“在”过去和未来之间，这只是因为——作为成为的运动——对他们来说是本体论上的基础。
This underdetermination of the present notwithstanding, the Critique equips us with the means of constructing a concept of historicalisation that promises to enrich Marx’ s philosophy of history. In order for this concept to work, it must register the singularity of the historical (as opposed to the individual and the social) act, as well as articulate a general set of relations within and between totalisation, temporalisation and materiality, relations that each and every historical act incarnates’. 209 There are a number of ways to approach historicalisation through Sartre, but undoubtedly the most productive is through the concept of enveloping totalisation’ and its correlative praxis-process in Sartre' s second Critique. Enveloping totalisation does not represent a departure, but rather an intensive and extensive expansion -acompression and decompression’ -of totalisation in his first Critique. As Flynn puts it, what [enveloping totalisation] adds tototalisation’ tout court from volume 1 is a greater intensity and a broader scope. It is more comprehensive than isolated organic praxis in both senses of the term: it is more inclusive of the mediating relationships that render abstract organic praxis concrete and, correspondingly, it yields greater understanding of the praxis in questionit is a unifying notion (historicising praxis-process), not an atemporal concept, that subsumes our praxes as parts of a dynamic whole.' 210Commenting on Sartre’ s position that every singular totalisation is enveloping as a totalisation as well as enveloped as a singularity' 211, Flynn goes on to state that the singularity of the totalisation comes from its unique locus as the nodal point and matrix of an indefinite multiplicity of relationships’ , and its enveloping character arises from the linkage it constitutes (both in knowledge and in being) to the entirety of these relations.' 212 There are two noteworthy conclusions to take away from this. First, the primacy of individual and social (collective, group) praxis has been supplanted by that of hatfprais-procehiceduciblts ndividualand Georg Lukacs, SociapuactorsStislithénoHtoliogPiapdtiasis 9t fatotalidatidnvinntone (Cambridge and London: MIT Press, 1972), 204. The expression pernicious chasm comes from Ernst Bloch.
209 Incarnation’ does not feature as a central çategory, in Sartre’ s first Critique. It mainly designates individuation within the group, particularly its summit' (e.g. the sovereign). Incarnation is, however, crucial to the dialectical logic of his secoņd Critique. As an internal and local temporalisation' of a certain moment of the ongoing totalisation' , it encompasses every level of enveloping totalisation. It is, ‘at all levels, the retotalisation of the enveloping totalisation by every event, every praxis aņd every particular exis.' Sartre, CDR 2, 77, 256. The conceptual homology between Sartre' s incarnation' and Hegel' s concrete universal’ is clear.
210 Flynn, Sartre, Foucault, and Historical Reason, Vol. I, 157.
212 Flynn, Sartre, Foucault, and Historical Reason, Vol. I, 157. As Flynn poiņts out, this aspect of enveloping totalisation is for Sartre the law of immanence' which constitutes the synthetic interiority of the historical field.' Sartre, CDR 2, 384.
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