on an ever expanding scale’, such that capitalist accumulation ‘merely presents as a continuous process what in originary accumulation appears as a distinct historical process. 129 And finally, in the Grundrisse, he suggests that ‘once this separation is given, the productionprocess can only produce it anew, reproduce it, and reproduce it on an expanded scale.’¹³⁰ These passages trigger De Angelis’s statement that ‘the difference between accumulation and primitive accumulation, not being a substantive one, is a difference in the conditions and forms in which this separation is implemented.’¹³¹ This argument has its limits – unlike originary accumulation, the substance of capitalist accumulation is far more complex, determined by a series of relations and dynamics irreducible to the separation of the means of production from the producers – but it is, nevertheless, a provocative way of framing the relationship between originary and capitalist accumulation. On one (albeit a restricted) level, we might assert that the only difference between these two accumulations is the social conditions and forms under which separation is enforced (be it a gun, for instance, or a handshake).

¹²² Marx’s analysis of the credit-system, the modern system of taxation, and the political economic function of debt is notable: ‘the national debt, i.e. the alienation [Veräußerung] of the state – whether that state is despotic, constitutional or republican – marked the capitalist era with its stamp. The only part of the so-called national wealth that actually enters into the collective possession of a modern nation is – the national debt.’ Marx, Capital 1, 919. If there is a ‘subject’ of originary accumulation, it is the state, not capital. To my knowledge, there is to date no work that looks at the capital-state relation from the standpoint of the relation between capitalist and originary accumulation.

¹²³ ‘The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extermination, enslavement and entombment in mines of the indigenous population of that continent, the beginnings of the conquest and plunder of India, and the conversion of Africa into a preserve for the commercial hunting of blackskins, are all things which signify the dawn of capitalist production. These idyllic processes are the chief moments of originary accumulation.’ Marx, Kapital 1, 779 (Capital 1, 915).

¹²⁴ De Angelis, ‘Marx and primitive accumulation: The continuous character of capital’s “enclosures”’, 2-4. The standard conception of originary accumulation still exercises a fair amount of influence. For instance, in his recent review of Oskar Negt and Alexander Kluge’s Geschichte und Eigensinn (1981) (translated in 2014 as ‘History and Obstinacy’), Stewart Martin questions Negt and Kluge’s declaration that ‘primitive accumulation not only stands at the beginning of modern human development, but also permanently renews itself in every moment.’ See Stewart Martin, ‘Political economy of life: Negt and Kluge’s History and Obstinacy’, Radical Philosophy 190 (March/April 2015), 33. ¹²⁵ Marx, Capital 1, 873.

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¹²⁶ The difference between originary accumulation and capitalist accumulation (the latter is frequently labelled as ‘mature accumulation’ or ‘accumulation proper’) must be maintained, so as not to conflate these concepts in Marx, who on a number of occasions explicitly differentiates them: ‘It is indeed this separation between the conditions of labour, on the one hand, and the producers, on the other, that forms the concept of capital, as this arises with originary accumulation…subsequently appearing as a constant process in the accumulation and concentration of capital, before it is finally expressed…as the centralisation of capitals already existing in few hands, and the decapitalisation of many.’ See Marx, Kapital 3, 256 (Capital 3, 354-55). Commenting on this passage, De Angelis suggests that ‘while sharing the same principle – separation – the two concepts point at two different conditions of existence. [Originary accumulation] implies the ex novo production of the separation, while [capitalist accumulation] implies the reproduction – on a greater scale – of the same separation.’ Massimo De Angelis, ‘Marx and primitive accumulation: The continuous character of capital’s “enclosures”’, 8. Thus even as, strictly speaking, ‘originary accumulation’ is the originary accumulation of capital, such that it is, at a certain level, misleading to suggest that it is not a kind of ‘capitalist’ accumulation (particularly since capitalist accumulation (proper) creates the conditions, as we will see, whereby originary accumulation is constantly reproduced), it is necessary, on another level, to differentiate these two accumulations. Only one – capitalist accumulation – actually creates surplus-value, whereas the other is the condition of possibility for this. Likewise, capital is the subject of capitalist accumulation, whereas it is not the subject of (its) originary accumulation (the state is).

¹²⁷ I am indebted to De Angelis for the passages cited here, specifically section 3.2 of his ‘Marx and primitive accumulation: The continuous character of capital’s “enclosures”’: ‘Separation and the secret of (primitive) accumulation’.

¹²⁸ Marx, Kapital 3, 256 (Capital 3, 354).

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Originary and capitalist accumulation cannot be conflated with one another,¹³² but this should not distract our attention from the extent to which these are densely interwoven, and therefore indissociable, social processes. Bonefeld’s work argues this point consistently and persuasively.¹³³ It underscores originary accumulation as a ‘permanently’ and ‘constantly’ reproduced accumulation which is, variously, ‘the condition and presupposition of capital’s existence’, ‘the foundation of…capitalist social relations and thus the social constitution through which the exploitation of labour subsists’, and ‘the presupposition of capital and the result of its reproduction.’¹³⁴ ‘In short’, Bonefeld argues, ‘primitive accumulation is the social constitution of capitalist social relations.’¹³⁵ There are two dimensions of his work which must be highlighted here, because they directly bear, as we will shortly consider, on the relationship between originary accumulation and the production of historical time. The first is Bonefeld’s use of Hegel’s concept of sublation [Aufhebung], the way in which he makes use of the three meanings sublation registers and which stand in contradiction to one another – (1) to raise/lift up, (2) to destroy/abolish, and (3) to preserve/maintain – so as to grasp the constitutive relation between originary and capitalist accumulation. Echoing Marx’s statement in the Grundrisse that ‘once developed historically, capital itself creates the conditions of its existence (not as conditions for its arising, but as results of its being)’¹³⁶, Bonefeld maintains that the principle ‘of primitive accumulation, i.e. separation, is aufgehoben in the social constitution of capitalist accumulation, and figures now no longer as its historical becoming but as the result of accumulation, a result that capital has to pose continuously to reproduce itself.’¹³⁷ Therefore, the second dimension is that originary accumulation is constitutive of the commodity-form as the dominant social form within capitalism, and hence constitutive of the ‘fetish character’ of the commodity. It is in this context that Bonefeld writes:

¹²⁹ Marx, Theorien über den Mehrwert, Dritter Teil, 309, 268 (Theories of Surplus-Value, Part 3, 315, 272).

¹³⁰ Marx, Grundrisse, 462.

¹³¹ De Angelis, ‘Marx and primitive accumulation: The continuous character of capital’s “enclosures”’, 6.

¹³² See footnote 126.

¹³³ With ‘The Permanence of Primitive Accumulation: Commodity Fetishism and Social Constitution’, see also Werner Bonefeld, ‘History and Social Constitution: Primitive Accumulation is not Primitive’, The Commoner, Debate 1 (March 2002), http://www.commoner.org.uk/debbonefeld01.pdf (accessed 23 May 2015), Werner Bonefeld, ‘Class Struggle and the Permanence of Primitive Accumulation’, Common Sense 8 (November 1988), 54-66, and Werner Bonefeld, Critical Theory and the Critique of Political Economy: On Subversion and Negative Reason (London and New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014), specifically Chapter 4: ‘Capital and Labour: Primitive Accumulation and the Force of Value’.

¹³⁴ Bonefeld, ‘The Permanence of Primitive Accumulation: Commodity Fetishism and Social Constitution’, 1-2.

¹³⁵ Ibid. 2.

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