关于身体对世界的归属(以及现象化和本体论的互补性)
But this incessant escaping, this impotency to superpose exactly upon one another the touching of the things by my right hand and the touching of this same right hand by my left hand, or to superpose, in the exploratory movements of the hand, the tactile experience of a point and that of the “same” point a moment later, or the audi- tory experience of my own voice and that of other voices—this is not a failure. For if these experiences never exactly overlap, if they slip away at the very moment they are about to rejoin, if there is always a “shift,” a “spread” [é cart], between them, this is precisely because my two hands are part of the same body, because it moves itself in the world, because I hear myself both from within and from without. I experience—and as often as I wish—the transition and the metamor- phosis of the one experience into the other, and it is only as though the hinge between them, solid, unshakeable, remained irremediably hidden from me. But this hiatus between
在这hthand touedpnd是的ching， 遥是现象经验和感是不写的必累条件正是能释体对果的需要(也世界对身体的需器by存在对氧化或现象化的需要的根本的断裂th正因如此14字也阻止了身体获得纯粹的内在性;它使它成为一个本质上不完整的“统一”，一个永远不会完全完成的个性化过程。
雷诺·巴巴拉斯在《现象的存在》一书中阐述了这种对身体-世界耦合的理解的必要性及其在巴巴拉斯的经验中的根源。触摸和触摸之间的分离是有形世界存在的条件(对于视觉和听觉也可以说类似的东西，即那些具有双重特征的其他感官)：
触摸只有在浸入身体时才会产生;它只以这种肉体的形式出现。触摸是它自身，也就是说，它是感知的，只是在它没有意识到自己处于或作为它所到达的世界而存在的程度上。触摸的化身对应于这样一个事实，即它的对象并没有清晰地摆在它面前，而只是作为一个触觉世界的模糊存在而被给予，作为触觉世界的一个维度的呈现，这个维度本身是不可呈现的。这一点的缺失¬
Bodies in Code
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