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# State Platform Capitalism

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Big tech and the proliferating platform business model represented the best venue for capital seeking out returns in a broader environment of stagnation (Rikap and Lundvall, 2021). Rather than competing in oversaturated markets for particular product lines, platforms compete with one another to intermediate social and economic exchanges between users at scale (Srnicek, 2017). For platform firms, securing first-mover advantage is a matter of survival because they operate in ‘winner-take-most’ markets (Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2014). Success often means establishing a ‘digital ecosystem’ that serves as a ‘market maker’ insofar as users are locked in, network effects take hold, and rival platforms struggle to attract users or complementors (Gawer, 2022). After the 2008 crisis, the abundance of cheap capital combined with rock-bottom interest rates allowed platform firms to expand at breakneck speed. Profits became virtually passé as platforms focused on ‘growth at all costs’ – and often at exorbitant cost to investors. Capital was ploughed into (making or buying) innovations in software, but also very tangible assets such as data centres and network infrastructure. While they were slow to come, the gains being chased were real for those platforms that could establish a dominant position. After years of losses, Silicon Valley giants like Facebook, Google, and Amazon generated \$90 bn in profits in the pandemic year of 2020 (Tarnoff, 2022).

As platform firms have proliferated, they have come to intermediate an ever greater quantity of routine social and economic interactions. The burgeoning ‘platformization’ of everyday life means ordering food, hailing a cab, messaging a friend, or paying for goods is increasingly difficult – if not impossible – without the exchange being intermediated by one (or many) US technology firms. It is not just consumers who cannot avoid the platform giants. Global businesses and governments too have come to depend upon the data centres, software, networking equipment, and financial technologies owned and operated by platform giants to conduct their everyday business. Platforms have consequently become the critical infrastructure upon which other sectors of the economy and society rely for their everyday functioning. The newfound powers of such ‘private infrastructure’ providers have led to growing concern for state sovereignty and capacity (Rahman, 2018). Some have argued that their power has grown so large that they have suspended the rule of capitalism altogether (Varoufakis, 2024).

But despite what seems to be their growing global dominance, US tech giants do face mounting competition. The threat of regulation by foreign governments – so far held largely at bay by Washington – looms large (Bradford, 2023). But more strikingly, they confront mounting commercial competition from the country which contains their only serious rivals: China. Beijing inhibited the operations of Silicon Valley tech giants in China throughout the

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2000s. As they amassed nearly unassailable market positions in many countries, they largely struggled to gain a foothold in China. This left space for domestic Chinese firms to grow and innovate. Although still considerably smaller in scale and value, today, China’s platform giants are increasingly venturing overseas and competing directly with their US rivals. In some market sectors Chinese platforms like Huawei, Tiktok, Shein, Alibaba, and ZTE can win. Huawei has no US rival in the field of 5/6 G networking and is mounting a real challenge to US opponents in the chip and AI sector, while Chinese media platform TikTok is stealing a march on American rivals across large parts of the world. Alibaba and Tencent are increasingly important players in cloud computing, while these and other firms offer a growing range of vital services to global markets such as e-government technologies, smart cities, health tech, and AI.

US institutions have voiced mounting alarm at the rapid growth of Chinese platform firms. For instance, China’s Belt and Road Initiative has facilitated the expansion of China’s global port investments. Chinese-owned ports typically deploy a logistics management platform called LOGINK that intermediates relations among shippers, receivers, port operators, and regulators. By integrating and sharing shipping data amongst these users, LOGINK provides essential functions that underpin global trade. It also writes the rules by which its users interact, which affords it significant power in trade and production networks. The US government interprets integration of this digital software with port infrastructure as a threat because ‘China’s government may use insights gleaned from LOGINK to expand and more precisely target its use of economic coercion. Data aggregated through the platform may enable China to block or disrupt trade flows’ to its enemies’ (USCC Staff, 2022). Importantly, the US government does not allege that China has actually done any ofthese things, but it fears widespread use of the LOGINK platform gives Beijing a strategic network position that has the potential to be weaponized.

1.4 An Emergent Global Regime of Competition

As the LOGINK example indicates, platforms do far more than intermediate relations among buyers and sellers. They also regulate and govern interactions between third parties, and extract an extraordinary amount of valuable data in the process. This expansive power to govern through code has led many commentators to understand large platform firms as alternative power centres to nation-states. According to some, firms like Google are simply too expansive and complex for states to regulate, while their rules and investment strategies continue to disrupt and reshape growing swathes of the real economy (Gu, 2023).

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This points to an apparent tension between the emergence of a new state capitalism and the platformization of the global economy. On the one hand, states are reasserting their role as regulators and direct economic actors worldwide. But on the other hand, the world’s largest private platform corporations exercise control over the digital infrastructure upon which states’ power – and society at large – increasingly depends. By intermediating and governing relations, platforms ‘enclose markets’ within their boundaries in ways which appears to pose a threat to states’ political prerogative (Staab, 2024). How might we reconcile this purported rise of a new state capitalism with the simultaneous and unprecedented rise in private corporate power?

Our core contention is that far from representing a contradiction, a confluence of interest between states and platforms has emerged. In the context of growing geopolitical hostilities, the United States and China increasingly instrumentalize platforms because their ability to enclose markets and exert regulatory power afford novel opportunities to exercise power. Meanwhile, platform firms’ ambition to expand their digital ecosystems and internationalize operations has become dependent upon states. Governments act as patrons that shield platform firms from regulatory measures in foreign jurisdictions, provide direct subsidies and other preferential forms of treatment, and are the source of lucrative contracts which fund innovation and investment. This is not to deny the tensions, sometimes significant, between digital platform firms and their home states. Nevertheless, we contend that these conflicts are closer to footnotes than headlines in the story we present – states increasingly attempt to secure the global power of ‘their’ digital platforms as a means to exercizing extraterritorial forms ofpower, while platform firms welcome sustained support from states to bolster and secure their international operations.

This symbiotic relationship between states and platform firms, in the context of growing geopolitical rivalry, animates the emergence of a new kind of global political economic competition. We introduce the concept of state platform capitalism (SPC) to identify and theorize this novel and emergent regime of competition: in which platform firms and states cooperate in their mutual attempts to achieve control over – and weaponize if necessary – the hardware and software that underpin exchanges within the global economy (Rolf and Schindler, 2023).

Clearly, not all states are equal in this global rivalry. Indeed, the two global centres of state platform capitalism today are the United States and China. This Element is about how their drive to platformize the world’s data flows has spilled over into a structure ofglobal competition, with states and platform firms playing distinct but complementary roles in this contest for supremacy. Platform competition looks quite different from traditional capitalist competition – it encompasses conflicts between ecosystems rather than conflicts for market share in particular product lines (Cennamo, 2021). Thus, state platform capitalist competition is fought out in ways and in spheres quite different from older forms ofmarket or geopolitical competition. Our purpose here is to identify how SPC competition operates, and with what consequences.

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This text is divided into two sections. The first section conceptualizes state platform capitalism and charts its rise. After presenting a historically informed theoretical framework in Section 1, Sections 2 and 3 examine, respectively, the US and Chinese varieties of SPC. We explain how these national varieties of SPC emerged, identify their key actors, and describe their organizational features and dynamics. We demonstrate how in both cases varied forms of statefirm interaction are increasingly oriented towards expanding the international reach of platforms, while simultaneously bolstering the geostrategic objectives of states. In this way, while acknowledging its distinct national manifestations, we emphasize the systemic character ofSPC – and especially how its ‘varieties are conditioned by their interaction and competition. The second section explores how SPC animates distinctive forms of competition in a range of fields. Section 4 explores its implications for battles over digital currencies, while Section 5 reviews the competition to control future ‘smart cities’. Section 6 narrates the competition to establish digital standards (both formal and de facto), and Section 7 focuses on cybersecurity. We conclude by reflecting on the implications of SPC for the future of digital connectivity and the global political economy more generally.

Part I A New Paradigm

2 State Platform Capitalism: Theory and History

2.1 Introduction

Amidst the global health emergency and socio-economic turmoil unleashed by the COVID-19 pandemic, observers could have been forgiven for missing a conspicuous datapoint. In 2020, the ratio of US government federal spending to GDP reached an all-time high, surpassing even that achieved at the height of mobilization for total war in 1944–5 (IMF, 2024). The interventions required to prop up economies during the pandemic lockdowns were not a complete aberration; however. government spending across advanced economies has been on a steady (though fluctuating) upward trajectory ever since the end ofthe Second World War. The 2008 financial crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic simply accelerated this trend. Along with the perpetually rising economic profile of states, state capitalist practices and policy interventions have both made a dramatic return and evolved in new ways. From the expansion of sovereign wealth funds and policy banks to proliferating industrial and technology policies, and full-blown economic nationalism, state interventions in the economy have proliferated on a global scale (Alami and Dixon, 2024).

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The re-emergence of state capitalism has coincided with an epochal shift in the organization of capitalist firms: the rise of digital platform companies to the commanding heights of the global economy. Tech firms’ boosters welcome a ‘second machine age’ of ‘brilliant technologies’ which promise dramatic increases in productivity and wealth (Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 2014). Meanwhile critics argue that big tech amounts to extractive, parasitic organizations driving economies towards ‘techno-feudalism’, in which predatory tech elites extract labour from digital serfs amidst economic stagnation (Durand, 2020; Varoufakis, 2024). Amidst this debate, there is broad consensus that digital platform firms have increasingly come to exercise ‘state-like’ governance functions that erode the power of public authorities (Lehdonvirta, 2022; Törnberg, 2023). As platforms continue to expand, governments are understood to be waging a zero-sum ‘global battle to regulate technology’ – one which they are commonly understood to be losing (Bradford, 2023).

State capitalism and platform capitalism, then, appear to represent deeply contradictory trends. On one hand, states’ role as economic actors continues to multiply and intensify. Yet on the other hand, states seem powerless to regulate the largest platform firms such as Google, Amazon, and Alibaba. Which is it? And which side will win out? We present an alternative view. We show how contemporary state capitalist and platform capitalist practices – while initially distinctive and relatively autonomous trends – share deep historical roots, were both significantly driven by the global economic crises of 2008 and 2020, and are mutually reinforcing rather than contradictory trends.

Our starting point is to claim that state capitalism and platform capitalism should be conceived in the first instance as organizational and institutional ‘fixes’ to the structural problems encountered by global capitalism (Peck and Tickell, 1994; Alami and Dixon, 2020a). The concept of afix was first developed by Harvey (1981) in order to identify how capitalists and state managers devise temporary solutions to the structural crisis tendencies that frequently disrupt capitalist accumulation. They may engineer moves of money from manufacturing into real estate and infrastructure or into underdeveloped regions or economies (spatial fix), restructure businesses, outsource and offshore activities (organizational fix), or restructure policy environments to secure new avenues for growth (institutional fix). However, rather than resolving crises, fixes tend to defer, displace or redirect them. As such, fixes forestall crises, but they create novel contradictions that ultimately culminate in new crises: such is the crisis-prone nature of capitalism.

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This section first identifies how a rejuvenation ofstate capitalist practices was significantly driven by the dynamics of a global economic slowdown in 2008, before becoming imbricated with geopolitical competition. The urgency of rescuing banking sectors and industrial producers both forced states to break with (self-imposed) laissez-faire of the globalization years, but also revealed what had always been true: that capitalist economies are underpinned by state power. But state capitalist dynamics became increasingly (geo)politicized due to the uneven and combined dynamics at play in the global political economy (Alami and Dixon, 2021). As some states pursue these practices somewhat successfully, others are driven to imitate and adapt to keep up. In this way, policy instruments which emerged as crisis-management tools are becoming deployed for geopolitical ends, with the effect of legitimating their use and strengthening the aspirations of other states to exert control over their own economies.

Next, we turn to the rise of digital capitalism and the platform business model. Although digitalization has a long history, the rise of giant digital platforms to pre-eminence in the global economy is equally tied up with the crisis of 2008 (Srnicek, 2017). We map the evolution of platform business strategies within this broader political economy context. Finally, we demonstrate that rather than being fundamentally opposing trends, state capitalism and platform capitalism are complementary, and increasingly dovetail with one another. As governments embrace state capitalism in their attempts to bolster national security, it is only logical that they seek to exploit the tremendous governance capabilities and extraterritorial reach of platform firms. Platforms, meanwhile, seek to bolster their international scale and scope by obtaining state protection and patronage. The fusion of the distinct but convergent logics of state and platform capitalism is, we claim, fuelling a novel mode ofcompetition between the United States and Chinese states and their platform firms, which we elaborate in the remainder of the text. As with all such ‘fixes’, however, dynamic contradictions and tensions are built-in to this mode of competition – and how these manifest is the major focus of the second part of the Element.

2.2 State Capitalism

State capitalism has a long history. The concept first was introduced with reference to concentrated industrial trusts which were increasingly tied up with the state, alongside emergent forms of national ownership, in late nineteenth-century Europe (Sperber, 2019). Since then, it has passed through many permutations, being used (variously) to signify diverse organizational systems: from the Soviet Union’s centralized planning apparatus and the Keynesian policy frameworks of the advanced economies during the post-war period, to the ‘illiberal’, state-directed and resource-based economies of contemporary Russia, Iran, and Venezuela (Kurlantzick, 2016).

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In this Element, we seek conceptual clarity by drawing on advances made by the literature on the ‘new state capitalism’ (Alami and Dixon, 2024). Much writing broadly conceived ofthe neoliberal period as a ‘retreat ofthe state’ from governing the economy (Konings, 2010). This conceptualization understood economies to existent on a spectrum between ‘liberal’ and ‘coordinated’ market economies – with commentators treating those not fitting the ideal types as state capitalist aberrations, limited to a handful of middle-income and developing economies like Russia, Turkey, and China (e.g., Bremmer, 2009). Such work ignored the considerable support (both financial and in terms of coordination) states offered to their firms right through the neoliberal period (Alami and Dixon, 2020b). It also offered a poor means by which to grasp how or why a dramatic expansion of highly visible and direct statist interventions have proliferated on a global scale – across virtually all varieties of capitalist economy.

By contrast, following Alami and Dixon (2024), we conceptualize state capitalism not as an ideal type or a variety ofcapitalism, but as a set ofprocesses and relationships by which states seek to actively support the process of capital accumulation. Understood in this way, state capitalism is conceived as a perennial feature of real capitalist economies – but also that as a set of practices, it is potentially subject to transformation, evolution, and increases (or decreases) in scale and scope over time. There is indeed both continuity and innovation in contemporary state capitalist practices (Musacchio et al., 2015). They range from what Alami and Dixon (2021, 765) identify as ‘state-capital hybrids’ like sovereign wealth firms, state-owned (or backed) firms and policy banks; to the ‘muscular statism’ of industrial and innovation policies, capital controls, and development and planning strategies. And while many interventions are underpinned by economic nationalism, the new state capitalism is simultaneously transnational in character. Far from acting in ways which fragment the globalized economy, sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) and stateowned enterprises (SOEs) are major drivers of transnational economic integration as they pursue expansive overseas investments (Babić et al., 2022).

Understood in this way, it is clear that state capitalist practices have dramatically increased in both scale and scope over the past decade and a half. What drove the emergence of the new state capitalism? The global financial crisis of

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2008 punctured deep-seated assumptions about the smooth evolution of neoliberal globalization. It generated far-reaching changes in the structures and dynamics of the world economy, most notably inaugurating a period of secular stagnation in growth and productivity. While these trends predate 2008 (Brenner, 2006), both were considerably worsened by the economic crisis and its aftermath. The economic turmoil initiated by lockdowns during the COVID-19 pandemic also simply served to accelerate these long-standing economic trends as states struggled to contain the economic fallout (van Apeldoorn and de Graaff, 2022). It was fundamentally the deepening of economic stagnation, punctuated by the economic crises of 2008 and 2020, which drove states to intervene in their economies in ever more intensive ways to support growth.

The effect of rising state capitalist interventions was often to stabilize or even boost growth for its practitioner economies. But at the same time, state capitalist practices have inevitably served to fragment the global economy. The IMF has warned ofrising ‘geoeconomic fragmentation’ as states seek to exert control over their economies (Gopinath, 2024). International business scholars have identified how state capitalist practices have solidified the emergence of poles of politicaleconomic power characterized by increasingly distinct regional market structures, supply opportunities, regulatory systems, and risk environments (Luo and Van Assche, 2023; Lewin, 2024; Luo and Tung, 2025). At the same time, states seek to exert greater control over global value chains which extend far beyond their national or regional territories, driving ongoing integration and tension between economic poles (Schindler and Rolf, 2024). These new state capitalist practices are the source of considerable geopolitical tensions, as they threaten to disrupt the relatively unified and open global economy which was forged during the neoliberal period (Alami et al., 2025). Indeed, statecraft is increasingly geared towards securing the conditions for long-term economic security and competitiveness, industrial and technological leadership, and resilience of critical supply chains and production networks (Weiss and Thurbon, 2020; Weiss, 2021). In this way, contemporary statist economic practices can be seen simultaneously as responses to and drivers of geopolitical tension.

Despite proliferating regional conflicts, the US-China rivalry represents the key geopolitical driver of this resurgence in state capitalist practices. Since the rapprochement between China and the United States during the later stages of the Cold War, US policy towards China remained largely consistent for three decades. Its principal focus was on pushing China to open its markets and financial sector to US and global investors, in exchange for receiving access to US markets and facilitating its entry into the global economy (especially via joining the WTO) (Rolf, 2021; Hung, 2022). Despite acceding to the WTO in

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2001, China implemented neoliberal reforms only selectively, trimming but never dismantling its powerful state sector. At the same time, Beijing ramped up its spending on military capabilities in line with growth, as military spending became a key part of China’s broader innovation ecosystem (Cheung, 2022). Pockets of support for pursuing more hardline neoliberal reform were fatally undermined by the global financial crisis of 2008, in the aftermath of which officials doubled down on ‘state capitalist’ practices. These included large-scale stimulus packages concentrating on infrastructure building, the launching of an expansive and expensive industrial policy in 2015 called Made in China 2025 (Naughton and Tsai, 2015), and subsequently ploughing unprecedented quantities of funding towards strategic private sector fields like ICT and green technology (Naughton, 2020b).

The United States enacted a major foreign policy ‘pivot to Asia’ in 2011, explained at the time by US foreign policy elites as a response to China’s mooted ‘new assertiveness’ (Shambaugh, 2020). In addition to re-asserting power in the Asia Pacific after a decade of war in the Middle East, this pivot was driven by a desire to prevent China from becoming a new centre of political-economic gravity in the global system (Turner and Parmar, 2020). Critically, the United States developed a Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement, designed to freeze China out of regional trade and technology networks, though the agreement ultimately floundered during 2016 (Ravenhill, 2017).

The US pivot and TPP sat uneasily alongside the Obama administration’s purported commitment to a ‘liberal peace’ power politics, and to ongoing engagement with China (Harris and Trubowitz, 2021). The Trump administration, by contrast, abandoned this long-standing ‘Open Door’ geopolitics (van Apeldoorn et al., 2023) in favour ofa bluntly mercantilist trade policy. Initially, the objective was to reduce the US trade deficit with China by imposing a series of tariffs, but the mission quickly expanded to include targeting China’s leading high-tech firms such as Huawei and ZTE. This profound and long-standing foreign policy shift was outlined in the 2017 US National Security Strategy. Not only did it identify China (alongside Russia) as the primary threat to national security (rather than non-state terrorist groups), but it rejected the notion that they could become partners through diplomatic engagement and economic integration:

These competitions require the United States to rethink the policies ofthe past two decades – policies based on the assumption that engagement with rivals and their inclusion in international institutions and global commerce would turn them into benign actors and trustworthy partners. For the most part, this premise turned out to be false.

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While Trump did reach a temporary trade accord with Xi Jinping’s administration, the COVID-19 pandemic interrupted its implementation and relations collapsed. The Biden administration essentially embraced the Trumpian worldview, systematizing Trump’s piecemeal initiatives into an increasingly comprehensive framework aimed at limiting China’s integration with the global economic order, and maintaining US dominance in strategic high-technology sectors (Leoni, 2022). Trump’s return in 2025 simply signalled the death knell for any hope of a reversion in US policy.

The scope for a reduction in geopolitical tension appears limited. Both the United States and China have deployed expansive state capitalist practices towards the rivalry, in ways which have permanently reconfigured the dynamics of their economies. China’s party-state has deepened its reach across its economy, by expanding the influence of SOEs and in deepening control mechanisms over the private sector (Liu and Tsai, 2021; Pearson et al., 2021). Meanwhile, the United States has moved in a similar direction, albeit within ideological constraints imposed by its political system. Starrs and Germann (2021) observe sweeping changes in (1) the US tariff regime, designed to target Chinese imports in particular; (2) the inward investment regime, aimed at restricting Chinese firms’ access to high-tech US companies; and (3) export regulations, which use technology export bans to target Chinese firms like ZTE and Huawei. Heightened local procurement requirements have also been enacted through the reformed implementation of the Buy American Act, alongside evidence for a growing consensus on the value of state-led investments in strategic technology development and mission-oriented development projects in areas such as supply-chain reshoring and 5 G provision (Baltz, 2022).

But despite recent ructions caused by the second Trump administration’s imposition of tariffs, the costs of full economic decoupling between the US and China seem to remain prohibitive (Rosen and Gloudeman, 2021) – both for the economies themselves, and for third countries. The ‘new state capitalism’, far from autarchic, is instead substantially geared towards the establishment of control over the transnational networks that constitute the architecture of globalization (Schindler et al., 2023). China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), for instance, has extended China’s reach across Eurasia, Africa, and Latin America through a sweeping range of state-backed infrastructural investment and development financing initiatives. The BRI has in turn prompted the entry of the US government directly into the infrastructure financing space with its Development Finance Corporation and the nascent US-led G7 ‘Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment’ (PGII). So far, it these initiatives are much smaller than the BRI, and they have also failed to meet their modest objectives (Schindler and Kanai, 2021; Hameiri and Jones, 2024). Nevertheless, this competition to coordinate the build-out ofphysical infrastructure is increasingly tied to a related, and equally intense, competition over digital technologies.

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