Marx and the Concept of Historical Time

There are two outcomes which emerge from this practical materialism, one explicit and one implicit, each relying on the other and constituting a tension in relation to the other. First, as an explicit epistemological critique of an epistemological discourse, Marx’s Theses actively dialecticise the subject-object relation, such that sensuous human activity destabilises any selfsufficient barrier between the subject and the object, or between the ‘knower’ and the ‘known’. It is in this context that Wal Suchting contends that subject and object are not pre-constituted before practice, but rather ‘constituted within’ it.¹⁵ Second, Marx’s speculative redefinition of the subject as practice generates a (still implicit and underdetermined) claim on behalf of the ontological basis of this epistemological discourse. In this regard, the subject and the object, be they defined as the representative capacity of the human [Gemüt]¹⁶ and that which stands against it [Gegenstand], or dialectically rendered as sensuous activity on either pole, become in Marx epistemological derivations of an ontologically basic practice. In his transformation of a distinctly epistemological problematic, Marx enables the creation of a concept of practice which moves dialectically and unevenly between epistemology and ontology. If this concept grounds the subject-object relation of modern epistemology, the ‘is’ and the ‘practice’ within Balibar’s formulation ‘the subject is practice’ not only function as the copula and the predicate of a philosophical proposition, but, after Hegel, represent dialectical moments of a speculative absolute identity which is not a substantial but rather, as we will now see, a relational ontology.

¹³ Praxis implicitly stands in as the meaning of ‘practice’ in the Theses. Marx never outlines a concept of ‘practice’ as epistemologically or ontologically distinct from praxis, in the Theses or elsewhere, but it is possible to suggest that the movement from an ontology of praxis to an ontology of production – that is, the movement from the Theses to The German Ideology – marks the development of a historicalontological concept of practice within which the differentiation of practice from praxis, and the inseparability of praxis and poiêsis, is established. After The German Ideology, practice is not just ontologically basic to the subject-object relation of modern epistemology, as is offered by the Theses, but historically-ontologically basic to the praxis-poiêsis relation as well. It is Marx’s specification of practice as labour, as the social production of the means of life, that secures the removal of the separation between praxis and poiêsis.

¹⁴ Balibar, The Philosophy of Marx, 25.

¹⁵ W.A. Suchting, Marx and Philosophy: Three Studies (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1986), 57. ¹⁶ Gemüt is a notoriously difficult concept to translate. In Kant, as elsewhere, it signifies the human mind, soul, consciousness, spirit, disposition and body. What is evident is that Gemüt is a concept that exceeds the summation of its constituent parts, including the human [Mensch] and the understanding [Verstand]. ‘The representative capacity of the human’ is a clunky placeholder, but preferable to reductive and exclusive translations such as ‘the mind’.

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Feuerbach resolves [auflösen] the religious essence into the human essence. But the human essence is no abstraction inhabiting each single individual. In its actuality it is the ensemble [das Ensemble] of social relations. Feuerbach, who does not enter into a critique of this actual essence, is hence compelled: (1) to abstract from the historical process and to fix the religious sentiment [Gemüt] as something by itself and to presuppose an abstract – isolated – human individual; (2) essence, therefore, can be comprehended only as ‘genus’, as an internal, mute generality which naturally unites the many individuals.¹⁷

The first thesis does not consider the meaning of ‘the human’ in its redefinition of objective activity as sensuous human activity. The sixth thesis, on the other hand, directly confronts the question of human essence in a fashion that confirms the status of Marx’s materialism as new. What grounds this confirmation, such that a new concept of the human and a new concept of essence emerge – and emerge, moreover, as conceptually dependent on one another – is the fact that Marx explicitly poses this question at the level of actuality [Wirklichkeit].¹⁸ Marx’s concept of the human is not new because this human is actual: to make this claim is to forget Marx and Feuerbach’s indebtedness to Hegel’s position in the Logic that subjectivity resides in the concrete fullness of abstraction within consciousness. Rather, this is a conceptually new human because the actuality is here unequivocally social. Human actuality is, from the outset, an ensemble of social relations. Marx deliberately utilises the French term ‘ensemble’ in order to denote a fluid, open and indeterminate unity which evades, contra Hegel, the ‘hierarchical completeness associated, philosophically, with the German terms for totality (Totalität) and whole (Ganze).’¹⁹ Far from introducing the human as a substance with inherent attributes, the sixth thesis implies that it is how such attributes are relationally produced and distributed that constitutes its essential character. In this manner, the subject in Marx resides in [inwohnendes] the practical unity of the ensemble of social relations. The sixth thesis presents, although it by no means explicitly develops, the possibility of a historical, or better, historicalising, subject, one that prioritises social relations over their relata, and one that remains abstract so long as abstraction is not philosophically and politically actualised within isolated human individuals. Thus the equivalence which Feuerbach establishes between ‘genus-essence’ [Gattungswesen] and ‘nature-essence’ in The Essence of Christianity is for Marx predicated on the abstraction from a sensuously passive, and consequently unnatural, human, despite the fact that Feuerbach is quite concerned with the re-appropriation of human nature as a collective social and political project. The Theses profoundly rework the philosophical contours of essence. They introduce the possibility of granting a historical logic to the relationship between the categories of genusspecies-individual, and that between universal-particular-individual, relationships that largely take the form of unilateral movement in one direction or the other (nominalism or realism). It is the spectre of such a historical logic – unrecognised by Marx in the Theses – that potentially reconfigures the predominant framework through which essence is thought, let alone lived.²⁰ The sixth thesis prefigures, to give two examples, essence ‘lying in’ existence in Heidegger’s phenomenological ontology of Dasein in Being and Time (1927), and the ‘crisis’ of relations between art and individual artworks in Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory (1970).

Consider Marx’s sixth thesis on Feuerbach:

¹⁷ Marx, TüF, 6 (ToF, 423). Marx’s claim that Feuerbach resolves the religious essence into the human essence is, to be fair, highly unfair to the complex relationship Feuerbach establishes between theology and anthropology in The Essence of Christianity (1841).

¹⁸ Balibar, The Philosophy of Marx, 28-9.

¹⁹ Peter Osborne, How to Read Marx (London: Granta Books, 2005), 30.

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The Theses obviously disrupt the philosophy of time in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. For Kant, time is the a priori condition of all appearances in general (all objects of the senses), a necessary representation which immediately grounds inner sensible intuition (the domain of the soul) and mediately grounds outer sensible intuition (the appearance of things as a priori determined by relations of space).²¹ Time is thus the pure form of sensible intuition; synthetic a priori judgements and the understanding cannot be realised without it. The basic lesson of the transcendental aesthetic is that time is only empirically real because it is transcendentally ideal: there is no objectivity to time from the standpoint of what Kant calls the ‘thing in itself’: ‘time is…merely a subjective condition of our intuition…and in itself, outside the subject, is nothing.’²² Kant develops this position further in the schematism of the pure concepts of the understanding (the categories). In the analytic of principles, schematism is the procedural field of time that mediates the subsumption of all appearances and all objects under the categories, that regulates the application of the categories to the manifold. This ‘third thing’, which Kant designates as a ‘transcendental time-determination’, is a pure mediating representation which stands ‘in homogeneity with’ – which harmonises – the relationship between the sensible and intellectual dimensions of the Gemüt.²³ In the ‘A’ (or 1781) deduction of the categories, Kant emphasises schemata as the product of the imagination and synthesising faculty of the Gemüt, a priori determinations of time that realise the understanding by restricting it. In other words, the concepts of the pure understanding are capable of relation and have significance because they temporalise, and they temporalise because their application is necessarily limited to finite appearances of time and space. Thus when Heidegger reads schematism as the ‘sensibilisation of concepts’²⁴, he simultaneously understands it to be temporalisation by concepts.

²⁰ However, one could claim that the priority of existence over essence is actually already explicit in Feuerbach, which complicates matters, historico-philosophically. This would involve a larger appraisal of Marx’s (in some respects misleading) critique of Feuerbach in the Theses.

²¹ Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason [1781, 1787] (hereafter CPR), trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), A34/B51, 163-64.

²³ Ibid. A139/B178, 272.

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This summary is provided in order to underscore the fact that Kant’s philosophy of time is not a means with which to undertake a temporal reading of the materialist concept of history. Epistemologically, insofar as it extends the subject-object relation in Kant, Marx’s grasping of the object of appearance as sensuous human activity, which is grasped, further, by sensuous human activity, and therefore by the open unity of the ensemble of social relations, effectively precludes the use of Kant’s schematism, because, ontologically, a subject which is practice is the place of this transcendental time-determination. As the subject in Marx, sensuous human activity is the performance of the temporal function of the imagination in Kant, and it thereby precludes the separation of this function from the manifold of intuition. Simply put, it makes no sense to suggest that Marx’s concept of practice (and thus history) is temporally intelligible through Kant’s schemata. We must add, moreover, that this is true on Kant’s own terms. From the standpoint of the Critique of Pure Reason, ‘practice’ is not only not present in the table of categories (it is not one of the ‘ancestral concepts’ [Stammbegriffe] of the pure understanding), but it is also not a ‘predicable’ concept (derivative concepts that owe their intelligibility to the categories).²⁵ In sum, for Kant, practice is not an epistemological concept. Its conceptual status is rather presented in the 2^nd Critique – the Critique of Practical Reason – wherein it comprises the practical ‘deployment’ of reason. Hence Marx’s rejection in the Theses of any systematic distinction between a transcendental aesthetic and transcendental analytic, between sensibility and conceptuality, is in a sense confirmed by the impossibility, for Kant, of affording practice the power of temporalisation by way of the schematism of the categories. If practice is in some manner the persistence of the real in time and the condition of possibility of thinking temporal succession, the schema of substance²⁶ cannot secure this for us. More fundamentally, if, as it is possible to argue, practice is constitutive of the entire scope or ‘field of time’ [Zeitinbegriff] itself, the schema of modality²⁷ cannot secure the significance [Bedeutung] of this.

²⁴ Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics [1929], trans. James S. Churchill (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1965), 102. Given his overall project, it is not surprising that in his reading of schematism Heidegger proclaims that ‘…these eleven pages of the Critique of Pure Reason form the heart of the whole work’, and moreover that ‘…transcendental schematism determines the essence of ontological knowledge.’ Ibid. 94, 110. 25 S

²⁵ See Kant, CPR, A82/B108, 213.

²⁶ Ibid. A144/B184, 275.

²⁷ Ibid. A146/B185, 276.

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Kant’s critical philosophy cannot explain the temporalising power of practice (at least as Marx reconceives practice in the Theses), and thus is not a philosophical basis of a temporal reading of the materialist concept of history. But what of Hegel? Is it possible to take a cue from the preface to Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit and to claim, first, that the concept must incarnate itself in existence, become a phenomenon which can only exist through time and in space, and, second, to suggest that existence must make itself adequate to the concept? Hegel makes this assertion in his differentiation of philosophy from mathematics, in his dissociation of philosophy from the unessential, lifeless purpose of mathematics registered by the concept of magnitude. For Hegel, as against pure and applied mathematics alike, time in philosophy ‘is the existent concept itself [der daseiende Begriff selbst].’²⁸ Yet to extend this function and scope of the Concept [der Begriff] in Hegel to the materialist concept of history in The German Ideology is to overstep the bounds of what kind of ‘concept’ this concept of history is. It is to attribute an ontological (temporalising) power to what in The German Ideology is the thought of something (in this case, ‘history’), as against the attribution of this power to what is being thought (for instance, ‘history’ as practice immanent to human need). In other words, it is one thing to state that the materialist concept of history registers (or rather, as this thesis seeks to do, can be made to register) that time and space are actively produced by what is being thought by this concept²⁹, but it is quite another to declare, as Hegel effectively does, that it is because of the concept itself that there is time and space. In other words, Hegel’s ‘concept’ is not the same kind of ‘concept’ that the materialist concept of history is. There are two different kinds of ‘concept’ at work here, such that Hegel’s concept actually incarnates itself in existence and compels this existence to become adequate to it. It would seem (at least for now³⁰), then, that Hegel’s concept is not what we need: to extend the temporalising power of this concept to the materialist concept of history does not, like Kant’s schematism, provide us with the basis that we are after. There are things to be gleaned from Hegel’s Phenomenology (the constitution of movement as negativity in ‘labour’ first and foremost amongst them), yet we must, at least for now, proceed with a temporal reading of the materialist concept of history without an adequate understanding of the inherently temporalising power of sensuous human activity itself.

²⁸ G.W.F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit [1807], trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 27. ‘Time is the concept itself, that there is.’ Ibid. 487. For Hegel, this is the standpoint of absolute knowing [absolute Wissen], the pure movement of self-consciousness knowing itself as self-consciousness. Time as the concept itself is a standpoint which can only ever be taken in an open historical present. Hegel does not speak of absolute knowing as a closed or achieved content. There is, in other words, no such thing for Hegel as ‘absolute knowledge’.

²⁹ This dovetails with Haver’s argument (in specific reference to Marx’s analysis of the circulation of money in the Grundrisse) that ‘it is not merely that circulation occurs within the putatively a priori coordinates of time and space; it is more radically the case that circulation as such…determines the fact that there is time and space.’ Haver, ‘For a Communist Ontology’, 113-14.

³⁰ However, and this is the task of Chapters 3 & 4, one can make the case, as much of the literature in so-called ‘Systematic Dialectics’ has done, that Marx’s concept of ‘capital’ registers capital as the concept (in the Hegelian sense). The same cannot be said of ‘history’: it is not this kind of concept, but rather the name of something which, as we will later examine, capital is the condition of thinking.

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1.2 A Materialist Concept of History: The German Ideology

We now turn to The German Ideology. In ‘Opposition of the Materialist and Idealist Outlook’, the initial section wherein the contours of the materialist concept of history are outlined, Marx and Engels establish the ‘first premise of all human history’ through three postulates:

(1) The first premise of all human history is…the existence of living human individuals. Thus the first fact to be established is the physical organisation of these individuals and their consequent relation to the rest of nature…

(2) Humans can be distinguished from animals by consciousness, by religion or anything else you like. They themselves begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to produce their means of life [ihre Lebensmittel zu produzieren], a step which is conditioned by their physical organisation. By producing their means of life humans are indirectly producing their material life…

(3) The way in which humans produce their means of life depends first of all on the nature of the means of life they actually find in existence and have to reproduce. This mode of production must not be considered simply as being the reproduction of the physical existence of the individuals. Rather it is a definite form of activity of these individuals, a definite form of expressing their life, a definite mode of life on their part. As individuals express their life, so they are. What they are, therefore, coincides with their production, both with what they produce and with how they produce. Thus what individuals are depends on the material conditions of their production.³¹

The German Ideology adds a distinct historical logic to the new materialism of the Theses. It also, as we will now consider, adds a distinct historical logic to the philosophical anthropology of the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844³² (hereafter 1844 Manuscripts) and the Excerpts from James Mill’s Elements of Political Economy.³³ The materialist concept of history in The German Ideology is predicated upon a materialist concept of anthropology: for

³¹ Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Die deutsche Ideologie (hereafter DI), in Marx and Engels, MEW, Band 3 (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1978) 20-1 (GI, 42). In addition to its colloquial meaning as victuals, Lebensmittel can be translated as ‘means of subsistence’, ‘means of existence’ and ‘means of life’. ‘Means of subsistence’ is the predominant and weakest choice, as it exclusively emphasises ‘the reproduction of the physical existence of…individuals’, a dimension in which Marx’s concept of ‘life [Leben] is necessarily grounded, but which it also profoundly expands.

³² See Karl Marx, The Economic & Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 [1844] (hereafter EPM), trans. Martin Mulligan (New York: International Publishers, 1964). The German edition cited in this thesis is Karl Marx, Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte aus dem Jahre 1844 (hereafter OPM), in Marx and Engels, MEW, Band 40 (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1968).

³³ See Karl Marx, Excerpts from James Mill’s Elements of Political Economy [1844] (hereafter JM), in Marx, Early Writings, 259-78. The German edition cited in this thesis is Karl Marx, Auszüge aus James Mills Buch Élémens d'économie politique (hereafter AJM), in Marx and Engels, MEW, Band 40 (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1968).

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Marx, ‘the human’ is a kinetic, economic being, which means that it is the very activity of the social production of the means of life. At first glance, this concept of the human does not seem to represent much of a departure from the 1844 Manuscripts nor the notebooks on James Mill. In these writings, ‘the human’ and ‘the social’ are already always tightly interwoven concepts, later condensed in the sixth thesis of the Theses. By 1844, the human has already been figured as an indelibly social being: both an individual in relation to and interchange [Austausch] with other individuals and that very relation and interchange itself.³⁴ As Marx says across his 1844 writings: ‘the individual is the social being…the human’s individual and generic life are not different’, ‘social being…is no abstract, universal power standing over against the individual, but is the essence of every individual…’, and ‘my own existence is social activity.’³⁵ In what sense, then, does The German Ideology critically transform the 1844 writings? In what sense does it (retroactively) provide these writings with a historical logic?

We might begin by considering the concept of nature in relation to the ‘first premise of all human history’. The human being does not make its own history alongside a self-sufficient nature, a nature in itself and as such. More radically, the first premise of all human history is the premise of history per se: the notion of a ‘history of nature’ in isolation from the ‘existence of living human individuals’ is, for Marx, nonsensical. As he puts it: ‘We know only a single science, the science of history. One can look at history from two sides and divide it into the history of nature and the history of humanity. The two sides are, however, inseparable; the history of nature and the history of humans are dependent on each other so long as humankind exists.’³⁶ And further: ‘…nature, the nature that preceded human history, is not by any means the nature in which Feuerbach lives, it is nature which today no longer exists anywhere…and which, therefore, does not exist for Feuerbach.’³⁷ Should humankind cease to exist, that would not mean that other forms of organic and inorganic matter would also not exist. Marx’s claim, rather, is that these other forms of matter would be neither historical nor natural: ‘history’ and ‘nature’ alike come to an end with the end of the human being. It is evident that, for Marx, the ‘existence of living human individuals’ is inextricably tied to nature. But what is missing from the 1844 Manuscripts and the notebooks on James Mill, and what is emphasised from the very outset of The German Ideology, is (to rework the 1844 Manuscripts) the existence of humans as natural-historical beings and nature as a human-historical means of life, which is to say a human-historical ‘matter, …object, and…instrument of life activity.’³⁸ The German Ideology clearly continues the emphasis the 1844 Manuscripts place upon humanity’s metabolism with nature. At the same time, this shared emphasis is critically enriched in The German Ideology, because it is framed by a decisive historical logic which structures human universality qua the objectification of its labour. This opens up the possibility of conceiving nature as an ongoing extension of the human, such that nature becomes humanity’s historical ‘inorganic body’. The explicit association between labour, universality and nature in the works from 1844 finds its historical-ontological ground in The German Ideology. Whilst the temporal consequences of this remain to be developed, we might suggest that the materialist concept of history can be grasped as a continual cross-fertilisation between the temporality of human activity and that of nature, or, in the language of the ‘materialist method’, as an ‘intercourse’ [Verkehr] between the inseparable temporalities of the natural-human and those of human-nature.

³⁴ After Andrew Chitty, I translate Austausch as ‘interchange’ rather than ‘exchange’ [Tausch]. The former has a more expansive meaning than the latter: for Marx, Tausch denotes the exchange of private property, or what Chitty refers to as ‘conditional exchange’. See Andrew Chitty, ‘The Early Marx on Needs’, Radical Philosophy 64 (Summer 1993), 30, ft. 13.

³⁵ Marx, OPM, 538-39; Marx, AJM, 451; Marx, OPM, 538 (respectively, EPM, 138; JM, 265; EPM, 137). ‘The human, much as it may therefore be a particular individual (and it is precisely its particularity which makes it an individual and an actual individual social being), is just as much the totality, the ideal totality, the subjective existence of thought and experienced society for itself; just as it exists also in actuality as the intuition and the actual enjoyment of social existence, and as a totality of the human manifestation of life.’ Marx, OPM, 539 (EPM, 138).

³⁶ This passage in The German Ideology is famous, in part, because it was crossed out in a final revision of the manuscript. This particular translation appears in Osborne, How to Read Marx, 38. Emphasis added. A slightly different translation of this passage also appears in a footnote in Alfred Sohn-Rethel, Intellectual and Manual Labour: a Critique of Epistemology [1970], trans. Martin Sohn-Rethel (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1977), 18.

³⁷ Marx and Engels, GI, 63.

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Marx’s differentiation of the human from the animal originates with the notion that the human actively produces its means of life, whilst the existence of the animal does not exceed the means it discovers. For Marx, the animal does not produce its means of life, therefore its reproduction is wholly dependent on the discovery of that which it cannot produce, and, thus, of that which it is not and cannot be. Strictly speaking, Marx’s animal is ontologically static: it has no history, nor does it have temporality. This dovetails with Kate Soper’s assertion that ‘all animals reproduce themselves, only human beings hitherto have reproduced themselves in the form of an ever-expanding social and objectively existing patrimony.’³⁹ The animal has no capacity to be more than itself. That which it was, that which it is, and that which it is not yet collapse into one another, rendering the three dimensions of human time meaningless in relation to the animal. To put it another way, the human produces its own temporality, whilst the animal does not. The only temporality to which the human and the animal alike are subject to is a particular temporality of nature: a cosmological time marked by a succession of instants, indifferent to the physiological life and death of all organisms.⁴⁰ The animal is not a social, an economic, nor a historical being: ‘the animal does not enter into “relations” with anything, it does not enter into any relation at all. For the animal, its relation to others does not exist as a relation.’⁴¹ In some regards, there is precedence to this differentiation between the human and the animal in The German Ideology. The 1844 Manuscripts declare that the animal ‘produces one-sidedly…produces only itself,’ whereas the human ‘produces universally…reproduces the whole of nature.’⁴² Here, as elsewhere, labour distinguishes the human from the animal. As is well-known, Marx’s philosophical anthropology before The German Ideology is rooted in a deeply Romantic, positive depiction of labour. Labour is the human’s life-activity, its act of self-creation and self-actualisation, its becoming-for-itself, the practice that constitutes its existence and through which its essence, the meaning of human being, is intelligible. In the 1844 Manuscripts, the object of labour – both material and spiritual – is the objectification of the human as the living genus, the materialisation of human activity in what Marx variously characterises as ‘true’, ‘inner’ or ‘human’ property.⁴³ The object of labour is universal because it can be made, and used, by any social individual. Equally, the universality of genus-activity is actualised within each activity itself: each object that is produced by human labour becomes the representative of a particular species to which it belongs.⁴⁴ That is, the human’s existence as a genus-being [Gattungswesen] – qua universal and consciously free being – bestows upon those objects that it creates (itself and other things) the status of species-being. For Marx, this concept of labour is what differentiates the human from the animal.

³⁸ Marx, OPM, 516 (EPM, 112).

³⁹ Kate Soper, On Human Needs: Open and Closed Theories in a Marxist perspective (Brighton: Harvester Press; Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1981), 46. As Marx and Engels state in The German Ideology: ‘…the production, as well as the satisfaction…of needs is a historical process, which is not found in the case of a sheep or dog…although sheep and dogs in their present form certainly, but malgré eux, are products of a historical process.’ Quoted in ibid.

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At the same time, the 1844 writings do not thematise the idea that labour historicalises, that the production of the means of life is ‘a definite form of activity of…individuals, a definite form of expressing their life, a definite mode of life on their part.’⁴⁵ How does The German Ideology establish the creation of the means of life as a historical dynamic? How is the concept of ‘life’ in Marx a distinctly historical concept? How does the production of the means of life – the economic – constitute the elementary content of Marx’s philosophy of history?

⁴⁰ Osborne, How to Read Marx, 40.

⁴¹ Marx and Engels, GI, 51. Emphasis added.

⁴² Marx, EPM, 113.

⁴³ As Chitty reminds us, Marx’s concept of ‘true’, ‘inner’ or ‘human’ property and its differentiation from ‘outer’ or ‘private’ property, derives from Hegel’s conception of property as the objectification of free will in The Philosophy of Right (§41) and its opposition to ‘possession’ (§45). Possession is particular, whilst property is rational, and thereby universal (§49). See Chitty, ‘The Early Marx on Needs’, 30, ft. 19. This dovetails with the difference between ‘interchange’ [Austausch] as opposed to ‘exchange’ [Tausch].

⁴⁴ Ibid. 24.

⁴⁵ Marx and Engels, GI, 42. Emphasis added. A bit later: ‘…definite individuals who are productively active in a definite way enter into…definite social and political relations.’ Ibid. 46. Emphasis added.

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