Critical Theory of Communication New Readings of Lukács, Adorno, Marcuse, Honneth and Habermas in the Age of the Internet

1.5.6. Adorno, Habermas and Marcuse about Heidegger

Herbert Marcuse was in the 1920s influenced by Heidegger, but turned away from him when his Nazi sympathies became evident. Frankfurt School authors such as Marcuse, Adorno and Habermas were extremely critical of Heidegger and certainly share the assessment that a critical theory of society is not possible with, but only against Heidegger.

Theodor W. Adorno argues that Nazi ideology is immanent in Sein und Zeit, which was published in 1927 (Heidegger 1927). Adorno writes in his analysis that Heidegger’s ‘metaphysics of death’ cultivates ‘the heroic possibilities of death’ and is ‘a propaganda for death’ (Adorno 1965/2001, 131; see also Löwith 1946). Heidegger’s combination of philosophy and poetry is for Adorno (1960/1961) ‘provincial kitsch’ (229) that uses ‘archaic language’ (230). For Adorno, Heidegger’s fetishism of the origin is a form of mysticism (Adorno 1960/1961, 32–34). The ‘cult of origin and renewal’ would ‘not by accident and not externally have sympathy with the barbarism that took shape in his [Heidegger’s] political history’ so that foundations of ‘National-Socialist ideology’ would be contained in Sein und Zeit (241) [translation from German]. ‘Heidegger’s agreement with fascism and the ideology of the conservative revolution, the more elegant version of fascist ideology, was not a lack of character of the philosopher, but lay in the content of his doctrine’ (287).

In a lecture from 1935 that after its re-publication in 1953 resulted in public debates, Heidegger (2000, 213) spoke in the context of National Socialism of the ‘inner truth and greatness of this movement (namely the encounter between global technology and modern man)’. Jürgen Habermas (1953, 197) drew the German public’s attention to his discovery that Heidegger in 1953 ‘publishes his words, in the meantime eighteen years old, about the greatness and inner truth of National Socialism’ and that it was therefore ‘time to think with Heidegger against Heidegger’.

1.5.7. Heidegger and Marcuse

Herbert Marcuse in 1928 moved from Berlin to the University of Freiburg in order to start a habilitation project under Heidegger’s supervision. Marcuse’s thought was in the mid- to late-1920s deeply influenced by Heidegger’s (1927) Sein und Zeit. This also becomes evident in Marcuse’s first published essays, such as Contributions to a Phenomenology of Historical Materialism (Marcuse 2005, 1–33). Marcuse tried to combine Marx and Heidegger. This influence also becomes evident in Macuse’s habilitation thesis Hegel’s Ontology and the Theory of Historicity, which he prefaces with the words: ‘What this work contributes to the unfurling and clarification of problems, it owes to the philosophy of Martin Heidegger’ (Marcuse 1932a, 8). Because of his Jewish background, Marcuse could never defend his habilitation thesis. With the rise of Nazism, he had to flee Germany and spent the rest of his life in the USA. In 1941, he published his first English book, which was a second monograph about Hegel: Reason and Revolution. Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory. In this book (1941a), Marcuse does not mention Heidegger at all. By the 1930s he had completely turned against Heidegger’s philosophy.

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Marcuse described his relationship to Heidegger’s philosophy in an interview:

I read Sein und Zeit when it came out in 1927 and after having read it I decided to go back to Freiburg (where I had received my PhD in 1922) in order to work with Heidegger. I stayed in Freiburg and worked with Heidegger until December 1932, when I left Germany a few days before Hitler’s ascent to power, and that ended the personal relationship. I saw Heidegger again after the war, I think in 1946–47, in the Black Forest where he has his little house. We had a talk, which was not exactly very friendly and very positive, there was an exchange of letters, and since that time there has not been any communication between us. […] We saw in Heidegger what we had first seen in Husserl, a new beginning, the first radical attempt to put philosophy on really concrete foundations— philosophy concerned with human existence, the human condition, and not with merely abstract ideas and principles. That certainly I shared with a relatively large number of my generation, and needless to say, the disappointment with this philosophy eventually came—I think it began in the early thirties. But we re-examined Heidegger thoroughly only after his association with Nazism had become known. […] But I soon realized that Heidegger’s concreteness was to a great extent a phony, a false concreteness, and that in fact his philosophy was just as abstract and just as removed from reality, even avoiding reality, as the philosophies which at that time had dominated German universities, namely a rather dry brand of neo-Kantianism, neo-Hegelianism, neo-Idealism, but also positivism (Marcuse 2005, 165–166).

Marcuse realised that in order to ground a concrete, praxis-relevant Marxist philosophy, it is not necessary to rely on non-Marxist philosophy. He found the philosophical work he was looking for in Marx’s Economic and Philosophic

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Manuscripts of 1844 that were first published in 1932. Marcuse published in 1932 an enthusiastic review of the book (New Sources on the Foundation of Historical Materialism, Marcuse 1932b), in which he argued that these manuscripts’ publication ‘must become a crucial event in the history of Marxist studies’ (Marcuse 1932b, 86).

The significance of Marcuse’s rejection of Heidegger’s philosophy also becomes evident in a review of ‘German Philosophy, 1871–1933’ that he wrote in 1934. In a section about Heidegger’s work, he characterises this philosopher’s work as racist:

Heidegger’s philosophy is weeded to the idea of an authentic existence that is realized through a firm willingness to die for one’s own possibilities. It is here that Heidegger’s existential analytic is transformed into a politics of heroic, racist realism. […] The characteristics of authentic existence – the resoluteness toward death, the decision, the risking of life and the acceptance of destiny – are severed from all relations to the real misery and the real happiness of mankind and from all relations to the reasonable ends of humanity. In this abstract form, these characteristics become the fundamental categories of the racist worldview (Marcuse 2005, 160–161).

Marx’s early philosophical writings remained a major influence on Marcuse’s works, whereas he did not further engage with Heidegger’s theory after Hitler’s rise to power.

In August 1947, Marcuse wrote a letter to Heidegger, in which he said:

You never publicly denounced any of the actions or ideologies of the regime. Because of these circumstances you are still today identified with the Nazi regime […] But we cannot make the separation between Heidegger the philosopher and Heidegger the man, for it contradicts your own philosophy. […] Is this really the way you would like to be remembered in the history of ideas? (Marcuse 1998, 263–264).

In a response to Herbert Marcuse, Heidegger wrote in January 1948 that Marcuse’s letter ‘shows me precisely how dificult it is to converse with persons who have not been living in Germany since 1933 and who judge the beginning of the National Socialist movement from its end’ (Wolin 1993, 162) and that there was not just a ‘regime that murdered millions of Jews’, but also one that murdered millions of ‘East Germans’ (Wolin 1993, 163). Marcuse, who coming from a Jewish family and being a Marxist had to flee from Nazi Germany, answered in May 1948 that Heidegger tried ‘to relativize […] a crime by saying that others would have done the same thing. Even further: how is it possible to equate the torture, the maiming, and the annihilations of millions of men with the forcible relocation of population groups who sufered none of these outrages’ (Wolin 1993, 164).

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1.5.8. Whoever Is Not Willing to Talk about Heidegger’s Relation to Nazi Fascism and Anti-Semitism, Should Also Keep Quiet About Heidegger in Respect to Capitalism and Critical Theory

When Max Horkheimer (1939/1989, 78) wrote in his essay The Jews and Europe that ‘whoever is not willing to talk about capitalism should also keep quiet about fascism’ (78), he expressed that there is an inherent connection of the logics of capitalism and fascism: ‘Fascism solidifies the extreme class diferences which the law of surplus value ultimately produced’ (Horkheimer 1939/1989, 78). It is disturbing that many of those who are impressed by Heidegger’s philosophy and try to use it in critical theory try to talk with Heidegger about capitalism, but keep quiet about Heidegger’s relationship to anti-Semitism and Nazi fascism. Whoever is not willing to discuss Heidegger’s relation to Nazi fascism and anti-Semitism shouldn’t discuss Heidegger in respect to capitalism and critical theory.

1.6. The Chapters in this Book

This book consists of five essays that contribute to grounding foundations of a dialectical critical theory of communication that takes a cultural materialist approach (see also Fuchs 2015a for a discussion of Cultural Materialism). Each chapter is focused on specific works of one critical theorist and their application: Georg Lukács (chapter 2), Theodor W. Adorno (chapter 3), Herbert Marcuse (chapter 4), Axel Honneth (chapter 5), and Jürgen Habermas (chapter 6). I will give a brief outline of these essays.

1.6.1. Chapter 2: Georg Lukács as a Communications Scholar: Cultural and Digital Labour in the Context of Lukács’ Ontology of Social Being

The task of this chapter is to apply thoughts from Georg Lukács’ final book, the Ontology of Social Being, to the theoretical analysis of cultural and digital labour. It discusses Lukács’ concepts of work and communication and relates them to the analysis of cultural and digital work. It also analyses his conception of the relation of labour and ideology and points out how we can make use of it for critically understanding social media ideologies. Lukács opposes the dualist separation of the realms of work and ideas. He introduces in this context the notion of teleological positing that allows us to better understand cultural and digital labour as well as associated ideologies, such as the engaging/connecting/sharingideology, today. The analysis shows that Lukács’ Ontology is in the age of Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter still a very relevant book, although it has thus far not received the attention that it deserves. This chapter also introduces the Ontology’s main ideas on work and culture, which is important because large parts of the book have not been translated from the German original into English.

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1.6.2. Chapter 3: Theodor W. Adorno and the Critical Theory of Knowledge

This chapter explores which insights of Adorno’s philosophy can be used for grounding a critical theory of knowledge? Adorno’s contribution to a critical theory of knowledge is analysed by revisiting the assumption that he is a media pessimist, reconsidering the debate about aesthetics between Lukács and Adorno and generalising its conclusions from art to the theory of knowledge, and by discussing and further developing Adorno’s dialectical concept of knowledge. Adorno’s theory of knowledge is not, as often claimed in media and cultural studies, a form of media and cultural pessimism that sees humans as passive, manipulated by ideologies, and incapable of resisting a society without alternatives. He saw alternative and critical potentials of the media. A critical theory of knowledge can be grounded in dialectics of identity and non-identity and the subject and the object. Adorno made important contributions to the foundations of such a theory. His works not just foreground the power of ideologies, but also stress the importance that one can learn from Hegel’s anti-positivist, dialectical language and thought how to criticise, deconstruct, and struggle against ideologies. Adorno’s works give us hope that instrumental knowledge that expresses partial interests is not the final world and can be changed by critique, which is the very process of the dialectic and dialectical knowledge.

1.6.3. Chapter 4: Herbert Marcuse and Social Media

This chapter reflects on the relevance of Herbert Marcuse’s philosophy of technology in the age social media. Although Marcuse did not experience the rise of the Internet, the World Wide Web and ‘social media’ as major means of communication, his insights about technological rationality, technology and the role of technology in the context of labour allow us to today reflect on the relevance of Marcuse’s philosophy of technology for a critical theory of digital and social media.

The chapter first gives an overview of how Marcuse thought about computer technology. It then engages with Marcuse’s interpretation of Hegelian dialectics for analysing social media’s dialectics. It also uses Marcuse’s works for critically theorising digital labour on social media and social media ideologies. The chapter engages with Marcuse’s understanding of the dialectical logic of essence in order to provide some foundations of social media ethics.

1.6.4. Chapter 5: The Internet, Social Media and Axel Honneth’s Interpretation of Georg Lukács’ Theory of Reification and Alienation

This chapter poses the question, what are the potentials of the concept of alienation/reification for a critical theory of society today? Based on the example of

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Facebook, it then asks, how can we understand alienation in the realm of the media? Axel Honneth has reformulated Georg Lukács’ theory of reification and alienation in a critical theory of recognition. The advantage of this theory is that it is based on the distinction of three subdomains of society, reformulates Hegel’s dialectic of essence and existence in moral theory and thereby transcends postmodern moral relativism, stresses the importance of sociality as moral essence, and distinguishes between alienation’s subjective, intersubjective and objective dimensions. It however downplays the importance of the economy and co-production in society.

Building on and departing from Lukács and Honneth, this chapter first formulates some principles of a moral theory that is grounded in the notion of co-operation as co-production that allows to identify nine dimensions of alienation: economic, political, cultural, subjective, intersubjective and objective alienation. The example of Facebook shows that alienation has not ceased to exist in the world of digital media, but has become more complex. The exploitation of digital labour, the surveillance-industrial complex, and centralised online visibility constitute additional forms of digital alienation.

1.6.5. Chapter 6: Beyond Habermas: Rethinking Critical Theories of Communication

This chapter asks, what is the relationship of labour and communication? This question is one about how the economy and culture are causally connected in society in general and contemporary society in particular. The chapter discusses several critical theories of communication and provides a classification of approaches. It engages especially with the approaches of Alfred Sohn-Rethel, Jean Baudrillard, Jürgen Habermas, Lev Vygotsky, Valentin Vološinov, Ferruccio Rossi-Landi, and Raymond Williams.

It applies a reading of these theorists to foundations of a dialectical critical theory of communication. Such a theory is dialectical in a manifold sense. It theorises the dialectics of work/communication, body/mind, individuality/ sociality, internalisation/externalisation, subject/object, practices/technology, communication/media, agency/structures, communication/communications, instrumental communication/co-operative communication that are fundamental determinants of communication.

Notes

1 See: Geschichte des Instituts für Sozialforschung, http://www.ifs.uni-frankfurt. de/institut/geschichte/, accessed on 6 January 2016.

2 Google Scholar, accessed on 19 March 2016.

3 See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lev\_Vygotsky

See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Valentin\_Voloshinov

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5 See: http://www.ferrucciorossilandi.com

6 See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Raymond\_Williams

7 This section is based on parts of the following two articles. The passages are reproduced with kind permission of the journal tripleC: Communication, Capitalism & Critique: Fuchs, Christian. 2015. ‘Martin Heidegger’s Anti-Semitism: Philosophy of Technology and the Media in the Light of the “Black Notebooks” ’. Implications for the Reception of Heidegger in Media and Communication Studies’. tripleC: Communication, Capitalism & Critique 13 (1): 55–78; Fuchs, Christian. 2015. ‘Anti-Semitism, Anti-Marxism, and Technophobia: The Fourth Volume of Martin Heidegger’s Black Notebooks (1942–1948)’. tripleC: Communication, Capitalism & Critique 13 (1): 93–100.

8 ‘Das Ende des Heideggerianterums’. Badische Zeitung Online, 23 January 2015.

9 Translation from German: ‘Die zeitweilige Machtsteigerung des Judentums aber hat darin ihren Grund, daß die Metaphysik des Abendlandes, zumal in ihrer neuzeitlichen Entfaltung, die Ansatzstelle bot für das Sichbreitmachen einer sonst leeren Rationalität und Rechenfähigkeit, die sich auf solchem Wege eine Unterkunft im, Geist‘ verschafte, ohne die verborgenen Entscheidungsbezirke von sich aus je fassen zu können’.

10 Translation from German: “Die Juden, leben” bei ihrer betont rechnerischen Begabung am längsten schon nach dem Rasseprinzip, weshalb sie sich auch am heftigsten gegen die uneingeschränkte Anwendung zur Wehr setzen’.

11 German original: ‘Allein was bedeutet Verdinglichung? Woraus entspringt sie? Warum wird das Sein gerade‚ zunächst’ aus dem Vorhandenen‚ begrifen’ und nicht aus dem Zuhandenen, das doch noch näher liegt? Warum kommt diese Verdinglichung immer wieder zur Herrschaft? Wie ist das Sein des‚ Bewußtseins’ positiv strukturiert, so daß Verdinglichung ihm unangemessen bleibt? Genügt überhaupt der “Unterschied” von “Bewußtsein” und “Ding” für eine ursprüngliche Aufrollung der ontologischen Problematik?’ (Heidegger 1927, 576).

References

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